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Abstract 	
An assumption in Cognitive Psychology, which has been challenged in recent 
years, is that the systems responsible for action and perception work independently of 
one another. These systems work together during conceptual tasks and research has 
demonstrated that action knowledge can influence performance even when the task is 
‘action-irrelevant’ (Borghi, 2004; Borghi, Flumini, Natraj & Wheaton, 2012; Creem 
& Proffitt, 2001; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001). However, participants in such tasks are 
often only asked to make simple category judgements, such as natural versus man 
made. The research reported in this thesis has shown that, under certain conditions, 
participants use action knowledge to make ‘complex’ category choices in an action-
irrelevant task. The experimental work has predominantly used the forced-choice triad 
task to assess the circumstances under which participants categorise objects based on 
shared actions. The triads were designed with a target object and two choice objects 
matching on either shared actions (rifle + water pistol), shared taxonomic relations 
(rifle + sword), or both (orange + banana). The context in which the objects were 
presented was also manipulated so that the objects were either presented on a white 
background (context-lean) or being used by an agent (context-rich). Participants were 
most likely to select the choice object that shared both a taxonomic and an action 
demonstrating that action has an ‘additive’ effect in categorical decisions. Presenting 
the objects being used by an agent in a functional scenario increased the saliency of 
the shared actions between the stimuli, and participants were more likely to select the 
action choice. The subsequent experimental work reported in the thesis sought to 
eliminate potential confounding variables including perceptual features, object 
typicality and task instructions. What the experimental work presented here has 
demonstrated is that action can influence decisions on more complex categories, and 
judgments of similarity. The research has identified three main circumstances under 
which knowledge of action becomes influential in the triad task designed for the 
purpose of this research as follows: (i) when it is presented in conjunction with 
taxonomic information, (ii) when it is presented with a context, and (iii) when 
participants are first asked to physically interact with the objects. 
	6		
Chapter 1 
The Role of Action in Cognition 
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Cognitive Psychology has traditionally taken the view that the systems 
responsible for perception and action act independently of one another. Recent 
research has shown that the two systems are not independent, but work together such 
that perception can have a direct influence on action responses (Creem & Proffitt, 
2001; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004). This has been shown 
to be the case in experiments where participants are asked to perform physical 
actions, as well as ‘action-irrelevant’ tasks in which action is not required for task 
performance (Borghi, 2004; Bub & Masson, 2006, 2010, 2012; Campanella & 
Shallice, 2011; Chao & Martin, 2000; Helbig, Graf & Keifer, 2006; Myung, 
Blumstein & Sedivy, 2006). While action has been shown to influence performance in 
a variety of cognitive tasks, the reported thesis is primarily aimed at how action 
influences categorical decisions. In categorising objects together, various sources can 
be drawn upon such as perceptual, taxonomic and thematic information. It has been 
further argued that concepts are developed around potential actions and that such 
information should represent an integral aspect of conceptual knowledge (Barsalou, 
2008, 2016b; Franks & Braisby, 1997). It has been further argued that concepts are 
embedded within the modalities in which they were originally experienced, and as 
such are ‘grounded’ (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2016a, 2016b; Martin, 2016). In the 
case of artefacts, this directly refers to concepts represented within the motor cortex. 
While research has shown that action is influential in task performance, action has not 
previously been considered as a source of information used in categorical decisions. 
The thesis reports experimental evidence using the forced-choice triad task 
demonstrating (some of) the circumstances under which action is used as a source of 
commonality in categorising objects together.  
Chapter 1 outlines the previous literature that has informed the experimental 
work of the thesis, including experimental evidence demonstrating how action 
information influences performance across a variety of cognitive tasks. In addition, 
Chapter 1 outlines the theoretical framework in which the experimental results here 
are discussed (Simulation theory, Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2016b). Chapter 2 
reports the initial experimental work using the triad task to demonstrate the 
circumstances under which action is used to categorise objects. In particular, the 
experimental work tested the relative influence of action and taxonomic information; 
the effect of context and how the results are influenced by task instructions and object 
typicality. The experimental work reported in Chapter 2 showed how action is 
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influential, and used, within an action-irrelevant task to group objects together. In 
Chapter 3, eye-tracking software was used to determine which elements within the 
context-rich images used were most influential in selecting the action related choice 
item. In Chapter 4, the triad task was amended in order to test if action influence 
could be increased through using physical actions. Chapter 5 describes the analysis of 
the stimuli used in the experimental work. This is because the experimental work 
through the previous chapters shows that the influence of action is not consistent, and 
some of the triads are more likely to lead to action-based responses than others. In 
order to assess this, protocol analysis was used to investigate the strategies employed 
by participants in the triad task. Chapter 6 outlines the close theoretical relationship 
between categorisation and similarity (Rips, 1989), and how research has shown that 
there is a dissociation between the two processes (Braisby, 2004; Rips, 1989; Smith & 
Sloman, 1994). The aim of the work reported in Chapter 6 was to see if action showed 
the same pattern of influence on the evaluation of similarity using the same stimuli 
developed in Chapter 2, re-designed in the form of a similarity judgement task. 
Chapter 7 draws the thesis to a close and discusses the results from this programme of 
work within the framework of simulation theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008).  
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1. Background Review Of Literature That Stimulated And Informed The New 
Work Reported In This Thesis.  
 
  Chapter 1 outlines the experimental and theoretical research that has informed 
the work reported in this thesis. This includes research on categorisation, embodied 
cognition, context, and the role of action in experimental cognitive psychology. The 
literature discussed here has been broken down into the following sections: 
(i). The Relationship Between Action and Perception 
(ii). Physical Action Responses 
(iii). Action-Irrelevant Tasks 
(iv). Is Action Knowledge Automatic or Task Dependent? 
(v). Neurological Findings 
(vi). Volumetric and Functional Actions 
(vii). Actions in Object Recognition 
(viii). When is Action not Activated? 
(ix). The Role of Context 
(x). Actions in Context 
(xi). Actions as Features? 
(xii). Simulation Theory 
(xiii). Evidence for Simulation Theory 
(xiv). Extensions to Simulation Theory 
(xv). The Current research 
(xvi). The Task  
 
1.1 The Relationship Between Action and Perception 
Traditional information-processing models (Massaro & Cowan, 1993; Simon, 
1979) suggest that a visual stimulus is transduced into a series of representations that 
can serve a number of psychological functions forming the basis of physical actions. 
This assumes that stimuli are interpreted by the visual system before being analysed 
separately by the motor cortex in order to execute an action. Such a view assumes that 
concept knowledge is abstracted from real-world encounters and stored as amodal 
symbols, whereby the mechanisms involved in concept representations differ to those 
used in perception and action (Hampton, 1995; Machery, 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 
2008; Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). However, this does not allow for the 
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interaction that takes place between the visual and action systems. It has been argued 
that these systems do not act independently of one another, and that this distinction 
has been greatly exaggerated by information-processing models (Ellis & Tucker, 
2000). For example, our concept of orange includes not only the typical visual 
information present (that it is orange in colour) but that it also includes the physical 
properties (that it is round, smooth to the touch and requires peeling in order to eat). 
In an early position that arguably laid the ground for more current perspectives, 
Gibson (1979) proposed that the vision and motor systems are entwined in such a way 
that all objects in the environment have affordances. These affordances are properties 
of an object that allow for potential actions to be made. A flat, sturdy surface could 
afford support and could even be walked upon affording locomotion. In contrast, a 
water surface would not afford either. Gibson posits that objects are perceived in 
terms of their potential affordances and how we interact with them rather than their 
properties. Potential actions, and the affordances offered by an object, are derived 
upon perceiving an object, before functional properties. Such a view might suggest 
that the human brain shows a predisposition for action over function. Gibson argued 
that the affordances of objects show a great deal of variation between different items 
and are manufactured in order to be manipulated such as lifting, carrying and 
grasping. This is partly because objects themselves vary on many dimensions such as 
size, shape, texture and weight. For example, a small ball would allow for a person to 
pick it up with one hand where a larger ball would not and would need to be picked 
up with both hands. Such affordances are directly perceived and can be established 
from the visual system without the need for abstract processing (Greeno, 1994).  
However, not all affordances are derived from the perceptual system. For 
example, fire can afford heat, which can be derived from the senses but is not a 
visually perceivable property. Objects that have a handle afford the action of being 
grasped by the handle. The context in which someone views an object can also 
influence the affordances derived from such. For example, if someone saw a frying 
pan with the handle pointing towards them they might be inclined to pick it up by 
grasping the handle in a use-appropriate manner in which case the grasp could lead to 
a potential action. In contrast, if someone saw the frying pan with the handle pointing 
away from they might be more inclined to grasp it by the pan rather than reach over 
and grasp it by the handle (see Creem & Proffitt, 2001).  
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In summary, the theory of affordances provides a way of combining both the 
visual and motor system in a dynamic manner allowing for the interaction between 
the two systems. Gibson distinguished between affordances and categorisation in that 
an object does not need to be categorised in order for affordances to be derived. A 
small, round object does not need to be categorised in order for it to be judged as 
‘graspable’. This supports the view that the visual and action systems work in tandem 
rather than separately. 
 
1.2 Physical Action Responses 
In line with the views of Gibson (1979), further research has also concurred 
that the distinction between the visual and motor/action system has been overstated 
and that the two systems have more of a reciprocal role (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; 
Grèzes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis & Passingham, 2003; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 
2004). Ellis and Tucker (2000) argued that as well as objects having affordances, they 
also contain micro-affordances. The difference between the two lies in the specificity 
of the action that the visual object can facilitate. For example, a mug with a handle 
can facilitate the action of grasping and picking up (affordance). A micro-affordance 
would be the mug facilitating a specific type of grasp. For example if the handle of 
the mug were pointing to the right it would facilitate a right-handed grasp and vice-
versa. As Ellis and Tucker (2000) put it, “features of the object such as its location, 
shape and orientation will lead to activation of specific components of a reaching and 
grasping action” (p. 453). As objects can afford a wide range of possible actions both 
functional and volumetric (Bub & Masson, 2006; Bub, Masson & Cree, 2008), it 
follows that objects possess a variety of micro-affordances to suit such situations.  
Tucker and Ellis (1998) showed that objects have micro-affordances through 
experiments demonstrating Stimulus Response Compatibility (SRC) effects on how 
grasp actions are made. Such effects are similar to the Simon effect (Simon & Ruddel, 
1967), which describes the way in which the spatial position of a target stimulus 
significantly slows down response times when the response apparatus is not within 
the same (compatible) spatial position. What is particularly significant about such 
effects is that they are found even when spatial position is irrelevant to the task.  
In Experiment 1 of Tucker and Ellis (1998), participants were shown images 
of household objects such as a knife, teapot and a frying pan in either an upright or 
inverted position and participants were asked to respond to the orientation of the 
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object (left-hand inverted/right-hand upright or vice versa). The experimenters 
manipulated the direction of the handle in each image so that the handle either pointed 
to the left or to the right. The results showed a significant interaction between handle 
direction and response hand. When the handle of the objects pointed to the right 
participants were faster and more accurate to respond with the right hand; conversely, 
when the handle pointed to the left participants were faster to respond with the left 
hand over the right. This would show that the orientation of the object was able to 
potentiate possible actions and hence participants were faster to respond with the 
stimulus compatible hand.  
Tucker and Ellis (1998) suggested that one possibility when considering these 
results was that rather than the orientation of the stimuli potentiating a grasp response 
to the compatible hand, participants were rather assigning an abstract left-right coding 
to the object based on its orientation. As such, they would be attuning to the location 
of the object rather than the potential action that could be carried out. Therefore, 
responses were faster with the right hand when the object was orientated to the right 
because it had simply been coded ‘right’ by the participant (and vice versa for the left 
hand/left orientation).  
In order to test this, Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the procedure with a 
different response mode. To do this, the same experiment was repeated but 
participants responded only with the index and middle finger of the right hand. If 
abstract coding of left and right were responsible for the compatibility effect seen in 
Experiment 1, then the same compatibility effects would be replicated. If, however, 
seeing the orientation of the objects does potentiate possible actions then using only 
one hand to respond should fail to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. The results 
of only using one hand failed to replicate the response compatibility effect suggesting 
that the previous effects found were due to the specific potential actions (micro-
affordances) activated and not due to the location of the items.  
Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment 1 but presented objects whose use 
demanded that a person rotates their wrist to a vertical or horizontal orientation, 
turning the wrist either clockwise or anti-clockwise. The SRC effects found in 
Experiment 1 were not replicated in Experiment 3. Tucker and Ellis suggest that this 
might be due to one of two reasons; (a) as wrist movements take longer to make 
compared to button presses used in Experiments 1 and 2, it might be the case that any 
potentiation effects may have decayed before response onset, or (b) the planning of 
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wrist movements is not made prior to the action being made, but is made “online” 
while the action is being performed. The former explanation is less likely given 
research which shows that action effects are relatively long lasting across 
experimental techniques (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; 
Campanella & Shallice, 2011; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). Overall, the authors argue that 
the data demonstrate the link between action and cognition, i.e. that the visual system 
does not process information separately from the motor system but that the two 
systems interact in a dynamic manner. Viewing specific object stimuli had the effect 
of potentiating specific action and an object with the handle on the right/left side lead 
to faster and more accurate responses with the right hand/left hand respectively.  
What is most interesting about the SRC effects found in Tucker and Ellis 
(1998) is that the potentiation of possible actions were brought about despite the 
action not being relevant for the task. This would imply that actions are automatically 
potentiated from visual information and would be in line with the account of 
affordances suggested by Gibson (1979)1.  
Tucker and Ellis (2001) have shown further compatibility effects when the 
actions are mimicked as the task response. Experiment 1 of Tucker and Ellis (2001) 
followed a similar task paradigm to that of Tucker and Ellis (1998) but, rather than 
participants responding to the orientation of the object, participants judged whether 
the object was natural or man-made. The experiment used a variety of natural and 
man-made stimuli which were further sub-divided into small objects that would 
normally be picked up with a precision grip (a pinch between the index finger and 
thumb) or a large object picked up with a power grasp (clasping of the whole palm 
and fingers).  
Participants were provided with a response device consisting of two buttons, 
one between the index finger and thumb and the other along the side of the object 
operated with a clenched fist (see Fig 1.1). These buttons resembled the general pinch 
and power grasps and would be operated in one hand with both buttons accessible. 
The response pattern itself was counterbalanced between participants with half 
making the precision grip to the natural objects and the power grip to the man-made 
objects and vice versa. In addition, the authors sought to test if object distance had 
																																																								
1 The suggestion that action is automatically recruited has been debated in recent literature and is 
discussed in more detail in Section 1.4.  
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any effect on the compatibility effects. The objects were either presented close to the 
participants (15cm – peri-personal) or further away (200cm – extra-personal) and the 
authors predicted that an enhanced compatibility effect would be found in the close 
condition. A correct response was made if the participants correctly identified the 
objects as either natural or man-made.  
The results demonstrated strong evidence for compatibility effects with larger 
objects responded to faster with power grips and smaller objects responded to faster 
with precision grips. These effects were found despite object size being irrelevant to 
the task at hand. Interestingly, no difference in response times was found between the 
peri-personal and extra-personal space manipulation. These results further 
demonstrate that viewing objects automatically potentiates possible actions leading to 
faster response times when the response function was compatible with the general 
grip associated with use of the object.  
The remaining experiments (Experiments 2 to 5) used a slightly different task 
of a go-no go paradigm where participants were trained to respond to tones rather 
than the images using the same response apparatus as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 
2 participants were trained to prepare the index finger/thumb response if they heard a 
high pitched tone, or to prepare the squeeze on the cylinder if they heard a low 
pitched tone. After the tone they saw an image of an object and were told to make the 
prepared response only if the object they saw was natural. The results showed no 
compatibility effects, suggesting that the action compatibility effect generated from 
seeing the object was blocked by the previous action planning.  
Using this go-no go paradigm the compatibility effect was only seen when the 
object denoting a go or no go response was presented 300ms before onset of the tone 
(Experiment 3) and when the object disappeared immediately before onset of the tone 
(Experiment 4a). The effect was not found when the object disappeared 300ms before 
onset of the tone (Experiment 4b). Finally, Experiment 5 was the same as Experiment 
1 only participants used both hands to make a response with mapping 
counterbalanced between the left and right hand making precision and power grasps. 
The results once again showed a significant compatibility effect with potential actions 
not limited to the dominant hand of response.  
Overall, the results of the experimental work showed that actions relevant to 
the use of objects can be potentiated from visual information despite the object 
properties in question being task-irrelevant. What the data further shows (using the 
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terminology of Tucker & Ellis, 2001) is that the potentiation effect is transient. 
Looking at the difference between Experiments 4a and 4b it can be seen that 
introducing a delay negated the potentiation effect with no significant interaction 
found. Tucker and Ellis suggest that the mechanisms of the dorsal stream that 
represent the visual stimuli are not static, but are continually refreshed. If the prime 
were kept in continual view, then the dorsal stream would remain refreshed and the 
potentiation effect would remain consistent. In contrast, when the prime is removed 
the dorsal stream cannot refresh the same information and as such any potentiation 
effect would decay. Where the presented object is removed from view immediately 
before the onset of the tone (Experiment 4a) the dorsal stream is still influenced by 
the stimuli and hence the potentiation effects are still seen. In such a view, the 
potentiation effect only occurs while the stimulus is kept in constant view. However, 
this is in contrast to other research suggesting that action effects can be relatively long 
lasting (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; Campanella & 
Shallice, 2011; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). Similar effects were found in Experiment 1 of 
Ellis and Tucker (2000) where participants responded with a power or precision grip 
to a low or high-pitched tone. However, the compatibility effects here were confined 
to the high-pitched/precision grip mapping response.  
Grèzes et al. (2003) have since sought to identify the brain areas activated 
whilst conducting such behavioural experiments. Their experiment followed the same 
basic paradigm of Experiment 1 of Tucker and Ellis (2001) where participants 
responded with a power or a precision grip if an object was natural or man-made. 
Participants made these choices with two manipulanda, one of a precision and one of 
a power grasp (similar to that used in Tucker & Ellis, 2001, and seen in Figure 1.1). 
The experiment was a replication of Tucker and Ellis (2001), except MRI scans were 
taken while participants engaged in the task.  
The experiment found that participants were significantly faster to make 
precision grips to those objects normally picked up with a precision grip than they 
were to make power grips to the same objects. However, no difference was found 
between the time it took participants to make power grips over precision grips to 
objects normally picked up with a power grip. The MRI scans found a high level of 
activation in the parietal, premotor and inferior cortex. In particular, it was found that 
the greater the difference between the reaction times of the congruent and incongruent 
trials, the greater the activity that was found in such areas. The authors explain this as 
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a competition effect that occurs between the affordances potentiated from seeing the 
objects and the response to be generated. During congruent trials there is little 
competition effect and the activation of the prefrontal cortex is small. However, when 
the affordances and the response to be made differ the, competition effect is greater 
leading to higher activation in the prefrontal cortex and longer response times. Grèzes 
et al. (2003) take this as further evidence for the activation of affordances and the 
automatic nature of potentiated actions.  
	
Figure 1.1. Response device used in Tucker and Ellis (2001) consisting of a grasp and a pinch 
button. 
1.3 Action-Irrelevant Tasks 
It seems then that participants are influenced by instantiated action knowledge 
in tasks where they are required to make action-based responses, i.e. in ‘action 
required’ tasks (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004). Further 
research for the intrinsic activation of action knowledge has shown that even in tasks 
where participants are not required to access action-based semantic information 
(‘action-irrelevant’ tasks) such knowledge still has a strong influence on task 
performance and is activated ‘automatically’.  
Myung et al. (2006) demonstrated this using a lexical decision task 
(Experiment 1) and a speech-to-picture matching task (Experiment 2). While the 
definition of action does vary across research (Tucker and Ellis, 1998, 2001, define 
action as the precision or power grip used to pick up the item), Myung et al. (2006) 
take the view that objects share an action based on hand positions and body 
movements for the intention of using the objects for their functional purpose. For 
	17		
example, piano and typewriter share an action because of the finger movements 
required to play the keys or type. In the lexical decision task, participants were aurally 
played word-word and word-nonword pairs where the relation between the target and 
prime was manipulated for the congruency of action. For example, the target of 
typewriter followed the prime of either piano (action related) or blanket (non-related). 
Participants were faster to correctly identify the target as a word when the prime 
shared an action compared to the unrelated prime.  
This was followed-up in their second experiment using a speech-to-picture 
matching task where the results were recorded using eye-tracking software. Four 
objects were shown on a screen consisting of the target, two un-related objects and an 
object that was either related to the target by action, as in Experiment 1, or shared 
perceptual characteristics (i.e., they looked similar). Participants listened to the name 
of the target played aurally and were instructed to touch the correct matching object 
on the screen in front of them. Participants spent more time looking at, and were more 
distracted by, the object that shared an action with the target compared to the object 
that looked similar. These results show that activation of action knowledge is implicit 
in such a task, and particularly important given that this is an action-irrelevant task in 
which no physical action is required to respond. 
Borghi (2004) has provided further evidence that action knowledge influences 
task performance in action-irrelevant tasks. Borghi showed that during property 
generation tasks, participants were more likely to generate properties of objects 
directly related to action when they were thought of in the context of direct physical 
interaction. In other words, thinking of using an object brings to mind directly the 
object parts that afford actions. Borghi (Experiment 1, 2004) gave participants, in a 
between-subjects design, a series of objects and asked if they could imagine either 
using/acting, building or seeing the objects. On seven critical objects participants 
were then given a property generation task and asked to list relevant parts of the 
objects. The protocols were analysed according to the context in which participants 
were asked to think of the objects and it was found that properties relevant to physical 
interaction were produced earlier when participants were asked to think about using 
the objects compared to building or seeing.  
In Experiment 2 the imagery decision task was removed and a neutral 
condition was introduced whereby participants were simply asked to perform the 
property generation task. No differences were found between the neutral and the 
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action/use condition where participants still gave action-based properties earlier and 
with more frequency. The lowest action-based properties were generated in the 
building and seeing condition. This might indicate that within a general context, 
concepts are intricately linked to actions given that no difference was found between 
the action and neutral condition. Borghi further demonstrated the “irrelevant” 
influence of action in Experiments 3-5 where a property verification task was used. 
Participants were given a sentence followed by an object part that was either affording 
“the child divided the orange – slice” or was not affording “the child divided the 
orange – pulp”. Across the experiments participants were faster, and produced fewer 
errors, on artefacts when the object part afforded the action in the sentence. Therefore, 
the results support the notion that concepts are intricately linked with physical actions 
and such information is ‘automatically’ evoked.  
Campanella and Shallice (2011) have shown further evidence that action is 
automatically activated in action-irrelevant tasks, and that such effects are long 
lasting. In their first experiment, Campanella and Shallice employed a word-to-picture 
matching task where participants were shown a word (denoting an object) followed 
by two object images and they had to identify if an object matching the word was 
seen on the left or the right and to answer as quickly as possible. The distractor item 
was manipulated in how it was related to the target item such that it either shared no 
relation (pincers + candle), a visual relation (pincers + compass) or an action relation 
such that the pairs were manipulated in the same manner (pincers + nutcracker). 
Participants showed a very high level of accuracy when the distractor shared no 
relation to the target. Most interestingly, accuracy significantly decreased with a 
visual distractor, and decreased even more so with a manipulability distractor.  
In Experiment 2, Campanella and Shallice not only replicated the effects of 
Experiment 1, showing that a manipulability distractor impacts on performance, but 
also showed that such distractors continue to have a detrimental effect on 
performance. Participants repeated the same task as in Experiment 1, only this time 
images were repeated so that participants saw each pair three times. The results 
showed that, as expected, a learning effect was seen on the visual distractor pairs such 
that after three presentations accuracy had significantly improved from the initial 
presentation. However, the opposite was shown for the manipulability distractor pairs 
in that a negative serial position effect was seen. After three presentations the 
accuracy had significantly decreased compared to the initial presentation.  
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These results could be explained by the activation of the motor system. When 
reading the target word, the motor system becomes active (following a simulation of 
the object2) and distractor pairs that share the same action (and therefore the same 
motor pattern) cause interference in selecting the correct item as they also activate the 
motor system at the same time. Over repeated exposure, this motor simulation 
becomes strengthened resulting in a long-term use-on-grasp effect (Jax & Buxbaum, 
2010), causing stronger interference effects and hence a negative serial position effect 
occurs. This effect does not occur on the visual distractor pairs as no action 
knowledge is activated to cause an interference effect. However, what complicates the 
results here and this interpretation is that items that share an action will invariably 
share visual characteristics due to ergonomic constraints and how they are designed to 
work with the human body. Therefore, it is possible that the manipulability distractors 
had a stronger interference effect than the visual pairs because of sharing multiple 
sources of commonality rather than only sharing a single source of communality. The 
issue of ergonomics in selecting items that share actions is problematic for research in 
this area, and will be further explored in Chapter 2).   
 
1.4 Is Action Knowledge Automatic or Task Dependent? 
Claims concerning the automaticity of potentiated actions when viewing 
objects, such as those of Tucker and Ellis (1998, 2001, 2004), Ellis and Tucker (2000) 
and Myung et al. (2006), have since been moderated by further research showing 
potentiated actions to be task dependent (Bub & Masson, 2006; Bub, Masson & 
Bukach, 2003; Bub et al., 2008). Bub and Masson (and colleagues) have shown 
differences in passive viewing of objects and how this is insufficient in activating 
gestural knowledge (the gesture used in interacting with an object). Bub et al. (2003) 
designed an experimental task based on the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935). In their 
task, participants were trained to associate a specific gesture (pinch, poke, closed 
grasp, open grasp) with a colour. After the training phase, participants were shown a 
series of coloured objects functionally operated with either a pinch, poke, open or 
closed grasp and instructed to mimic the gesture to the colour that they had previously 
learnt. In congruent trials the gesture associated with the colour matched the 
functional gesture of the object. In incongruent trials, the gesture associated with the 																																																								
2 According to simulation theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2003).  
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colour was different to the functional gesture of the object. The premise behind this is 
that if gesture knowledge is automatically recruited by looking at an object, then 
participants should be faster to respond on the congruent trials. The activation of the 
gesture on incongruent trials should cause an interference effect and hence increase 
response latencies.  
In Experiment 1, participants were shown these congruent and incongruent 
trials along with coloured squares containing no object and asked to mimic the 
associated gesture previously learnt. Whilst response latencies were quickest overall 
on the coloured squares containing no object, there was no significant difference 
between the congruent and incongruent object trials. This was taken to show that 
simple passive viewing of objects does not recruit gesture knowledge associated with 
the functional use of it (an effect replicated in other experimental work, Bub & 
Masson, 2006, Experiment 1). The second experiment further examined this to see if 
a congruency effect could be found if participants had increased attention levels to the 
stimuli used in a task-switching paradigm.  
In Experiment 2 a cue presented at the beginning of each trial indicated to 
participants whether to gesture to the colour (using the same training phase as in 
Experiment 1) or gesture to the object. The gesture to the object was to mimic the 
gesture normally associated with using it. Here the results showed a significant 
congruency effect in both the gesture to colour and object tasks. In both cases the 
response latencies on incongruent trials was significantly longer than on the congruent 
trials showing a direct interference from the activation of gestural knowledge of the 
object. It is not clear, however, if under any conditions participants made incorrect 
gestures (incompatible with the functional use) when they were asked to gesture to the 
objects rather than the colour. Therefore, the interference effect found on the gesture-
to-object task is possibly caused not by the potential instantiation of the action to be 
made, but by errors in memory of what the colour represented in the training phase.  
Experiment 3 examined whether or not gestural knowledge could be recruited 
in tasks where a physical action is not required. This is more closely linked to the 
work within the current thesis where an action-irrelevant task is used. Experiment 3 
followed the same design as Experiment 2, but participants were either instructed to 
gesture to the colour (as in the previous experiments) or name the object. A 
significant congruency benefit was seen when participants gestured to the colour of 
the object, but no differences were found between the congruent and incongruent 
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trials when participants were instructed to name the object. These results demonstrate 
that functional knowledge, particularly the action involved in physical interaction 
with the object, is recruited in tasks where a physical action is required but not when 
naming the objects or in passive viewing.  
Bub and Masson (2006) followed up this line of research using a similar 
paradigm as Bub et al. (2003) to further investigate how gestural knowledge is 
automatically recruited in such tasks. In Experiments 1-3 participants were presented 
with an object prime, followed by an image of a hand gesture in which participants 
were asked to mimic the gesture shown. This followed the same design as the 
previous work whereby congruent trials were those in which the hand gesture shown 
matched that of the functional use of the object whereas these were different in the 
incongruent trials. Experiment 1 (where participants passively viewed the objects) 
showed no congruency effect between the congruent and incongruent trials (as found 
in Experiment 1 of Bub et al., 2003). However, in Experiment 2 participants were 
instructed to focus on the objects in more detail by running the same experiment, but 
asking participants to name the object shown in the prime at the end after mimicking 
the gesture. Using this paradigm participants showed an advantage with faster 
response latencies on the congruent than incongruent trials. It is possible in 
Experiment 1 that the task was not salient enough to activate semantic knowledge of 
the object, and that such action interference effects are only found when semantic 
knowledge is required for the task (as in Experiment 2, but in contrast to the previous 
research stated above showing action to be automatically instantiated, Borghi, 2004; 
Campanella & Shallice, 2011; Myung et al., 2006).  
Experiment 3 increased the congruency advantage by presenting the prime and 
the gesture object simultaneously. In Experiments 4-6 the authors used the same 
Stroop-variant used in Bub et al. (2003) examining the differences in how different 
types of actions are evoked. The authors focused specifically on what they term 
functional and volumetric actions. Volumetric actions refer to any action involved 
with manipulating or moving an object, but are not the actions to interact with an 
object for its functional purpose. For example, the functional action of a calculator 
would be a ‘poke’ action of pushing the buttons where a volumetric action might be 
the ‘grasp’ of picking it up to carry it. All objects have both functional and volumetric 
actions with the potential that volumetric actions are numerous in comparison to 
functional actions. It should be noted here that there are some objects for which the 
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functional and the volumetric actions can be the same (e.g. a drinking glass) and are 
termed as non-conflict objects in comparison to conflict objects (e.g. a calculator) and 
differences between such will be addressed in Section 1.6 (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; 
Osuirak, Roche, Ramone & Chainay, 2013).  
Bub and Masson (2006) gave participants a training phase to associate specific 
colours with both functional and volumetric gestures. In the same manner as 
previously, participants in the test phase were shown the objects in varying colours 
and asked to make the gesture associated to the colour in the training phase. Across 
Experiment’s 4 and 5 (varying the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials) it 
was shown that participants were slower to make the gestures in the incongruent trails 
than the congruent trials. This effect was found for both the functional and the 
volumetric actions. This would suggest that both forms of actions are conceptually 
stored and can be primed to have an interference effect. What is particularly important 
here is that increasing attention to the objects (rather than passive viewing) evokes 
action knowledge associated with both the functional use of the objects as well as 
knowledge of general interaction with the same objects. 
 
1.5 Neurological Findings 
The notion that action information is incorporated into conceptual knowledge 
is supported not only by behavioural research but also by neurological research. 
Research has shown that areas of the brain related to action execution, namely areas 
of the premotor cortex, become active in both action-required and action-irrelevant 
tasks (Aziz-Zadeh & Damasio, 2008; Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti & Iacoboni, 
2006; Canessa et al., 2008; Chao & Martin, 2000; Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 
2004; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Martin, 2007, 2016; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, 
Wiggs & Ungerleider, 1995; Tettamanti et al., 2005). The evidence supporting the 
claim that such effects are specific to the concept evoked and not just a general 
response to the task is that such areas only become active for specific concepts.  
Chao and Martin (2000) conducted an fMRI study in which brain scans were 
taken while participants looked at images of faces, buildings, animals and tools. What 
was found was that the areas linked to action and the premotor cortex became active 
only when the participants viewed the images of the tools which carry a distinct level 
of interactive information such as hammer and spanner where buildings, animals and 
faces do not. Tettamanti et al. (2005) also showed that when participants listened to 
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sentences containing actions involving the mouth, hands and feet, such as “I bite an 
apple” and “I kick the ball”, there was activation of the fronto-parieto-temporal 
network in the left hemisphere. This was in direct contrast to participants listening to 
abstract sentences where no activation of the premotor cortex was seen.  
Canessa et al. (2008) further showed differences in brain activation based on 
both action and functional knowledge. Participants were presented with pairs of 
objects and asked whether or not they shared the same manipulation pattern, or the 
same context of use. The results showed that while areas of the brain were activated 
simultaneously, activation of the left fronto-parietal areas including the dorsal 
premotor cortex were significantly stronger when participants were asked to identify 
which of the two objects shared the same manipulation pattern. Overall, the research 
here shows that areas of the brain devoted to planning and executions of actions are 
evoked even in passive tasks and that such information is incorporated into concept 
knowledge (Aziz-Zadeh & Damasio, 2008; Caramazza & Mahon, 2006; Grèzes & 
Decety, 2001; Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs, Damasio & Damasio, 2003). It should be 
noted that the programme of work reported in this thesis is not based within 
neurological research. However, such supporting findings from that perspective will 
be alluded to throughout the thesis. 
 
1.6 Volumetric and Functional Actions 
Bub et al. (2008) further tested the notion of differences in functional and 
volumetric actions through physical actions rather than pantomimed gestures (as used 
in their previous work – see section 1.4). Subsequent research has shown that 
participants perform differently in task conditions when required to perform physical 
actions on objects (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; Osuirak et al., 2013). Bub et al. designed a 
response element known as the ‘graspasaurus’ (see Fig 1.2). This consisted of a three-
dimensional, curved base with four response elements to allow participants to make a 
grasp, pinch or poke response (two grasp elements with a horizontal cylinder to allow 
a grasp and a vertical cylinder with a ‘trigger’ to resemble a spray bottle). Two 
graspasaurus were designed to allow for four functional and four volumetric actions 
(one for each gesture type).  
Experiment 1 of Bub et al. (2008) used the same Stroop-variant task of Bub et 
al. (2003) and Bub and Masson (2006). Participants were trained to associate a 
specific colour to a gesture/response element and then saw objects in varying colours 
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and were instructed to make the physical gesture on the correct element of the 
graspasaurus to the colour of the object. The results showed the same effect as in the 
previous work, i.e. that response latencies on congruent trials, where the appropriate 
gesture matched that of the object’s natural functional gesture, were significantly 
shorter than on incongruent trials. In order to remove the possibility that participants 
would naturally gravitate towards the correct element on the congruent trials because 
of shared perceptual features (the response element looks like the object in the test 
trial), Experiment 2 repeated the procedure but instructed participants to simply point 
to the correct element rather than make the gesture. If perceptual information was 
playing a strong role here in the congruency effect then pointing at the correct 
response element should replicate the same patterns as in Experiment 1. However, 
this was not the case and no significant congruency effect was found demonstrating 
that gestural knowledge was evoked in Experiment 1 and that this interfered with the 
response to be made on incongruent trials. This would suggest that the effect found in 
Experiment 1 was not due to the perceptual characteristics of the object, but to the 
actions being potentiated upon viewing the target object.  
The third and fourth experiments tested differences in using words (object 
names) as opposed to images to see if words alone can evoke gestural knowledge. 
Experiment 3 followed the same design as the previous (replacing the target objects 
with words) and participants again responded to the colour by making the associated 
gesture on the graspasaurus. Under these conditions, a significant congruency effect 
was not found demonstrating that passive viewing of words is ineffective in evoking 
gestural knowledge. However, in Experiment 4 a lexical decision task was added 
where participants first responded to the colour using the graspasaurus and then 
identified if the word was real or a non-word. Nonsense letter strings were added for 
this task but not analysed. This increase in attentional resources led to a significant 
congruency effect with shorter response latencies on the congruent than incongruent 
trials in both the functional and volumetric gestures. Therefore, passive viewing of 
words does not evoke gestural knowledge, however, when participants are forced to 
attend to the meaning of the words (as in the lexical decision task) gestural knowledge 
is recruited despite not being necessary for the task and this impacts on task 
performance.  
What should be noted here is that in both Experiments 1 and 4, where 
significant congruency effects were found, there was no significant main effect of 
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gesture type where subsequent research has found differences in how functional and 
volumetric information is recruited (Bub & Masson, 2010, 2012). Experiment 5 tested 
differences in functional and volumetric priming by using a combination of the lexical 
decision and gesture task to establish whether activation of functional and volumetric 
activation reflects a general ‘action component’ or if each can be recruited without the 
other. In this task, participants were shown a word (object, abstract or non-word) 
followed by a hand cue denoting either a functional or a volumetric gesture to mimic 
on the graspasaurus. After the response was made the participants verbally responded 
to the lexical decision task by stating yes or no. The gesture to be made matched that 
of the object in the word prime in the congruent trials whereas in incongruent trials 
these differed. Unlike the previous experiments, there was a trend for shorter response 
latencies in making functional over volumetric gestures and a significant interaction 
effect was found. Participants were significantly faster to make the gesture when it 
was functionally related to the object, but not when it was volumetrically related.  
This has two important implications here. First, the finding that functional 
information can be recruited without volumetric information shows that the two are 
stored separately and do not share neural topography. This therefore suggests that 
activation of action knowledge is not a result of an overall ‘action’ component. 
Second, the rapid recruitment of functional information shows that functional 
information “holds a privileged place in the conceptual representations of objects” 
(Bub et al., 2008, p. 49) over volumetric information. This is supported by research 
demonstrating that functional information plays a central role in how objects are 
conceptualised (Barsalou, Sloman & Chaigneau, 2005; Barton & Komatsu, 1989; 
Chaigneau & Barsalou, 2008; Chaigneau, Barsalou & Sloman, 2004; Keil, 1989; 
Kemler-Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000; Masson, Bub & Newton-Taylor, 
2008; Rips, 1989; for an opposing viewpoint see Malt & Johnson, 1992).  
Masson, Bub and Warren (2008) supported these findings when participants 
were asked to read sentences containing an object, with no reference to a manual 
interaction, before seeing a hand gesture to respond to on the graspasaurus. A 
significant priming effect was seen on making functional hand gestures at both short 
(300ms) and long (750ms) priming intervals showing that functional information is 
quickly recruited in such tasks. However, no priming effect was seen for making 
volumetric gestures (though a borderline significant trend indicated a priming effect 
only at the long priming interval).  
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Figure 1.2. The response elements (Graspasaurus) used in Bub et al. (2008) for the functional 
gestures (A) and the volumetric gestures (B). 	
Bub and Masson (2012) have also supported differences between functional 
and volumetric actions in a primed response-to-gesture task. They designed an 
experiment where participants sat in front of the graspasaurus with three functional 
and three volumetric elements to grasp. Participants were shown a target cue on-
screen depicting either a functional or a volumetric grasp and had to respond to the 
correct element. The onset of the cue was manipulated in conjunction with the name 
of an object played to the participant through headphones. The object itself was either 
congruent or incongruent to the cued hand gesture in terms of the associated action. 
The cue appeared on-screen either 150ms prior to onset of the word, at onset of the 
word, in the middle of the word or at the end. Reaction times for making functional 
and volumetric gestures were recorded for each level of the cue presentation. No 
effects were found for either grasp type when the cue was presented 150ms before 
onset of the word. However, strong priming effects were found for the functional 
grasps at onset, middle and end of the word where participants were faster for 
congruent than incongruent hand gestures to the object. As the onset of the cue 
increased in strength in relation to onset of the word, the priming advantage of 
congruent over incongruent trials also increased. This therefore shows that activation 
of functional knowledge of an object is relatively fast and has a strong effect which is 
maintained across the duration of the spoken word3.  																																																								
3 However, what was not tested for here and remains unsure is the length of time for which this priming 
effect still exists after the word has been spoken. 	
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In contrast to the functional grasps, the priming pattern of volumetric grasps is 
very different and not as consistent as that of the functional. For the volumetric 
grasps, no priming advantage for congruent over incongruent trials was seen for the 
cue 150ms before onset of the word nor at the point in which the cue appeared at the 
end of the word. At the onset of the word it appeared that the incongruent trials had a 
small but significant advantage over the congruent trials, which had a longer reaction 
time. This pattern was reversed when the cue appeared during the middle of the 
spoken word with the congruent trials having a shorter reaction time than incongruent 
(found in Experiment 1 and replicated in Experiment 2). This suggests that volumetric 
grasps are slower to activate, but quicker to dissipate. What is interesting here is that 
the prime initially resulted in a negative priming effect before quickly changing into a 
positive priming effect. Bub and Masson suggest that this is the result of the slow 
activation of volumetric information that begins relatively weak and develops in 
strength over time, in this case during the pronunciation of the spoken word. At the 
early stages the strength is weak and when a conflict occurs in an incongruent trial 
(between the action of the word and the action to generate) there is little competition 
in the cued action and evoked information. This results in the initial negative priming 
effect seen when the cue is presented at the onset of the spoken word. As the strength 
of the evoked volumetric information increases over time the competition effect also 
increases on the incongruent trials to the point where it slows down participant’s 
reaction time. The result is a significantly longer reaction time on the incongruent 
than congruent trials. This information however quickly dissipates and there is no 
priming effect seen when the cue is presented at the end of the spoken word.  
The overall pattern in the volumetric grasps was reversed in Experiment 3 
where a verb was added to the spoken word. For example, participants heard “Lift up 
the pencil”. The cue was presented either at the onset, middle, or end of the object in 
the sentence and a significant positive priming effect was seen at all three presentation 
intervals. Participants were consistently quicker on the congruent trials than they were 
on the incongruent trials. Overall, the results here show that both functional and 
volumetric information are evoked in cognitive tasks, but not at the same rate of 
instantiation. Functional information is stronger and more important as it is evoked 
quickly and is long lasting. In comparison, volumetric information is generated slowly 
and is quick to dissipate afterwards. However, the addition of a verb denoting the 
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action can strengthen the volumetric information to have a consistently positive 
priming effect.  
While it has been shown that functional information is stronger, research has 
also shown that interacting with an object in order to use it for its functional purpose 
impacts on later volumetric actions for grasping (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010, 2013). 
However, the reverse is not true and volumetric actions do not impact on functional 
actions. Jax and Buxbaum (2010) designed an experiment in which participants were 
presented with both conflict and non-conflict items and instructed to put their hand on 
the object as though they would either use the object (use action), or pick it up to pass 
to the experimenter (grasp action). The task order was manipulated and included into 
the analyses as a factor as either grasp-then-use or use-then-grasp conditions. 
Analysis of participants’ initiation times to make use actions were significantly slower 
than to make grasp actions. Initiation times were also significantly slower for the 
conflict items than for the non-conflict items.  
This is theoretically in line with the previous research as the conflict items 
would instantiate multiple motor patterns for actions which should slow down 
performance, whereas the non-conflict items would instantiate only a single motor 
pattern for both using and grasping an object. Therefore, the conflict items should be 
slower to act upon given the competition between those motor patterns activated. The 
latter finding has been supported by Jax and Buxbaum (2013) where using the same 
experimental technique two patients with ideomotor apraxia showed the same 
response pattern to the conflict and non-conflict items, which was more markedly 
pronounced compared to control subjects. In addition to these findings, Jax and 
Buxbaum (2010) also found a significant three-way interaction between task, object 
and order. When participants were asked to put their hand on the objects to use them 
they were significantly slower to do so for the conflict objects than the non-conflict. 
This pattern did not differ depending on which of the tasks was performed first, either 
use-then-grasp or grasp-then-use. When participants were asked to put their hand on 
the object to grasp and pass them there was no difference between the objects when 
they were asked to perform the grasp task first. However, when they were asked to 
perform the use task first, they were then significantly slower to put their hands on the 
conflict objects than the non-conflict in the grasp phase.  
This shows that understanding of the use of the objects and instantiating such 
knowledge interfered with the grasp task when such knowledge is irrelevant for the 
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task. The authors define this as a ‘long-term use-on-grasp interference’ effect. This 
interference was found to exist at both the early and later stages of the grasp task and 
lasted for approximately 20 minutes (as was the length the experiment took to 
complete). The authors explain this as being part of the “race effect” (Jax & 
Buxbaum, 2010, p.354) between functional and structural information. Functional 
information is much stronger than structural (referred to as volumetric by Bub and 
Masson, 2010, 2012; Bub et al., 2008), but requires activation of semantic knowledge 
to do so, i.e. you must know how to use it in order to do so. Whereas structural 
knowledge does not require such and is quicker to instantiate and hence “wins the 
race”.  
However, such results are in contrast to that found by Bub and Masson (2012) 
who showed that volumetric/structural actions are slower to evoke than functional 
actions. This difference could be explained by the fact that in Bub and Masson’s work 
the participants had to make a physical response on the graspasaurus whereas in Jax 
and Buxbaum’s research participants did not have to physically pick up the objects or 
use them.  
Osiurak et al. (2013) conducted two experiments designed to replicate the 
work of Jax and Buxbaum (2010) using only non-conflict items. Experiment 1 was a 
direct replication of Jax and Buxbaum (not including the conflict items) where as, in 
Experiment 2 participants were physically asked to pick up the object and pass it over 
to the experimenter or to pick up the object and use it to hit a ping pong ball hanging 
in front of them on a string. The purpose of this was to directly compare the 
differences between the intention to use and object compared to physically doing so. 
Experiment 1 replicated the results of Jax and Buxbaum in which participants were 
faster to make grasp movements to transport the object than they were to use them. 
However, the results of Experiment 2 were in direct contrast to this showing that the 
actions to use the objects were significantly faster than that to grasp and transport 
them. This is most likely caused by the fact that having to grasp an object does evoke 
semantic information related to such an object such as its weight and solidity, as well 
as information relating to the destination such as where the experimenter’s hand was 
to receive the object. Such characteristics would not have been evoked in Experiment 
1 since they were not needed. This therefore supports the notion put forward by Bub 
and Masson (2012) that functional information is strong where volumetric/structural 
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information is slower to evoke hence leading to a use-on-grasp effect, but not a grasp-
on-use effect.  
 
1.7 Actions in Object Recognition 
In addition to the experimental evidence outlined above, studies on object 
recognition have also shown that action information is recruited and used in aiding 
such processes (Bub, Masson & Lin, 2013; Helbig et al., 2006; Helbig, Steinwinder, 
Graf & Kiefer, 2010). Helbig et al. (Experiment 1, 2006) presented participants with a 
prime followed by a target object; they had to identify both objects. The prime and 
target either shared an action (e.g. pliers and nutcracker) or shared no action, but were 
somewhat similar in their perceptual looks (e.g. pliers and horseshoe). In identifying 
the objects the participants were significantly more accurate on congruent pairs that 
shared an action. The experiment was repeated in Experiment 2 using words rather 
than visual images given the research that words can activate the premotor cortex 
(Hauk et al., 2001; Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2006). However, the results were not 
replicated suggesting that words do not activate action knowledge in the context of 
object recognition.  
Helbig et al. (2010) followed this up by designing an object recognition task 
using video primes. In Helbig et al. (Experiment 1, 2010) the prime consisted of a 
hand performing the action on an invisible object against a black background. The 
prime was shown to the participants followed by an image of the target object. The 
prime was either congruent or incongruent with the action that would normally be 
associated with the functional action of the object. After the target object was shown 
an object label appeared and participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as to whether or not the target image and the word label matched. 
Participants were significantly more accurate when the action in the prime was 
congruent with that associated with the target object. However, unlike in previous 
research there was no difference in the reaction times. Helbig et al. further replicated 
these results in Experiment 2 where the task was made more difficult in a backwards 
masking paradigm. Overall, the experimental results suggest that both static images 
and video primes can facilitate object recognition by instantiating action information 
whereas words (object names/labels) do not.  
 
1.8 When is Action not Activated? 
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While action knowledge might be activated automatically, it does not 
necessarily mean that it would always influence performance in experimental tasks. 
The experimental research discussed above (Bub et al., 2003; Bub et al., 2008, Bub & 
Masson, 2006, 2012; Elis & Tucker, 2000; Grèzes et al., 2003; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 
2001, 2004) has demonstrated that evocation of action knowledge is automatic and 
influences task performance, even in action-irrelevant tasks where such knowledge is 
not needed. This makes the prediction that visual stimuli should invoke action 
knowledge which has been supported by the research outlined above (Bub et al, 2003; 
Bub et al, 2008, Bub & Masson, 2006, 2012; Elis & Tucker, 2000; Grèzes et al, 2003; 
Tucker & Elis, 1998, 2001, 2004). However, research has shown that the use of visual 
images is not always effective in inducing priming effects (Borghi, Bonfiglioli, Lugli, 
Ricciardelli, Rubichi & Nicoletti, 2007).  
Borghi et al. (Experiment 1, 2007) showed primes to participants of either a 
precision grip, a power grip or an open hand followed by an object that the participant 
had to classify as either natural or man-made (with the open hand acting as a no-go 
trial). The objects were selected so that half were interacted with a precision grip, and 
half with a power grasp. As with the previous work using primes (Bub et al, 2003; 
Bub et al, 2008, Bub & Masson, 2006, 2012; Elis & Tucker, 2000; Grèzes et al., 
2003; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004), it was predicted that participants would be 
quicker on congruent trials where the prime matched the action of the object. 
However, no effect of priming was found with no advantage of congruent over 
incongruent trials. It was found that natural objects requiring interaction with a power 
grasp, were identified faster than all other objects. This might possibly be the case 
because artefacts are more strongly associated with both functional and volumetric 
knowledge than natural objects, therefore simulating artefacts might cause more of a 
cognitive demand than its counterpart (Borghi et al., 2007; Vainio, Symes, Ellis, 
Tucker & Ottoboni, 2008).  
Experiment 2 was identical to the previous with the exception that participants 
performed a motor training phase prior to the experiment. The precision grip and 
power grasp images were shown in random order and the participant was to mimic the 
gesture shown. In replicating the experiment, the significant interaction between 
prime and object gesture was found where reaction times on congruent trials were 
faster than on incongruent trials. This can be explained by the results of Jax and 
Buxbaum (2010) who showed the long-term use-on-grasp effects. As the primes 
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shown to the participants were of the functional grasp of the object, this should 
activate a long lasting representation that should then facilitate the mimicking of the 
gesture. The same would not be predicted if the primes were of a volumetric action 
since Jax and Buxbaum found no long term grasp-on-use effect. In addition, Borghi et 
al. replicated the same effect from Experiment 1 where participants were faster to 
respond to natural objects with a power grasp than any other objects.  
The overall results here could be explained by two possibilities: 
(i). The use of pictorial images as primes is insufficient to activate knowledge 
of action and no priming effect occurs.  
(ii). The use of pictorial images can instantiate action knowledge but this does 
not mean that its activation is salient enough to influence the 
categorisation task used above.  
Given the previous evidence using priming experiments from Tucker and Ellis (1998, 
2001, 2004) and Ellis and Tucker (2000) the first explanation does not seem likely. 
Such experimental work has shown that using images of objects can activate action 
knowledge. This is further supported by Creem and Proffitt (2001) who showed that 
action knowledge is instantiated when participants were asked to pick up a physical 
object placed in front of them. When asked to simply pick up the object placed 
directly in front of them, participants nearly always reached for the handle of the 
object to perform an “appropriate” grasp. However, when participants engaged in a 
simultaneous semantic paired-associates task, the percentage of appropriate grasps 
significantly dropped showing that the concurrent task interrupted the depth of 
semantic knowledge of the object activated and blocked activation of physical 
interaction. This finding shows that action knowledge can be evoked from physical 
and pictorial stimuli and therefore the first explanation cannot be substantiated.  
It is therefore more likely that the latter explanation is true of the results. 
Visual imagery can activate a wide range of information such as functional, thematic 
and autobiographical and while this may also include action information, this does not 
necessarily mean that such action information will override other features and always 
be used in the task at hand. There are other factors involved that increase the salience 
of the action information and make it more likely that it will be used in such tasks. In 
the case of Borghi et al. (2007), it is clear that action information may have been 
activated in Experiment 1, but such information only became task salient when 
participants performed a motor training phase before the experiment. This in turn has 
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the obvious drawback of increasing the participants’ attention to the ‘action’ aspect of 
the experimental work and potentially lead to participant demand characteristics.  
Using a similar task to that of Borghi et al. (2007), Vanio et al. (2008) further 
investigated compatibility effects on natural/man-made categorical decision making. 
Vanio et al. (2008) modified the procedure used in Borghi et al. (2007) by presenting 
items in their actual size and by presenting a dynamic prime to the participants. The 
latter was introduced as a result of Borghi et al. having shown that action compatible 
effects were only seen following a motor training phase.  
In Experiment 1, the authors presented eight images of a hand making a power 
grasp or a precision grasp in a sequential order so that participants saw a dynamic 
hand prime. At the end of the sequence an object was superimposed on top of the 
hand so that they were transparent, and the participant could see both. The participant 
was tasked with identifying if the object seen was either natural or man-made. Catch 
trials were also included where the end of the prime showed an amalgamation of a 
power and a precision grasp, on such trials participants were instructed not to respond. 
The objects themselves were either small or large in size (presented in a real-time 
visual appearance) and the hand gesture to pick up the object was either congruent or 
incongruent with the prime (power or precision). As with previous research it was 
predicted that participants would be faster on congruent trials.  
The results showed that overall, participants were faster to respond to the 
objects denoting a power grasp, and faster to respond to natural rather than man-made 
objects (with the effect particularly strong for natural objects). In line with Borghi et 
al. this is most likely because artefacts have stronger functional information 
associated with them compared to natural objects, which do not possess such 
functional knowledge, for example, a hammer is designed with a specific function in 
mind where as an orange does not have a function. Since ‘less’ information is 
activated on the natural objects these are quicker to respond to. Most importantly a 
significant compatibility effect was observed. Participants were significantly faster to 
respond to the power grasp compatible objects after seeing a power grasp prime, and 
conversely were faster on the precision objects after seeing the precision prime. This 
would show that dynamic primes are sufficient in instantiating action knowledge to 
facilitate categorical decisions based on shared actions.  
Vainio et al. (2008) extended these findings when participants were instructed 
to respond verbally (Experiment 2) and used response apparatus allowing them to 
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respond with either a precision or a power grasp (Experiment 3). As the congruency 
effects found with the type of gesture (power grasps and precision grasp object 
responses facilitate by the congruency of the prime shown) were replicated using 
different responses, this shows that such effects are not simply the result of physically 
priming a hand response. Rather, the results imply that such action knowledge itself 
was instantiated resulting in action compatible results across various response 
mediums.  
The research outlined above has demonstrated that action knowledge is 
automatically instantiated under certain task conditions. However, importantly for this 
thesis, the picture that seems to be emerging from this literature is that action 
knowledge is influential, but not in all cases. The question that arises is what are the 
possible factors that mediate this influence? 
 
1.9 The Role of Context 
The research described above makes a strong case for concluding that the 
evocation of action knowledge, whilst potentially automatic, only influences 
performance in experimental tasks under certain circumstances such as following 
motor training (Borghi et al., 2007). It could potentially be that such tasks ‘activate’ 
action knowledge only in the context of a goal made relevant by the task. A further 
factor which has been shown to influence the saliency of not only action knowledge, 
but other objects’ features in general, is the presence (or absence) of context (for a 
review, see Yee & Thomson-Schill, 2016). Barsalou (1982) argued that concepts have 
properties that are both context-dependent, only arising under certain situations, and 
context-independent, which are activated regardless of the situation they occur. For 
example, the fact that a skunk smells is a context-independent property, regardless of 
the context, this should always come to mind when thinking about skunks. In contrast, 
the fact that a roof can be walked upon is a context-dependent property where this 
feature should only be activated in the context of needing to gain access to a roof.  
Experiment 1 (of Barsalou, 1982) used a property-verification task (pilot work 
was conducted to generate a list of context-independent and dependent properties). 
Participants were presented with a sentence including an underlined noun that they 
read aloud before seeing a property that they had to verify if the property belonged to 
the noun in the sentence. The hypothesis here was that for context-independent items 
the property should come to mind just as quickly whether the property was related or 
	35		
unrelated to the context. For example, if “has a smell” is a context-independent 
property of skunk then participants should be just as quick to verify this in the related 
sentence of “the skunk stunk up the entire neighbourhood” as they are in the unrelated 
sentence of “the skunk was under a large willow”. In contrast, for context-dependent 
items participants should be quicker to verify the properties when they are related to 
the sentence than when they are unrelated. For example, “can be walked upon” should 
be verified quicker after the related sentence of “the roof creaked under the weight of 
the repairman” than after the unrelated sentence of “the roof had been renovated prior 
to the rainy season”. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed these hypotheses, no 
differences were found in response latencies between the related and unrelated 
contexts of the context-independent items. In contrast, the response latencies for the 
related context on the context-dependent items were significantly shorter than for the 
unrelated contexts.  
Barsalou (1982) further confirmed this distinction in Experiment 2 using a 
similarity judgement task. Participants were given pairs of objects from both common 
categories (e.g. birds, furniture) and from ad hoc categories (e.g. plunder taken by 
conquerors, can be a pet) and asked to rate their similarity on a scale of 1 to 9. The 
context manipulated in this experiment was that half of the subjects were given the 
category name prior to seeing the pair (context condition) while the remaining half 
did not see such headings (no-context condition). The predictions were that as 
common categories are bound by contextually independent properties then similarity 
ratings between the pairs should not differ whether or not the participants are given 
contextual information. In contrast, as ad hoc categories are bound by the context in 
which they occur (Barsalou, 1982, 1983, 2002), then similarity between such pairs 
should be significantly higher when they are presented within context.  
The results again confirmed these predictions with context having no effect on 
the common categories, whereas the similarity ratings were significantly higher for 
the ad hoc categories when presented with context than when they were presented 
without. The results of both experiments confirm that concepts contain both context-
independent and dependent properties. However, while the items used were assessed 
to ensure that the context-dependent and independent items were equally related to 
the target nouns, it is possible that context-independent properties are lexically more 
common and therefore, more likely to occur frequently in language.  
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What is not clear is where the role of action knowledge lies on this spectrum. 
Research supports both the notion that action could be thought of as a context-
independent “property” (Borghi, 2004; Bub et al, 2003; Bub et al., 2008, Bub & 
Masson, 2006, 2012; Chao & Martin, 2000; Elis & Tucker, 2000; Grèzes et al., 2003; 
Tucker & Elis, 1998, 2001, 2004) as well as being context-dependent (Borghi et al., 
2007; Creem & Proffitt, 2001). However, it is clear that this depends upon the method 
used and whether semantic knowledge is recruited for task completion. It is possible 
that this is due to how context is operationalised for the experimental tasks used.  
Despite this research, newer ways of thinking about concept formation such as 
simulation theory posit that there is no such thing as objects being ‘context free’ 
(Barsalou, 2003, 2008, 2016a, 2016b, Solomon & Barsalou, 2004; Wu & Barsalou, 
2009; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). Under this view, the 
simulation of the generated concept generated will draw upon all modalities and as 
such will always be thought of in a contextualised manner (Barsalou, 2003). 
Therefore, the results of Barsalou (1982) could be explained in a different manner. 
The nouns in the sentences (skunk/roof) are the concepts to be simulated in the 
sentences. The notion that a skunk smells is quite common and would occur across a 
multitude of contexts. In contrast, the notion that a roof can be walked upon might be 
rare in terms the number of times a person has walked on a roof (unless that was a 
person’s profession).  
The simulation generated is influenced by its availability arising from both the 
recency of encountering the object in the real world, and the frequency with which 
such properties occur (Barsalou, 2003; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). One is more likely to 
encounter a skunk that smells than one which does not. Furthermore, it is more likely 
that encounters with a roof are more likely to be based on the roof being above a 
persons head rather than walking upon one. Therefore, a skunk that smells is more 
likely to be simulated than a roof that can be walked upon. It is not the case that such 
properties are context-independent, but are more likely to be included within the 
simulation of the concept. The concept will be simulated with a given context and the 
occurrence of the properties within the context leads to faster identification of the 
context-independent sentences.   
 
1.10 Actions in Context 
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Bub and Masson (2010) also found context effects on generated actions when 
participants read sentences and mimicked actions following a hand prime. In 
Experiment 1, participants responded using the ‘graspasaurus’ response element used 
in Bub et al. (2008, see Figure 1.2) and later Bub and Masson (2012). In the 
experiment, participants were presented with sentences which suggested either a 
functional or a volumetric action such as “David wrote with the pencil” (functional) 
or “Bert picked up the pencil” (volumetric) allowing for a simulation of the object 
based on using or manipulating the objects. Participants were instructed to read the 
sentence out loud and then after a delay of either 300ms or 750ms were shown a hand 
prime which they had to mimic on the response element. The actions they performed 
were either congruent or incongruent with the functional/volumetric action that would 
normally be associated with object and the action suggested by the context. The 
results showed that in line with previous research, response latencies were 
significantly shorter when the action mimicked was congruent with the context, and 
that overall latencies were shorter for functional than volumetric actions. The results 
also indicated a significant three-way interaction between the cue, the action type and 
the delay length. The analysis showed that at the shorter delay both functional and 
volumetric actions resulted in a small but significant priming effect. At the longer 
delay the volumetric actions did show a small priming effect, but this was not 
significantly different from the priming effect seen at the short delay. However, for 
the functional actions, the priming effect significantly increased in strength at the long 
delay compared to that seen at the short delay. Therefore, this shows that actions 
suggested by reading sentences prime the associated action but that this effect is 
stronger for functional than volumetric information.  
This is in line with the results of Bub and Masson (2012) who later showed 
that functional information is strong and fast paced in its nature whereas volumetric 
information is weaker and slower to develop. Experiment 2 showed that the effects 
seen in Experiment 1 were heightened when participants were shown an image of the 
object during the delay. Functional and volumetric actions resulted in a priming effect 
at the short delay, but as with Experiment 1, this was a small priming effect. At the 
long delay both functional and volumetric actions showed a strong priming effect, but 
this was only seen when the context suggested the action performed. The context 
suggested by reading sentences does invoke specific action effects, but this effect is 
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strengthened by incorporating visual information and seeing the referent object of the 
sentence.  
Further evidence for action playing a context-dependent role in conceptual 
knowledge has come from Borghi, Flumini, Natraj and Wheaten (2012) who 
considered context in terms of how items are functionally used together, i.e. sharing a 
functional co-occurrence. Borghi et al. presented participants with images showing 
pairs of objects manipulating the relationship between the paired items as well as the 
presence of a hand in the photos. Objects were shown sharing either a functional 
(scissors – paper), spatial (scissors – stapler) or no context (scissors – bottle) relation. 
A functional context was defined as a pair of objects that are not only found together 
but also used together as well. A spatial context was defined as being found together 
but not used. The hand factor was manipulated in four conditions; no-hand, where the 
objects were presented on their own; still-hand, a hand was placed near the objects but 
not touching them; functional-hand, a hand was placed on one of the objects as 
though it would be used; and the manipulation-hand condition where a hand was 
placed on one of the objects as though to pick it up but not to use it. Participants saw 
all possible object pairs in a complete within-subjects design and were asked to decide 
if the objects are “usually seen/used together or not”. A significant effect of context 
was found where participants were faster and made fewer errors in the functional 
context over the spatial context. The main effect of hand posture was also significant 
in that participants made fewer errors with the functional-hand images and reaction 
times were fastest with the no-hand images and slowest on the manipulation-hand 
images, the latter effect possibly found because the images contained less information 
and were easier to analyse visually.  
Of principle interest, the interaction was significant between hand posture and 
context. Post hoc analysis showed that there was no difference on the functional and 
manipulation images in the spatial context condition. For example, no difference was 
found for scissors-stapler when the hand was either placed on one of the objects 
either to use it functionally or to pick it up. However, in the functional context 
reaction times on the functional-hand images were faster than on the spatial. For 
example, participants were faster to identify that scissors and paper are used together 
when a hand was shown on the objects as though they would use it. When the hand 
was shown on the objects as though they would pick it up, but not use it, participants 
were slower to identify that scissors and paper are used together. Therefore, a 
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facilitation effect occurred whereby activation of the motor system through the 
functional-hand images speeded accuracy and response times on judging item pairs 
that are functionally related to each other.  
The results could be explained in one of two ways, the first is in line with 
Situated Simulation theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). 
Under this view, the results can be interpreted as showing that a motor simulation was 
activated which facilitated object identification and the correct responses in the 
functional-context, but hindered speed and accuracy in the spatial context as the 
motor system tried to interpret the scene in front of it. Since scissors and paper share 
more of a common occurrence between them (as they are used together), it is easier to 
simulate them in context than it is to simulate scissors and stapler. The second 
explanation is that faster responses on the functional-context objects reflects a 
semantic association between the two objects. Participants might therefore be faster 
because scissors are simply more strongly associated with paper than stapler.  
To test for this the authors repeated the experiment (Experiment 2) though 
participants were instructed to respond using foot pedals rather than using their hands. 
Using this technique would be able to distinguish between the two possible 
explanations. If the results were due to a stronger association between the functional 
stimuli then the same effects would be replicated when using their feet. However, if 
the results were not replicated then this would support the notion that the visual 
stimuli activate a motor simulation of the scene presented and thus facilitating the 
functional-context. Experiment 2 did not replicate the interaction effect seen in 
Experiment 1. Participants were equally faster to respond in the functional-context 
over the spatial-context, which once again elicited slower overall responses. This 
supports the conclusion that visual imagery activates a motor simulation of the event 
that is response specific in facilitating responses on a decision task between using 
hands or feet.  
This finding is further supported by both neurological evidence (Chao & 
Martin, 2000; Hauk et al., 2004) and behavioural evidence (Campanella & Shallice, 
2011). For example, Hauk et al. (2004) used event-related fMRI while participants 
engaged in a passive reading task where action words were used that were particularly 
related with the mouth, hands and feet (e.g. lick, pick and kick). The analysis revealed 
that the action words activated areas of the premotor cortex in a “somatotopic” 
fashion. The action words activated the regions of the premotor cortex that were 
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associated with movement of such areas. This supports the findings of Borghi et al. 
(2012) as the images used were associated with hand gestures and therefore would 
activate the dorsolateral regions of the premotor cortex facilitating decision responses. 
This effect would not be seen in Experiment 2 where participants used their feet to 
respond, though one might predict a facilitation effect with objects denoting a foot 
gesture.  
What should be discussed at this point is what is meant by the term “context”. 
The term itself has a wide range of definitions and it is often difficult to establish a 
shared meaning between disciplines (Bazire & Brézillon, 2005). For example, Borghi 
et al. (2012) discuss objects sharing a context when they are used together or share a 
thematic/spatial relation. In contrast, Barsalou (1982, 1999, 2003) discusses context in 
a more ‘situation’ based manner. For example, the context of buying fruit might occur 
within the context of being in a supermarket. For the purpose of the current thesis, 
context will be discussed in a more situation based meaning similar to the work of 
Barsalou (1999, 2003; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) and Palmer (1975) rather than objects 
sharing a context because they are used together (Borghi et al., 2012).  
Palmer (1975) showed that objects are faster to be identified in a physical 
context when it matched objects in a meaningful way. For example, a toaster was 
recognised quicker in a kitchen than in a garage. In a similar manner Kalénine, 
Shapiro, Flumini, Borghi and Buxbaum (2014) showed that visual scenes denoting 
either a use or a move context can potentiate affording actions. Kalénine et al. showed 
participants a visual scene consisting of a variety of objects that were organised in 
such a way that it was suggested to either move or use the target item. For example, in 
the move context, kitchen items including a timer were arranged so that the timer was 
in a drawer and needed to be picked up out of the drawer and requiring a power grasp 
to do so. In the use condition the items were arranged so that everything was ready 
and the timer needed to be set requiring a pinch to do so. The overall task of the 
participant was a categorisation task. In each scene participants saw the objects and a 
red square appeared around one of the items. Participants then heard either ‘natural’ 
or ‘man-made’ and participants had to answer yes or no. To do so participants were 
given a response device consisting of a cylindrical tube placed in front of them and 
held down a response box key until they were ready to answer. What was recorded 
here was the initiation time to release the button. Participants were given reverse 
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mapping instructions with half making a power grasp onto the device to answer yes 
and a pinch to answer no, or vice versa.  
It was predicted that the move context, which suggested a grasp action, would 
potentiate grasp responses while the use condition would potentiate pinch responses. 
No differences were found in the move context where participants were just as fast to 
make grasp responses, as they were pinch. However, the results did find that in the 
use context participants were faster to respond with a pinch movement than they were 
with a grasp. This is in contrast with research that has found that pinch movements 
are slower in general to make as they require precision, time and finesse (Borghi, 
Bonfiglioli, Lugli, Ricciardelli, Rubichi & Nicoletti, 2005; Vanio et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the results of Kalénine et al. show that visual scene contexts can potentiate 
actions however this is not for all contexts, but only those that suggest using objects 
in a functional manner. This leads to the predictions that action responses are more 
likely given a visual context (particularly denoting a functional use between them) 
than situations that impose no visual context.  
 
1.11 Actions as Features? 
An important aspect of this thesis, is the question of how action is stored in 
relation to a concept. Traditional models of categorisation (Collins & Quillian, 1969; 
Rosch & Mervis, 1975) take the view that concept knowledge is stored as amodal 
representations with the different elements stored as abstract symbols from the modal 
system used to process the information. For example, the knowledge that a water 
pistol is a toy, is made of plastic and is lightweight, would all be stored as individual, 
and “arbitrary” (Barsalou, 2003), symbols transduced from the original experience. 
Under this view, the knowledge that is also operated with a trigger squeeze would be 
stored in exactly the same symbolic form.  
Different features for objects are stored as individual symbols and the 
combination of these symbols form	the	concept. According to traditional feature list 
views, only intrinsic features of the object such as perceptual and function properties 
were counted as features. Therefore, even if the concepts are stored amodally, action 
was not considered to be one of these features. Despite the fact that action was never 
previously considered to be an intrinsic feature of an object, the amodal views of 
conceptual knowledge could predict that action knowledge is incorporated within 
concepts by suggesting that action is stored as a feature. However, what is 
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questionable is the extent to which amodal feature-based theories of concept 
representation can be effectively extended to encompass action as a ‘feature’ of 
objects.  
Intrinsic features, such as functional and perceptual properties, are often well 
defined. For example, a kettle either boils water or it does not, a bird can either fly or 
it cannot. Even when artefacts are not being used by an agent, these properties still 
‘exist’. Such property knowledge would be easy to store within an amodal list given 
that the features are intrinsic and possessed by many instances of the category. In 
contrast, actions are not clearly defined as multiple actions can be performed on the 
same object, and not all category instances share the same action mechanisms. Given 
that actions are dynamic and that the term ‘action’ is itself open to interpretation, the 
notion of representing action as a feature presents a clear problem.  
Many researchers have identified that object concepts incorporate multiple 
types of actions such as functional (using an object for its intended purpose) and 
structural/volumetric (manipulating an object for the purpose of generic movement; 
Bub & Masson, 2010, 2012; Bub Masson & Cree, 2008; Buxbaum & Kalénine, 
2010). The operationalisation of ‘action’ within research has varied across 
experimental work. For example, action could be considered as the grasp and motor 
movement required to use a function for its intended purpose (squeezing a trigger, 
pressing a button), the grasp required to pick up an object (power or precision), that 
two items are used together (corkscrew and wine bottle), or even the functional goal 
of the situation (the ‘shooting’ of a rifle). A strict view would suggest that the 
conceptual system would need to store each individual action as a potential feature.  
Consider a mug for example. Under amodal views, the conceptual system 
would need to store multiple features including that it could be picked up by the 
handle, picked up by the base, picked up by the top of the mug, or even picked up by 
the handle using a precision grip. Tucker and Ellis (2001, 2004) have described how 
objects have micro-affordances; the action required for an object where current 
demands may alter how a person interacts with it (e.g., is the handle facing the left or 
the right, does it require grasping with the left or right hand). It is unlikely that 
separate features are stored based on grasping objects with either hand dependent on 
the position of the object, but that such micro-affordances are transient and developed 
‘in flight’. Therefore, it does not seem feasible, nor economical, for the conceptual 
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system to store multiple features around such potential actions that would only serve 
to exhaust its demands.  
The final point to make here is based on what constitute ‘features’. Traditional 
literature has always discussed features in terms of physical, functional and biological 
characteristics. They are properties of the object which are either clearly visible, allow 
certain functions or is inherent in the genetic makeup of the objects. While some 
researchers have described action knowledge as representing a feature of an object 
(Campanella & Shallice, 2012), this would not apply to all definitions of action.  
Consider a property generation task where participants are asked to generate 
properties of a rifle. Participants will generate perceptual properties along with 
functional and thematic properties. It should be noted that, as with action, thematic 
information is technically not a feature or a property of objects themselves. However, 
Wu and Barsalou (2009) found that thematic properties were reported by participants 
during a property generation task which might have arisen based on the participants’ 
misunderstanding of the word ‘property’ during such tasks. Based on participants’ 
performance during property generation tasks, they may very well generate the handle 
and trigger as properties of a rifle. Borghi (2004) showed that participants were most 
likely to generate the features of objects that directly relate to the functional use of 
them. However, it is unlikely that participants will generate grasp palm around the 
handle or squeeze the trigger as being ‘properties’ of the object given that they 
represent something that can be done and not possessive of a specific quality.  
Knowledge of how to interact with an object would not be considered as an 
intrinsic ‘feature’ of an object. Furthermore, objects can be interacted with in 
numerous different ways. The fact that a mug could be picked up by the handle using 
a precision grasp, might not necessarily be considered as a standard action, and 
therefore not a ‘feature’ of the object. The argument here is that this does not 
represent a featural aspect, and that an amodal system could not in fact achieve this 
given the wide complexity of the term ‘action’.  
 
1.12 Simulation Theory 
As outlined above in Section 1.11, amodal views cannot offer an economical 
view of concepts given the difficulties in defining ‘actions’ and the notion of 
‘features’. Part of the difficulty in explaining action, is the separation of the 
perceptual and motor as posited by amodal theories. In contrast, an embodied 
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approach (such as Simulation Theory; Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) 
would present a more parsimonious view by incorporating both the perceptual and 
motor systems. In such a view, potential actions are not stored within a list but are 
guided by the perceptual system and the affordances available.  
Situated Simulation takes the view that conceptual representations are not 
modular, but are grounded within multi-modal representations, particularly involving 
the perceptual, affective and motor systems. Concept representations are stored across 
all modalities and thinking about the concepts recruit information from all domains to 
create a single mental representation. Simulation theory argues that, upon thinking of 
a concept, information derived from those modalities, and the neurons active upon the 
initial encounter, are partially reinstantiated and a mental simulation is created. In 
contrast to traditional amodal theories, simulation theory suggests that concept 
knowledge is highly contextualised (Borghi, 2004; Barsalou, 1999; 2003, 2008; 
Connell & Lynott, 2014).  
Simulation theory suggests that knowledge of actions is incorporated directly 
into conceptual knowledge (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Barsalou, Solomon & Wu, 
1999; Wu & Barsalou, 2009; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). The theory suggests that unlike 
traditional views of category knowledge (Brooks, 1978; Collins & Quillian, 1969; 
Collins & Loftus, 1975; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), concepts 
are not represented as abstract and decontextualised ‘feature lists’ but are stored 
within sensory-motor circuits used on the initial encounter with an object (Aziz-Zadeh 
& Damasio, 2008; Fernandino & Iacoboni, 2010; Martin, 2016).  
Upon viewing an object, the conceptual system does not record a visual 
image, but rather registers the neurons that were activated at the time of the initial 
encounter (Barsalou, 1999). When thinking of, or re-instantiating, a concept the 
system partially reactivates those neurons that were active at the time in which we 
initially encountered the object. This includes neurons based within each of the brains 
sensory systems including neurons in the motor cortex. It is important here to note 
that this is only a partial, not full, re-instantiation, as a full instantiation of the visual 
cortex would result in physically seeing the object when it would not be there. As 
such our concepts are ‘modal’ being stored across such sensory systems. Re-
instantiating a concept reactivates the motor neurons which in turn will influence 
performance in tasks where such information may not be necessary to complete the 
task, yet is already activated. This leads to the prediction that upon thinking about an 
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object, information related to action should come readily to mind on tasks irrespective 
of whether it is necessary for the task.  
The simulation involving the object can take a variety of forms and is 
dependent on various factors such as the type of experience with the object, the 
amount of experience with the object (objects that are more common to us are easier 
to simulate) and how recently we encountered the object. Certain features of the 
objects become more salient in the simulation based on our most recent experience. 
For example, if your most recent experience with a grapefruit was seeing it in a 
supermarket then the simulation would most likely be based around such a shopping 
experience. However, if your most recent experience was eating one, then the 
simulation might centre around such an event and the taste of the grapefruit would be 
included in such. What is important to note is that the brain does not work like a 
recording device which, upon simulating, would reinstantiate the whole event as it 
was originally perceived. Rather the simulations created are based on a partial 
reactivation of the original neurons involved, which leads to the simulation. Connell 
and Lynott (2014) further suggest that the simulation/representation will always be 
different upon each instantiation with the object because of a variety of factors 
including strategic attention, task demands, time and linguistic abilities and changes 
in language.  
Yeh and Barsalou (2006) further propose that conceptual knowledge is 
‘situated’ within physical contexts. As our concepts are dynamic and contextualised 
(Barsalou, 2003), simulations of concepts are embedded within a given context, and 
not ‘abstracted’. For example, when thinking of a kettle the simulation system does 
not simulate a kettle in isolation, but generates a context in which the kettle would 
normally be seen. From a simulation perspective, there is no such thing as ‘context 
free’ (Barsalou, 2003, 2008, 2016a, 2016b). Yeh and Barsalou have proposed that the 
simulation (out of all the situations in which these items could have been 
encountered) will vary based on three factors; 
(i). Grain size: The physical size of the situation will vary given the nature of 
the spatial and temporal dimensions of such. For example, being in a 
classroom would represent a small grain size in comparison to being at the 
beach, which would represent a large grain size. This can be likened to the 
aperture of a camera where the ‘snapshot’ could include either a wide or 
narrow field of view.  
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(ii). Meaningfulness: This refers to the relation between the concept object and 
the situation, which could be meaningful or simply reflect a co-occurrence. 
For example, blackboards and desks have a meaningful relation to a 
classroom and are highly predictable whereas coffee cup might be less 
predictable and not an integral aspect of the classroom.  
(iii). Tangibility: This refers to whether or not the situation is imagined, further 
depending on a person’s previous experiences, or physically re-instated. 
This often comes into play in research on context-dependent memory 
where physical reinstatement of the context leads to better memory recall 
(Brinegar, Lehman & Malmberg, 2013; Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Smith, 
1979; Smith, Glenberg & Bjork, 1978; Smith & Vela, 2001).  
 
1.13 Evidence for Simulation Theory 
In support of the simulation view of concepts, evidence using property 
verification and feature listing tasks have shown how participants simulate objects 
during task performance (Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor & Thompson-Schill, 2003; 
Santos, Chaigneau, Simons & Barsalou, 2011; Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu & 
Barsalou, 2008; Solomon & Barsalou 2004; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). Solomon and 
Barsalou (2004) used a property verification task where they manipulated the 
relationship of the false trials to the target word along with the task instructions. 
Property verification tasks give participants the word of a concept followed by the 
word of a property. Participants are asked to respond true if the property is a part of 
the concept. For example, participants might be asked if keys is a property of PIANO 
(true condition) or if keys is a property of FLUTE (false condition). Participants who 
perform this task might use one of two strategies; either participants (as predicted by 
simulation theory) create a simulation of the object relying heavily on perceptual 
features, or they adopt a word association strategy. Dual-coding theory suggests that 
participants can use both linguistic and perceptual information depending on task 
conditions4 (Glaser, 1992; Paivio, 1986, 1991). From such a view, participants might 
simply respond to property verification tasks by simply detecting an association 
between the object and property rather than accessing a conceptual representation of 																																																								
4 The Language And Situated Simulation (LASS) theory would also make this prediction. However, 
the results of Solomon and Barsalou (2004) strongly imply that participants are using the simulation 
system to verify properties rather than the linguistic system. See section 1.13 for details.  
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the object. In order to assess the strategies participants use on this task they designed 
two sets of false stimuli, unassociated (BICYCLE-chin) or associated (MONKEY-
banana). If participants are simulating the objects then perceptual factors, rather than 
linguistic, should predict task response. The authors further manipulated the task 
instructions. If simulation theory holds true, then participants upon receiving the 
object concept should simulate the objects and hold a mental image of such during the 
task. In the imagery condition participants were asked to imagine the concept object 
and only respond true if the property was on the image. In the neutral condition no 
such explicit instructions were given and participants were simply asked to respond if 
the property belonged to the concept. If participants automatically simulate the 
objects then the same pattern of results should be found across both instructions5.  
A similar pattern of data was seen in both the imagery and neutral conditions, 
which would indicate that participants do use simulation as a standard strategy when 
thinking of concepts. In addition, differences were found in the results between the 
associated and unassociated false trials. Participants showed slower verification times 
and an increased amount of errors for the associated false trials showing that 
association between the concept and property, despite being incorrect, interfered with 
task performance. This in itself would indicate that participants used different 
strategies for completing each set. In addition, it was found that linguistic variables 
(including associative strength) best predicted performance on the unassociated false 
trials indicating that participants responded to such trials not by recruiting conceptual 
knowledge for the task, but by adopting a word association strategy. For the 
associated false trials the results were best predicted by perceptual factors indicating 
that participants used a simulation strategy.  
In support of such results, Kan et al. (2003) performed fMRI scans while 
participants completed the same task used in Solomon and Barsalou and showed that 
areas of the left fusiform gyrus involved in object recognition and visual imagery 
were active when participants responded to the associated false trials, but not the 
unassociated. Therefore, the overall results from the work of both Solomon and 
Barsalou and Kan et al. do show that participants simulate objects when thinking 
about them in support of the situated simulation model of conceptual knowledge. 																																																								
5 This was a general prediction, but in fact there should be differences between the conditions. For the 
participants in the imagery condition, the image they generate should be richer in detail given that they 
were explicitly instructed to generate a mental image.  
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However, this is clearly not the only strategy and that participants do use both 
simulation and word association strategies while performing property verification 
tasks.   
Wu and Barsalou (2009) offers further support for simulation theory using 
compound nouns. The theory suggests that the simulation created is specific in two 
ways. First, the simulation created, which can be a conscious or subconscious process 
depending on the task, is an imagined visual image and does rely on those areas of the 
brain involved in imagery processes (Kan et al., 2003; Santos et al., 2011). As stated 
above a variety of factors will influence the simulation created and the simulation will 
vary based on tangibility, meaningfulness and grain size (Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). 
Second, the simulations are situated with object-relevant contexts. Without specific 
instructions to do so, an object will naturally be simulated within a context that it is 
normally found within. They are not generated in a decontextualised manner, 
simulated against a white background, but are imagined within a dynamic scenario 
and hence background information will be present and often influence task 
performance6.  
Wu and Barsalou used a feature listing task and investigated how participants 
simulate concepts when they are accompanied by a modifying descriptor. For 
example, they were interested in whether or not participants would generate the same 
features/properties for the noun watermelon as they would for the modified noun half 
watermelon. If participants are simulating the objects in a visual manner then such 
descriptions should lead to different simulations. In particular, the authors were 
interested in how participants generated the internal or external features of the objects. 
For the nouns, a visual simulation should focus on the external features of the object 
and occlude the internal features since they cannot be seen. The reverse pattern should 
be found using the modified nouns, since the internal features are no longer occluded 
and participants should be more likely to generate such features using the modified 
nouns. In the above example using the modified nouns, participants should generate 
seeds as a property of the watermelon but should be less likely to do so with the 
standard noun. In addition, focusing on such internal features with the modified nouns 
means that to some extent the external features of the objects should be less visible 
																																																								
6 Supportive evidence for such can be found in Chapter 5 (Experiment 8) where the protocol analysis 
showed that participants gave thematic/situational reasons for making their choices on the triad task. 
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and they should be less likely to generate such. The instructions were manipulated in 
a similar manner to Solomon and Barsalou (2004) where participants were either 
assigned to a neutral or imagery condition, or asked to generate word associates7.  
Manipulating the task instructions showed support for simulation theory where 
equivocal results were seen between the neutral and imagery instructions. This would 
therefore suggest that participants automatically simulated the concepts during task 
performance. Furthermore, in favour of the simulation model of concepts, the results 
showed that participants generated more external features for the nouns compared to 
internal features. The reverse pattern was found on the modified noun-phrases with 
more internal than external features. This supports the previous notions that 
participants generate a visual image of the objects when simulating them. The 
presence of the noun modifiers influenced the simulation in such a way to reveal a 
different set of properties in relation to the object.  
Wu and Barsalou (2009) further demonstrated that participants are able to 
simulate objects with which they have had no previous experience, such as simulating 
a glass car (Experiment 2). The responses followed the same pattern as in Experiment 
1, in that noun modifiers revealed more internal and less external features of the 
object. Wu and Barsalou also provided evidence for the notion that simulations are 
embedded within context by analysing the number of situational properties generated. 
Across the three experiments, between 26% and 50% of the responses from 
participants were situational features. If it was the case that participants were not 
simulating the objects in a relevant context, then participants should not generate 
situational properties. The fact that they did suggests that thinking about concepts is 
not decontextualised, but embedded within dynamic situations.  
 
1.14 Extensions to Simulation Theory 
Previous theories including Paivio’s dual code theory (1986, 1991) and 
Glaser’s lexical hypothesis (1992) suggest that the linguistic information can be 
accessed irrespective of conceptual knowledge. Recent proponents of simulation 
theory have suggested that conceptual knowledge consists of not only a simulation 																																																								
7 Traditional (amodal) theories on categorisation would predict that if the organisation of concept 
knowledge resembles organisation of language then the results of the neutral and word association 
instructions should be similar because participants can bypass the conceptual system and use the 
linguistic system (Santos et al., 2011) to respond to the task. The results showed that this was not the 
case.  
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component, but also a linguistic component (Barsalou Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 
2008; Santos et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2008). Barsalou et al. (2008) have posited 
the Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) theory to include both components. 
Upon processing words both components become active, but have different 
processing rates. The linguistic system becomes the first to activate and peaks faster 
than the simulation system. The linguistic system has access only to information 
about the word such as form and whether or not it is a word or non-word. This also 
includes the activation of word associations derived from the linguistic system, which 
are retrieved without accessing conceptual knowledge. This is therefore a rather 
superficial strategy where only basic word form information is retrieved. At the same 
time, the simulation system becomes active but is slower to peak. At this point, 
conceptual information is retrieved when the objects are simulated. The theory falls in 
line with previous work on how task responses can be based on perceptual and 
linguistic information (Solomon & Barsalou, 2004; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). However, 
the LASS theory predicts differences in the time frame of which both types of 
information are activated.  
In support of this, Santos et al. (2011) showed differences in how participants 
generate properties as time progresses through the task. In their first experiment, 
participants completed a property generation task for approximately three seconds, 
and were stopped on the task as soon as they reached a pause and struggled to 
produce new properties. The answers generated were then coded as to whether or not 
the answers were linguistic, taxonomic or situated. In line with the LASS theory, the 
initial properties produced were linguistic in nature. Taxonomic and situated 
responses were only produced after linguistic responses. This falls in line with the 
predictions of the LASS theory in which the linguistic system is activated initially 
while the situated system is slower to peak. However, once it does it then takes over 
task performance.  
The same results were found in the second experiment where participants were 
allowed a full 15 seconds to generate properties and also completed a lexical decision 
task embedded within the procedure. Experiment 2 also indicated that taxonomic 
responses were produced just as quickly as linguistic responses, suggesting that the 
linguistic system is responsible for producing taxonomic associations. This makes 
sense in light of data that shows that strong word associations are often taxonomic in 
nature, for example cat is strongly associated with both dog and mouse which also 
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share strong taxonomic relations (Nelson, McEvoy & Schreiber, 1998). In further 
support of the LASS theory, Simmons et al. (2008) used fMRI scans to show how 
different neural regions were active during the property generation task. They showed 
that areas of the frontal gyrus responsible for word form processing and word 
associations, including Broca’s area, were active when participants generated 
linguistic but not situated properties. Those areas of the brain implicated in mental 
imagery, episodic memory and spatial localisation were active when participants 
generated situated properties. The fMRI data from Simmons et al. and the behavioural 
data from Santos et al. support the notion of conceptual knowledge comprising of 
both a linguistic and a situated component. 
It is clear that an explanation is required for the increase in evidence indicating 
a stronger influence of action on task performance than might have previously been 
expected. This can take the form of adapting established (traditional) theories or the 
adoption of substantially different ways of thinking about concepts. Whilst neither 
approach is without its drawbacks (see Section 7.4 for a return to this), it is felt that 
simulation theory can offer a clearer account of the role of action in the type of tasks 
used in this thesis and opens new avenues for further experimental exploration; it 
consequently forms the main explanatory framework for this thesis.  
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1.15 The Current Research 
The key points from the above literature review that informed the programme 
of work reported in the following chapters are: 
(i). A close relationship between action and perception has been established to 
the extent that action can exert an influence on cognitive tasks such as 
reach to grasp and gesture mimic tasks, and even on action-irrelevant tasks 
such as object recognition and feature listing tasks (Borghi, 2004; Bub & 
Masson, 2010, 2012; Chao & Martin, 2001; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Helbig 
et al., 2006, 2010; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004).  
(ii). Action is arguably automatically activated, but task dependent and short-
lived in cognitive tasks (Bub et al., 2003; Bub et al., 2008; Bub & Masson, 
2006). 
(iii). The influence of action on cognitive tasks is subject to context effects 
(Borghi et al., 2012; Bub & Masson, 2010; Kalénine, Peyrin, Pichat, 
Segebarth, Bonthoux & Baciu, 2009; Kalénine et al., 2014; Vanio et al., 
2008; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016).  
 
The majority of the work reviewed has assessed the influence of action in 
tasks where participants were instructed to make action-based responses (action-
required tasks). Only a few of the action-irrelevant studies involved a further category 
decision that could be potentially driven by action, and these category decisions were 
general classifications (natural vs man made) rather than more complex categories 
(tool vs fruit). The aim of this program of study was to use a more complex, action-
irrelevant categorisation task to investigate the conditions under which action 
influences categorical performance. It should be noted that for the purposes of this 
research, action is defined as the direct interface between objects and the human body 
and the action required to use the object for its functional purpose. For example, the 
functional action of a rifle would be the grasp made by the hand around the handle 
and the squeezing of the trigger, rather than the functional goal of the rifle to shoot or 
to kill someone. This distinguishes between the ‘functional action’ of an object and 
the ‘functional goal’. The research takes a different view of action compared to other 
research (Tsagkaridis, Watson, Jax & Buxbaum, 2014) where objects are viewed as 
sharing an action because they are used together (e.g. wine and corkscrew).  
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1.16 The Task 
The forced-choice triad task is one that is used within cognitive psychology 
and has been increasingly used within the area of categorisation. In the task, 
participants are allowed to see three objects (one target object, two choice objects) 
before selecting which of the choice objects they feel “goes best” with the target item 
(Lin & Murphy, 2001; Mirman & Graziano, 2012). This task has been successfully 
used to demonstrate that adults make use of thematic information as well as 
taxonomic (Lin & Murphy, 2001). In a similar manner, the reported experimental 
work used the triad task to compare objects that shared either an action relation to a 
target or a taxonomic relation. Furthermore, the context the objects were shown in 
was manipulated in showing items in a functional context, or against a “context-lean8” 
background. Given the research showing both the importance of taxonomic 
information, and that action information (along with other ‘features’ of objects) 
becomes more salient within context, it was predicted that action would be primarily 
drawn upon to base choices only when shown in context. Taxonomic information, 
which from a classic theoretical standpoint should dominate choices in this task, 
should be most influential when the objects are shown without context. Since the triad 
task is viewed as a categorisation task (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Mirman & Graziano, 
2012) and does draw upon semantic knowledge, it is predicted that action will play a 
strong role within this task. This is in spite of the fact that such knowledge is not 
necessary for task completion; participants will not be asked to mimic the actions of 
the objects or respond with any object related action.  	 	
																																																								
8 The term ‘context-lean’ has been used as opposed to ‘no-context’ or ‘context-free’ because of the 
notion suggested by Barsalou (2008, 2016b) that the latter do not exist. Even in situations when no 
other information is present, the objects are not context-free because of the contextual instantiation 
applied by the simulation system.  
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Chapter 2 
Rifles and Swords, or Rifles and Water Pistols: Examining Object 
Categorisation by Shared Actions or Shared Taxonomic Relations in a Triad 
Task 
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The previous chapter outlined research showing how action influences 
performance across a variety of cognitive tasks. Chapter 2 has investigated how action 
is used in making categorical decisions on the forced-choice triad task. The task 
consisted of a target object presented with two choice objects where participants 
select the object that “goes best” with the target. Previous research has shown how 
participants group objects together by either shared thematic or taxonomic relations 
(Golonka & Estes, 2009; Lin & Murphy, 2001). The research presented in this chapter 
has investigated how participants group objects together by shared actions or 
taxonomic relations. Action has been investigated in terms of competition and 
additive effects. To investigate the competition effects action was directly pitted 
against taxonomic information (Different Category Objects triads). In such triads the 
target (rifle) was presented with a taxonomic choice (sword) and an action choice 
(water pistol). To investigate the additive effects, action was combined with 
taxonomic information (Same Category Object triads). In such triads the target 
(orange) was presented with a choice option sharing both an action and a taxonomic 
relation (banana), and one choice sharing just a taxonomic relation (strawberry). 
Participants saw both triad types in a within-subjects design. Context was further 
manipulated between-subjects where half of the participants saw the objects on a 
white background (context-lean condition), and half saw the objects being used by an 
agent for its functional purpose (context-rich condition). Selection of the action 
choice was measured across the triads and showed that a strong context effect was 
found with greater selection of the action choice in the context-rich condition. 
Furthermore, the action choice was more likely to be selected on the same category 
triads compared to the different category triads showing that action is less likely to 
base category membership on its own, but has a strong additive effect.  
 Four experiments are reported here in the present chapter including the 
experiment outlined above. The further experimental work has additionally 
investigated potential factors that might bias the interpretation of the results including 
shared perceptual characteristics (inherent given the ergonomics considered when 
designing such objects), the typicality of the objects and the instructions used in the 
triad task.   
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2. Experiment 1 
Using The Forced-Choice Triad Task To Examine Categorical Decisions Using 
Shared Taxonomic Or Action-Based Relations 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlined the aim of the following research, namely to investigate the 
circumstances under which knowledge of object interaction becomes a relevant 
property for categorisation within an action-irrelevant task. In order to do this the 
forced-choice triad task (hence forth referred to as the triad task) was selected. The 
triad task here is seen as an action-irrelevant task because no physical action is 
required in order to respond on the task other than a key press. Participants are not 
asked to mimic or perform any action similar to those needed to use or handle the 
stimuli.  
The standard format of a triad task is to present a target object with two choice 
objects as either pictures or words. The choice options are manipulated so that they 
match the target in a specific respect (e.g. taxonomically or thematically, see Lin & 
Murphy, 2001). The participants’ selection is inferred to be a reflection of how they 
organise category knowledge (Estes, Golonka & Jones, 2011, Lin & Murphy, 2001). 
The instructions vary across experiments (see Experiment 4 for a further review) but 
generally ask participants to select the choice option that “goes best with” or “is most 
like” the target.  
Lin and Murphy (2001) successfully used the triad task to show that adults 
often group objects together by shared themes rather than in taxonomic categories. 
Previously, it had seemed that only young children, the elderly, and uneducated 
people make use of such thematic information before a thematic-to-taxonomic shift 
occurs in late childhood (Luria, 1976: Smiley & Brown, 1979). Lin and Murphy 
matched the choice options in a triad so that one shared a thematic relationship while 
the other shared a taxonomic relation. For example, the target of bee was presented 
with honey (thematically related) and flies (taxonomically related). They found that 
when participants were asked to select the item that “goes best with” the target, 
participants selected the thematically related item on 62% of trials (Experiment 19). 
																																																								9	Variations in this have been found using different task instructions and this will be reviewed later in 
Experiment 4.  
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Other research has since supported this showing that adults do make use of thematic 
relations, that such relations may arguably be considered a semantic property, and 
show differences in neurological topography (Estes et al., 2011; Golonka & Estes, 
2009; Kalénine et al., 2009; Lin & Murphy, 2001; Mirman & Graziano, 2012; 
Murphy, 2001; Sachs, Weis, Krings, Huber & Kircher, 2008; Sachs et al., 2008; 
Wamain, Pluciennicka & Kalénine, 2015; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999).  
Tsagkaridis et al. (2014), using a triad task, investigated the strength of 
thematic relations (over taxonomic) when they also shared a functional action. For 
example, wine bottle and corkscrew share not only a thematic association but also a 
‘joint use’ action since one must be used to open the other. In comparison, wine bottle 
and cheese share only a thematic relation and no action. These were also compared to 
a choice object sharing a taxonomic relation such as wine bottle and water bottle. 
Their experimental design included three sets of triads manipulating the competition 
effect between the choice options on how they were related to the target: 
thematic+action vs taxonomic, thematic+action vs thematic-action, taxonomic vs 
thematic-action. Across the triads, participants were most likely to select the thematic 
object which shared an action with the target (89%) followed by the taxonomic object 
(62%). The thematic items that shared no action were selected with the lowest 
frequency (44%). These results showed that thematic relations between items may be 
even stronger than taxonomic, and arise from not only a spatial/temporal relation but 
also a shared functional co-occurrence.  
However, a strong possibility that might bias this interpretation is the notion of 
shared frequency of co-occurrence between the objects sharing a thematic relation and 
an action. In nearly all occasions when a corkscrew is used it is for the purpose of 
opening a wine bottle and, therefore, one is rarely found without the other. Cheese can 
occur in a wide variety of situations without a wine bottle associated, as well as 
situations in which they both occur. It might not be that the wine bottle and corkscrew 
are categorised together because of the shared functional action, but because they are 
more strongly associated to a specific situation. In addition, the item-to-event strength 
of such items would differ. In considering a dinner party event both wine bottle and 
corkscrew would have a stronger item-to-event association than cheese and are hence 
more likely to be grouped together.  
What should be noted at this point is that there is a difference between the 
definition of the term ‘action’ taken by Tsagkaridis et al. and in the current 
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experimental work. Tsagkaridis et al. take the view that two objects share an action 
because they are physically used together for the same purpose. In the experimental 
work in this chapter (and the remainder of this thesis) items are described as sharing 
an action when they require the same physical action to use/operate them, but are not 
used in conjunction with one another. An example of this is rifle and water pistol, 
which share the same grasp and a ‘trigger’ action to operate them both. However, the 
items are not used together for a sole purpose, nor do they share a function10. Action 
here is operationalised in the same manner as by Myung et al. (2006) where piano and 
typewriter share an action because of the way the fingers and hands move when 
playing or typing. The definition of action used here distinguishes between the 
functional action of an object and the functional goal. For example, the functional 
action of a rifle would be the grasp made by the hand around the handle and the 
squeezing of the trigger, rather than the functional goal of the rifle, which would be to 
shoot or perhaps to injure/kill.  
Using the above definition of action, the aim of Experiment 1 was to 
investigate whether participants would match items in a triad based on shared actions, 
and how this commonality would compete against items that could be matched on 
taxonomic membership. Despite the strong influence of thematic relations within the 
triad task (Lin & Murphy, 2001) and the strength of thematic associations when 
combined with a goal-based action (Tsagkaridis et al., 2014), thematic associations 
were not included in the design of the triads. The aim here was to test how influential 
action knowledge is in making categorical decisions11.  
As outlined above the notion of ‘action’ is taken to mean the initial grip on the 
object and the action needed to operate it to use it for its functional purpose (e.g. 
squeezing the trigger on a rifle, peeling an orange). Previous research using the triad 
task has researched action as a source of information in categorical decisions, but not 
using the definition outlined above and often views shared actions as shared goals 																																																								
10 A rifle and a water pistol could be argued as sharing an overall goal to “shoot someone” and this is a 
potential source of information in categorising the objects together. See Chapter 5 for further analysis 
of the stimuli used in Experiment 2.  11	However, despite this it is possible that some of the items do share some thematic information. This 
is because of (i) individual differences in levels of previous interaction with the objects and (ii) the 
stimuli used and the difficulty in collecting common items of taxonomic categories that do not share 
thematic information. For example, common items of the category FRUIT will share some thematic 
information because people might have a personal preference for them, might keep them together in 
their homes or can buy them from the same location. The potential for thematic relations being an 
influential factor in the present task is addressed later in Chapter 5 using protocol analysis. 	
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(Kalénine et al., 2009; Tsagkaridis et al., 2014). Furthermore, research has 
demonstrated that function plays an important role in categorisation and concept 
knowledge (Barsalou et al., 2005; Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Chaigneau & Barsalou, 
2008; Chaigneau et al., 2004; Keil, 1989, Malt & Johnson, 1992, Rips, 1989) and 
might even serve as a ‘core’ feature (Medin & Smith, 1984; Smith & Medin, 1981; 
for an alternative view see Malt & Johnson, 1992). Since taxonomic links do include 
perceptual and functional features (Medin & Smith, 1984), this would explain why 
taxonomic information influences decision making in the triad task. However, given 
the evolutionary stance that concept knowledge should be in the service of actions 
(Franks & Braisby, 1997) and the view that conceptual knowledge is grounded in 
multimodal representations (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Wu & Barsalou, 2009; Yeh 
& Barsalou, 2006), then knowledge of shared actions between two objects could 
potentially present them as a better “pair” in the triad task.  
In order to investigate the competition effects of taxonomic and action 
relations in the triad task, two sets of triads were developed. To test the specific 
competition effect of taxonomic against action, one set of triads were developed 
where one choice option shared a taxonomic relation to the target while the other 
shared an action. These are referred to as the Different Category Object (DCO) triads. 
For example, the target of rifle was presented with sword (both weapons but used 
differently) and water pistol (a toy, not a weapon, but also operated by a trigger). In 
these triads neither choice option shared both a taxonomic and an action relation. 
Rather, the DCO triads allowed for the direct comparison of when participants group 
objects together based solely on shared actions, or shared taxonomic features.  
The second set of triads looked at the effect of action when it was in 
combination with taxonomic information, hence referred to as Same Category Object 
(SCO) triads. In these SCO triads the target object was presented with two choice 
objects where all three belonged to the same category. In addition, one of the choice 
options also shared an action with the target. For example, the target of orange was 
presented with strawberry (sharing no action) and banana (both peeled before eating). 
These SCO triads allow for the comparison to see what effect action has on 
categorical choices when it is also combined with taxonomic information. Wisniewski 
and Bassok (1999) showed that items are rated more similarly when they share both a 
taxonomic and a thematic property (milk + coffee) rather than just a taxonomic 
relation (milk + lemonade). In a similar manner, it might be the case that action also 
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has an additive effect in that participants could be more likely to select the action item 
when it also shares a taxonomic relation with the target (also in line with the ‘+ 
action’ effects found in Tsagkaridis et al., 2014).  
The second aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether the activation of 
action information is context-dependent or independent, given that previous research 
indicates both context-dependent and independent properties in concept knowledge 
(Barsalou, 1982). Research with children has shown that presenting a context before 
they engaged in a triad task modulated their responses (Blaye & Bonthoux, 2001). 
Using groups of 3 and 5-year-old children, Blaye and Bonthoux presented them with 
a triad based pre-test where the children were asked which item “went best with” the 
target between a taxonomic and a thematic choice. One week later they repeated the 
task, only the experimental group were shown a picture of a scene linked to one of the 
items designed to bias their choice. It was found that the 3-year-olds, the scene had no 
effect on their choices and they were able to switch between the taxonomic and 
thematic choices. The 5-year-olds in the control group were stable in their choices 
from the previous week, but those shown a scene were strongly influenced and often 
selected the opposing choice compared to the week before. This choice then remained 
stable one week later in a post-test analysis. This not only confirms that children can 
make use of both types of semantic information, but more importantly shows that 
context does influence triad responses in children. In addition to this, further research 
has shown that action responses are heightened when shown in context on other, non-
triad, cognitive tasks as outlined in Chapter 1 (Borghi et al., 2012; Estes, Verges & 
Barsalou, 2008; Kalénine et al., 2014).  
Following from this, the DCO and SCO triads shown in Experiment 1 were 
manipulated between-subjects, based on context. Given the difficulty in defining the 
term ‘context’ (Bazire & Brézillon, 2005) it is important to define the meaning of this 
for the experimental work. For the purpose of this thesis, context is defined as images 
presenting the items within an action-based scenario with the objects used for their 
functional purpose. This is similar to Palmer (1975) who showed that object 
recognition was faster in a congruent rather than incongruent scenario. This was done 
differently in Experiment 1 compared to Blaye and Bonthoux (2001) where, rather 
than the context preceding the trial presentation, the context in Experiment 1 was 
presented during the trial. All three items in the triads were presented as words, 
however, the target was also accompanied with a picture of the object. Participants 
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saw the object either in isolation on a white background (context-lean condition) or 
shown within an action based scenario with the objects being used by an agent 
(context-rich condition). In order to prevent a perceptual bias and stop the participants 
from selecting the item that looks most similar, only the target was shown as an image 
accompanying the word. 
Based on the previous research, it was predicted that action would influence 
participants’ choices in the triad task. Upon seeing the target item participants should 
simulate the objects in accordance to the situated simulation view of concepts 
(Barsalou, 1999), drawing upon all modalities and including the motor cortex. This 
should make the shared action element salient and hence present as a candidate for 
selection in this task. As such, it is plausible that the action-related item may be 
selected with a higher frequency than the opposing choice. This should be particularly 
true of the SCO triads where the action item also shares taxonomic membership. As 
the items share both relation types then action should act in an “additive” manner 
making the action choice a better category match12. What is interesting here is to 
examine the effects of the DCO triads where the participants can choose between a 
taxonomic and an action-related item. To date, no known research has directly 
compared taxonomic and action choices in such a task. Given the strength of 
taxonomic membership in concept knowledge it is possible that this might dominate 
choices when compared to only an action-related item, however, at this point such 
effects are uncertain. It was further predicted that the action choices are more likely to 
be selected when the items are presented within a functional context (context-rich) 
rather than against a white background (context-lean).  
 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students (24 females) from the University of 
Hertfordshire took part in the experiment with a mean age of 26.81 (SD = 8.03, age 
range: 17-51 years). Participants were recruited through opportunity sampling. The 
sample size was calculated following an a priori power analysis using G*Power. 
Given that the triad task reported here has not previously been tested, the analysis was 
																																																								12	The same would be predicted of the ‘probabilistic’ view of concepts (Medin & Smith, 1984; Smith 
& Medin, 1981) but the discussion will outline why this is unlikely to be the case here.  
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conducted using a moderate effect size (f = .25, see Cohen, 1992), with a correlation 
between repeated measures of .5. Assuming α =.05 and 1 – β =.80, the a priori power 
analysis indicated that a similar effect size would be detected using a sample of 34 
participants. 
 
2.2.2 Design 
The experiment was composed of a forced-choice triad task presented in a 2x2 
mixed design. All participants saw two types of object triads (within-subjects factor); 
Different Category Object (DCO) triads and Same Category Object (SCO) triads. The 
between-subjects factor was the context in which the triads were presented. The target 
on each triad was either presented as an image of the object on a white background 
(context-lean condition) or presented as an image of the object being used by an agent 
in a functional based scenario (context-rich condition). There were two dependent 
variables of interest here being the response time on the triads, and the frequency of 
which the participants selected the choice item sharing an action to the target on the 
DCO and SCO triads (henceforth referred to as the ‘proportion of action choice’).  
 
2.2.3 Materials 
In order to design the triads, an object pool was initially developed drawing on 
the stimuli used by Rosch (1975), and developing additional objects that matched on 
an action relation. Thirty object triads were initially designed for this experiment 
consisting of 15 of each DCO and SCO triads. The SCO triads consisted of two 
choice options in which both pertained to the same taxonomic category, with one 
choice option additionally sharing the same action. For example, for the target item of 
pencil the two options were elastic band (taxonomic relation only) and paintbrush 
(taxonomic and action relation). In the DCO triads only one of the choice options 
pertained to the same taxonomic category while the other shared an action but did not 
share category membership. For example, for the target item of rifle the two choice 
options were sword (taxonomic relation only) and water pistol (action relation only).  
When designing the triads it became apparent that while most objects have a 
main method of hand manipulation, others could be used in different ways. A pilot 
was conducted in order to ascertain that all of the items used shared the same 
functional action. Ten participants (5 females) from the University of Hertfordshire 
were given a questionnaire of all the triad items formed into triplets, and asked to 
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identify which shared the same action. All possible object combinations (within each 
triad) were coded and a Chronbach’s alpha of .21 revealed little cohesion among the 
items. Removal of the lowest eight items increased this to an acceptable .72, with 
combinations matching the definition of action outlined above.  
The category membership of the objects was also piloted in the same manner 
described above. Ten participants (9 females) recruited from the University of 
Hertfordshire were given a similar questionnaire to the previous pilot, with the triads 
shown in the form of triplets, and asked to select the objects that belonged in the same 
category. Chronbach’s alpha of .60 revealed an acceptable alpha level for these items 
based on their category membership. As such, the experiment ran with 22 target 
triads, 13 DCO triads and 9 SCO triads (a full list of the triads can be seen in 
Appendix F). The object triads were matched with 22 animal triads that acted as foils 
and the choice data from the latter was not analysed. Only the target picture in each 
triad was presented with an image of the target which was collected using a Google 
Image search on the item and selecting the appropriate picture for use in both 
conditions, either the object itself on a white background or being used by an agent in 
the objects functional sense. An image only accompanied the target as it was possible 
that by showing images of all the objects participants would simply base their 
responses on perceptual properties. 
 
2.2.4 Procedure 
The participants sat in front of a 15” Macintosh laptop and were shown the 
task instructions. They were informed of the nature of the task; they would be shown 
a target word with two choice options underneath. The instructions asked them to 
“Please indicate which of the two items goes best with the target at the top of the 
screen”. Participants were instructed to press the ‘a’ key to choose the item on the 
left-hand side of the screen and the ‘l’ key for the item on the right-hand side of the 
screen. They were asked if they had any questions and then the Superlab program ran 
through the forty-four triads. Each triad began with a fixation cue presented on the 
screen for 1000 milliseconds after which the cue disappeared and the target word 
appeared along with the appropriate image depending on which condition the 
participant was assigned to. After 1500 milliseconds the two choice options appeared 
beneath the target word and image, both of which remained on the screen while the 
participant made their choice. After they had made their choice the target, image and 
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choices disappeared and the fixation cue appeared again for the next triad. All triads 
were presented in a randomized manner and the action choice in each triad was 
counterbalanced as to whether it appeared on the left or right of the screen. The 
participant’s frequency of action choices was recorded on both the SCO and the DCO 
triads along with their response time. Their choices on the animal triads were of no 
theoretical importance for the purposes of this experiment (as they were not 
manipulated on a taxonomic or action basis) and as such were not recorded. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Response Time 
The mean response time on the SCO and the DCO triads are reported in Table 
2.1. Participants appeared faster at responding to the triads in the context-rich 
condition (MDCO = 2359.22, MSCO = 2350.81) than in the context-lean condition 
(MDCO = 2854.84, MSCO = 2664.96) A 2x2 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
showed that the main effects of triad type, F < 1, the main effect of context, F (1, 38) 
= 1.51, p = .23, η2 = .04, and the interaction effect, F < 1, were not statistically 
significant.  
The reaction time data was further analysed for outlying scores and normality. 
After removing the outlying scores (x1) the reaction time on the SCO triads was 
statistically normal, D(39) = .09, p > .05, however the reaction time on the DCO 
triads was positively skewed, D(39) = .15, p = .036. A square root transformation was 
applied and a 2x2 mixed ANOVA was conducted. The results of the previous analysis 
was replicated where the main effect of triad type, F(1, 37) = .23, p = .23, η2 = .04, the 
main effect of context, F < 1, and the interaction effect, F < 1, were not statistically 
significant. This would indicate that the time taken to make categorical decisions did 
not differ between artificial objects when category membership amongst the items 
varied considerably, nor did they vary when the objects were shown in a functional 
context.  
2.3.2 Action Choices 
The mean proportion of action responses in the SCO and the DCO triads 
across the two conditions are reported in Table 2.2. Within the DCO triads the action 
choice was made relatively infrequently when compared to the taxonomic alternative. 
In these triads participants showed a strong preference for the taxonomic item and the 
effect of context appeared to have no influence here (Mcontext-lean = .29, Mcontext-rich = 
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.29). In comparison to this, the action choice appeared to have a much stronger 
influence in the SCO triads with 51% selection of the action choice in the context-
lean condition and 61% in the context-rich condition. A 2x2 mixed ANOVA on the 
mean proportion of choices was conducted with triad type as a within-subjects factor, 
and context as a between-subjects factor13. The analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of triad type with action choices being made more frequently across the SCO 
triads than the DCO, F (1, 38) = 84.81, p < .001, η2 = .69. The main effect of context 
was not significant, F (1, 38) = 2.86, p = .10, η2 = .07, nor the interaction effect 
between the two factors, F (1, 38) = 3.34, p = .08, η2 =.08.  
 
Table 2.1  
Mean Response Time (Standard Deviations) in Milliseconds Across Triad Type and 
Context.  
Context N Triad Type 
DCO SCO 
Lean 20 2854.84 
(1313.96) 
2664.96 
(1224.70) 
Rich 20 2359.22 
(810.06) 
2350.81 
(944.18) 
 
Table 2.2  
Mean Frequency (Standard Deviation) of Action Responses Across Triad Type and 
Context. 
Condition N Mean percentage of choice (SD) 
  DCO triads SCO triads 
Context-lean 20 .29 (.16) .51 (.12) 
Context-rich 20 .29 (.13) .61 (.12) 
 
																																																								13	It has been suggested that because the data is not normally distributed and the choice reflects a 
binomial distribution that the data should be analysed using the Generalized Linear Mixed Model 
approach. The data was re-analysed using the GZLM and the same pattern of results was found with a 
significant main effect for triad type, F (1, 76) = 73.12, p < .001, but not for context, F (1, 76) = 3.43, p 
= .07, and no interaction effect, F (1, 76) = 1.71, p = .20. Given the robustness of the ANOVA design 
all analysis henceforth has been completed using standard ANOVA’s rather than the GZLM and any 
differences found are reported in the footnotes.  
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2.3.3 Age and Gender 
Of theoretical interest was whether the number of action choices was 
influenced by the age and gender of the participants. The influence of the participant’s 
age was examined by repeating the same ANOVA conducted in Section 2.3.2 after 
removing those participants whose age was more than two standard deviations above 
mean14. If it was the case that the age of the participants was affecting the action 
choices then removing those participants (N = 4) should alter the patterns seen in 
previous analysis. The ANOVA showed that the same patterns found in the previous 
analysis were replicated with a significant main effect of triad type, F (1, 34) = 70.50, 
p < .001, η2 = .68, based on higher action choices on the SCO triads. Once again, 
neither the main effect of context, F (1, 34) = 3.70, p = .063, η2 = .10, nor the 
interaction effect, F (1, 34) = 2.75, p = .11, η2 =.08, were significant. This would 
therefore indicate that triad patterns held consistent across the age of the participants.  
Gender was examined by conducting using a 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA using 
triad type as a within-subjects factor, and both context and gender as between-subject 
factors. The same patterns found previously were again replicated with a significant 
main effect of triad type (p < .001), but no main effect of context (p > .05) or 
interaction effect (p > .05). Of importance here, the main effect of gender was not 
significant, F (1, 36) = 2.12, p = .16, η2 = .06, indicating that selection of the action 
choice was consistent between males and females. In addition, gender did not interact 
with either triad type (F < 1) or context (F < 1), and the three-way interaction was 
also non-significant (F < 1).  
 
2.4 Discussion 
Overall, the results have shown that participants were very quick at making 
their decisions on the triads with choices taking typically less than three seconds. 
There was no difference found between reaction times on the SCO and DCO triads, 
presumably due to the fact that they both contain artefacts rather than natural objects 
and should therefore activate the same neural topography. However, the main data of 
interest here is the frequency of the action choices made. The data here show that 
participants make categorical decisions on the triad task primarily through the use of 																																																								
14 It was not appropriate to perform a repeated measures Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) because 
age was not significantly correlated to the number of action choices on the DCO or SCO triads, 
therefore violating the ANCOVA assumptions.   
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taxonomic information. When participants were presented with items that matched a 
target based on either taxonomic or action-based properties (DCO triads) they chose 
the taxonomic choice in nearly three quarters of their responses. For example, given 
the target of rifle participants were more likely to group this with sword than they 
were water pistol. Therefore, even when not given explicit categorisation instructions 
participants use category membership to make their decisions on the triad task. 
However, what the data do show is that while action may not be used as the primary 
basis for category membership, it did appears to have an additive effect. When 
participants were presented with items that both matched a target on taxonomic 
membership (SCO triads) they were more likely to select the choice item that 
additionally shared an action to the target. For example, given the target of pencil 
participants were more likely to group this with paintbrush rather than elastic band. 
While action here is not salient enough, generally, to override taxonomic 
membership, it did increase the commonality between a target and its match. The 
action choice was thus the preferred option and hence presumably stands as a better 
match to the target. Furthermore, the follow up analysis has shown that selection of 
the action choices was consistent across the age and gender of the participants.  
The results are in line with the situated view of concepts posited by Barsalou 
(1999). Under this view, when participants think about the objects they mentally 
simulate them drawing upon a multi-modal representation. As this includes a re-
instantiation of the neurons in the motor cortex originally activated upon encountering 
the object, the shared actions of the objects become more salient, and is hence more 
likely to be used here.  
However, the same pattern of results would be predicted of the probabilistic 
view of concepts (Medin & Smith, 1984; Smith and Medin, 1981) which would 
suggest that the paintbrush is more likely to be selected with the pencil because 
sharing more than one common element with the target makes it more probable as a 
category member. Therefore, rather than simulating the objects, it could be argued 
that the participants are, in an amodal fashion, mentally consulting a list of known 
‘information’ about the items. This cannot explain all the data from this first 
experiment, however, because a probabilistic view would also suggest that the action 
item in the SCO triads should be selected in all of the triads given that it has the most 
‘amount’ of shared features with the target and this was not so; as was seen in the 
data, wide variations occurred and the action choice in the SCO triads was not chosen 
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on 100% of the trials. In addition, such a view takes the stance that all properties of an 
object are weighted equally, which is not the case as some properties are more salient 
as others given the context they appear in.  
An interesting finding here was that despite predictions that context would 
have a significant effect on the choices made by increasing the salience of the shared 
action relation between the target and the match, this effect was not found. This may 
have been caused by the format chosen for triad presentation. Previous experimental 
work using triads (Kalénine et al., 2009: Lin & Murphy, 2001) has used the format in 
which all of the items were seen as all words or all images. It was originally thought 
that if participants saw images of all the targets and matches then their choices would 
simply be made based on perceptual properties and so only the target appeared as a 
picture whilst the choice items appeared as words. However, it is possible that only 
including an image of the target may have in fact occluded the action element 
between the target and choice options. For example, seeing only the image of a pencil 
might invoke a number of properties of the object and potentially make others more 
salient than the shared action between them. Bub et al. (2008) suggested that words 
only cannot potentiate actions and evoke gestural knowledge. However, simulation 
theory would predict that words on their own can instantiate action knowledge and 
research does support such a claim (Hauk et al., 2004: Santos et al., 2011; Simmons et 
al., 2008; Solomon & Barsalou 2004; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). Therefore, one aim for 
the next experiment was to redesign the triads so that participants saw images of all of 
the objects accompanied by its name.  
Looking at the data above it is not possible to conclude with complete 
certainty that the participants made their decisions based on the associated actions 
between the target and match. It is possible that choices were made based on 
perceptual properties between the items. For example, it could be the case that rifle 
was grouped with water pistol, and pencil was grouped with paintbrush, because they 
look similar to each other rather than sharing a functional action. The nature of design 
ergonomics means that items that are operated in the same manner will invariably 
look similar because they are designed to work within the parameters of the human 
body. A pencil and a paintbrush are both designed to sit within the Thenar space 
between the thumb and index finger and as such will be used in the same manner and 
look very similar to each other. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to address this issue 
of action versus perceptual information. A new set of triads was designed in which a 
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target was linked to choice items that shared either an action or perceptual properties 
and shared no category membership between them. If participants were selecting 
items based on perceptual properties then it would be predicted that on the new triads 
they would select the choice item that looks the same rather than the one sharing an 
action.   
 
2.5 Experiment 2 
Rifles Go With Water Pistols Because They Look Alike: Assessing How Action-
Based Choices Are Biased By Perceptual Characteristics 
 
2.6 Introduction 
Experiment 2 was primarily designed to address the issues raised in the 
previous discussion concerning the perceptual bias in the triad task used in 
Experiment 1. This led to two main changes. First, the format of the triads was 
changed so that each item in the triad was presented as the target word and an image 
of the object. The image was once again manipulated by context so that all items in 
the context-lean condition were shown as a sole object against a white background 
and those in the context-rich were shown in a functional scenario with the object 
being used by an agent. If it is possible that only presenting an image of the target 
object (as in Experiment 1) concluded the shared action element between the objects 
then overall action choices should be higher when all the items are shown as images.  
The second aim here was to assess if participants are selecting the objects in 
the triads because of shared perceptual qualities rather than shared actions. For 
example, it could be that participants are selecting water pistol to go with rifle not 
because of the shared ‘trigger’ action between them, but because they share 
perceptual qualities as a result of the way in which the objects are designed. In order 
to test this, the second main change was the introduction of a third set of triads where 
participants chose between items that either shared an action or perceptual qualities.  
In these Perceptual Category Object (PCO) triads, none of the objects shared 
category membership with the targets. One choice object shared an action with the 
target, but did not look similar, while the other choice looked similar to the target but 
did not share an action. For example, the target of cocktail shaker was presented with 
maracas (sharing an action but appearing dissimilar) and vase (visually similar but 
sharing no action). If it was the case that perceptual similarity (that coincided with a 
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shared action) was driving the choices made in the SCO and DCO triads of 
Experiment 1, then it would be reasonable to expect that this would extend to items 
which are clearly perceptually similar in the PCO triads and therefore action choices 
for thus new condition would substantially lower than in the SCO triads.  
The conceptual system stores a vast amount of information for concepts, and 
therefore objects can be categorised together based on numerous factors (functional, 
perceptual, thematic, autobiographical, etc.) Therefore, it could be the case that 
participants would use entirely different strategies in completing the DCO and the 
new PCO triads rather than drawing upon action knowledge in both. This however, is 
believed to not be the case and there are reasons to believe that the influence of action 
should be consistent not only between participants, but also within trials. The research 
outlined above in Chapter 1 has shown that the influence of action is consistent. In 
many of the experimental paradigms used (Borghi, 2004; Borghi et al, 2012; Bub & 
Masson, 2006, 2010, 2012; Bub et al., 2008; Chao & Martin, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 
1998, 2001), the influence of action was apparent across all participants. For example, 
the priming work of Bub and Masson (and colleagues) showed that for all of the 
participants, response latencies were decreased when shown a congruent action prime 
demonstrating that the recruitment of action information is consistent across 
participants. Therefore, it is predicted that the influence of action knowledge on the 
triad task developed in this thesis should be consistent and not limited to a few 
participants or on a few trials.  
Research has further shown that participants are relatively consistent with 
their categorisation choices which have been shown to remain stable across 
experimental procedures (Deák & Bauer, 1995; Hampton, Dubios & Yeh, 2006; Lin 
& Murphy, 2001; Simmons & Estes, 2009). If it is the case that participants were 
selecting the action choices on the DCO, and SCO, triads because of shared 
perceptual features then participants should be more likely to select the perceptual 
choice on the PCO triads (i.e. choose vase with cocktail shaker). If, however, 
participants were selecting the action choice because of the shared actions between 
them then they should be more likely to select the action choice on the PCO triads 
(i.e., choose maracas with cocktail shaker).  
  
2.7 Method 
2.7.1 Participants 
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Fifty undergraduate Psychology students (36 females) from the University of 
Hertfordshire with a mean age of 25.31 (SD = 7.92, age range: 18-49) were recruited 
through opportunity sampling and took part in the experiment in return for course 
credit. The sample size was calculated following an a priori power analysis using 
G*Power. The analysis was based on the observed effect size for the 2 x 3 interaction 
of context on triad type found in Experiment 1 (ηp2 = .081) which corresponded to a 
medium effect size (f = .30), with a correlation between repeated measures of .07215. 
Assuming α =.05 and 1 – β =.80, the a priori power analysis indicated that a similar 
effect size would be detected using a sample of 36 participants. 
 
2.7.2 Design 
Experiment 2 comprised a forced-choice triad task presented in a 3x2 mixed 
design. All participants saw three types of object triads (within-subjects factor); DCO 
triads, SCO triads and the new PCO triads. The DCO and the SCO triads were taken 
from Experiment 1 (with adjustments made to the triads, see Section 2.7.3). In the 
PCO triads the target was presented with two choice options, one of which shared 
perceptual properties with the target, but no action, while the remaining choice option 
shared an action, but no perceptual properties. Thus the target and choice items shared 
no category membership amongst each other. The between-subjects factor was the 
same as in Experiment 1, i.e., the context in which the triads were presented. There 
were two dependent variables of interest; (i) choice response time and (ii) the 
frequency of selected choice items sharing an action with the target on the DCO, SCO 
and the PCO triads. 
 
2.7.3 Materials 
The same SCO and DCO triads from Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 
2 with minor alterations made. Some participants from the previous experiment 
volunteered information after the experiment that several of the triads had been 
chosen due to sharing thematic information rather than using taxonomic or action 
based information. For example, several participants said that they grouped cake with 
ice cream rather than pizza because you eat the two together as cake and ice cream. 
																																																								
15 Power calculations for subsequent experiments using the 2x3 triad task were calculated using the 
corresponding figures from Experiment 1.  
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Therefore, in the SCO triads one (cake) was removed while in the DCO triads one 
was removed (dice) and two were redesigned to become SCO triads (ketchup and 
orange). This resulted in 10 SCO and 10 DCO triads for use in this experiment.  
The PCO triads were constructed from a target and two choice options in 
which neither shared category membership to the target, but one shared perceptual 
properties with the target but no action while the other shared an action but no 
perceptual properties. For example, the target of clarinet was presented with the 
perceptual item wooden spoon and the action item of balloon. A total of 15 triads 
were designed in this manner and piloted using the same procedure as in Experiment 
1 to ensure for consistency in action usage across the items. Ten participants (6 
females) from the University of Hertfordshire were given a questionnaire formed of 
triplets and were asked to identify which items shared the same action. A 
Chronbach’s alpha of .46 revealed a moderate level of cohesion. Removal of the 
lowest five items increased this to a high level of .78. As such the experiment ran with 
these 10 PCO triads combined with the 10 SCO and 10 DCO (see Appendix M). All 
target and choice items in the triads were presented as images collected using a 
Google image search, and with the word underneath the image. Images were selected 
on the basis of appropriateness for the conditions, being either the item on a white 
background for the context-lean condition or as the image being used in a functional 
context for the context-rich conditions.  
 
2.7.4 Procedure  
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
2.8 Results 
2.8.1 Response Time 
The mean response time on the SCO, DCO and PCO triads are reported in 
Table 2.3. Participants appeared faster at responding in the context-lean (MDCO = 
2074.77, MSCO = 2130.48, MPCO = 2772.44) compared to context-rich condition 
(MDCO = 2345.68, MSCO = 2450.31, MPCO = 3115.48). A 2x3 mixed ANOVA revealed 
that the main effect of triad type was significant using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
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adjustment16, F (1.62, 77.55) = 35.92, p < .001, η2 = .43. Post-hoc analysis using the 
Bonferroni adjustment showed that the difference between the SCO and the DCO 
triads was not significant (p = .75). However, reaction times on the PCO triads were 
significantly slower compared to both the SCO (p < .001) and the DCO triads (p < 
.001). Neither the main effect of context, F(1, 48) = 1.16, p = .29, η2 = .02, nor the 
interaction effect, F < 1, were significant. 
The reaction time data was further analysed for outlying scores and normality. 
After removing the outlying scores (x2) the reaction time on the SCO and the PCO 
triads were statistically normal, SCO: D(48) = .09, p > .05; PCO: D(48) = .08, p > .05, 
however the reaction time on the DCO triads was positively skewed, D(48) = .15, p = 
.013. A square root transformation was applied and a 2x3 mixed ANOVA was 
conducted. The analysis found that the main effect of triad type was significant, 
F(1.72, 78.89) = 40.28, p < .001, η2 = .47. Follow up analysis using the Bonferroni 
adjustment showed that the reaction times on the PCO triads were significantly longer 
than the SCO (p < .001) and the DCO (p < .001), but no difference was found 
between the latter (p = .23). The main effect of context, F(1, 46) = 1.59, p = .21, η2 = 
.03, nor the interaction effect, F < 1, were statistically significant. This would indicate 
that participants are slower at making categorical decisions when the objects are not 
linked by category membership.  
 
Table 2.3 
Mean Response Time (Standard Deviations) in Milliseconds Across Triad Type and 
Context.  
Context N Triad Type 
 DCO SCO PCO 
Lean 25 2074.77 
(939.09) 
2130.48 
(1041.06) 
2772.44 
(1286.69) 
Rich 25 2345.68 
(898.57) 
2450.31 
(971.86) 
3115.48 
(1331.67) 
 
2.8.2 Action Choices 
																																																								16	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was found to be significant; χ² = 12.77, df = 2, p = .002, and therefore 
the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .81.	
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The mean proportion of action responses in the DCO, SCO and the PCO triads 
across the two conditions are reported in Table 2.4. As with Experiment 1, 
participants were most likely to select the action choice in the SCO triads in both the 
context-lean (61%) and context-rich (70%) conditions. The lowest levels of action 
choices were in the DCO triads in both conditions (Mcontext-lean = .32, Mcontext-rich = .53). 
Within the PCO triads there was a relatively large proportion of action choices made 
accounting for nearly half of the choices in the context-lean condition (48%) and 
nearly three quarters of those in the context-rich condition (69%). It also appears that 
participants were more likely to select the action choices in the context-rich condition 
than the context-lean condition across all three triad types.  
A 2x3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the mean proportion of action 
choices using triad type as a within-subjects factor and context as a between-subjects 
factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of context with more action 
choices made in the context-rich than context-lean condition, F (1, 48) = 39.22, p < 
.001, η2 = .45, as well as a significant main effect of triad type, F (2, 96) = 22.77, p < 
.001, η2 = .32. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment revealed that there 
were significantly more action choices in the SCO than the DCO triads (p < .001), 
and in the PCO than the DCO triads (p < .001). The mean number of action choices 
between the SCO and the PCO triads was not significantly different (p = .09). Finally, 
the interaction effect between context and triad type was not significant, F (2, 96) = 
2.33, p = .10, η2 = .05. The variables account for a large amount of explained variance 
with eta-squared close to 80%. Overall participants were more likely to select the 
action choice when selecting objects sharing both an action and category membership, 
and particularly more likely when the objects were seen in context.  
 
2.8.3 Age and Gender 
The influence of the participant’s age was examined using a 2x3 mixed 
ANOVA after removing those participants whose age was more than two standard 
deviations above mean (N = 2)17. The ANOVA showed that the same patterns found 
in the previous analysis were replicated. The main effect of triad type was significant, 																																																								
17 The age of the participants was significantly correlated with the number of action choice on the SCO 
triads , R = .33, p = .019, showing a weak but positive correlation. However, age was not correlated 
with the number of action scores on the DCO (p > .05) or PCO triads (p > .05) and therefore it was 
decided that it was not appropriate to perform an ANCOVA because the effects were not consistent and 
violate the ANCOVA assumptions.   
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F (2, 92) = 20.38, p < .001, η2 = .31, based on lower action choices on the DCO triads 
compared to the SCO (p < .001) and the PCO triads (p = .002), but no difference 
between the SCO and PCO triads (p = .13). The main effect of context was also 
significant, F (1, 46) = 45.13, p < .001, η2 = .50, based on higher action scores in the 
context-rich condition. The interaction effect was again non-significant, F (2, 92) = 
2.56, p = .083, η2 =.05. This would therefore indicate that triad patterns held 
consistent across the age of the participants.  
Gender was examined by conducting using a 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA with triad 
type as a within-subjects factor, and both context and gender as between-subject 
factors. The same patterns found previously were again replicated with significant 
main effects of triad type (p < .001) and context (p < .001), but no interaction effect (p 
> .05). Of importance here, the main effect of gender was not significant, F < 1, 
indicating that selection of the action choice was consistent between males and 
females. In addition, gender did not interact with either triad type, F < 1, or context, F 
< 1, and the three way interaction was also non-significant, F(2, 92) = 2.81, p = .066, 
η2 = .06.  
 
Table 2.4  
Mean Frequency (Standard Deviations) of Action Responses Across Triad Type and 
Context.  
Condition N Mean percentage of choice (SD) 
 DCO SCO PCO 
Context-lean 25 .32 (.13) .61 (.15) .48 (.2) 
Context-rich 25 .53 (.21) .70 (.15) .69 (.14) 
 
2.9 Discussion 
The results here support and extend the findings of Experiment 1. The reaction 
time data showed no difference was found again between participants’ reaction times 
on the SCO and DCO triads. Interestingly, participants were slower to respond on the 
PCO triads suggesting that participants find it more difficult to make categorical 
decisions when taxonomic information between the items is not present.  
However, of main interest here are the data on the choices made. It was found 
once again that participants were more likely to select the action item on the SCO 
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triads when the choice items shared an action as well as taxonomic information. This 
is in comparison to the DCO triads where the item that only shared an action was 
generally less likely to be selected than the taxonomic competitor. This supports the 
data from Experiment 1 showing that action has an ‘additive’ effect when combined 
with a taxonomic relation. The action choices on the DCO triads were lower 
compared to the SCO triads suggesting that action information is less likely to be used 
on its own as a basis for category membership. When action is combined with 
taxonomic information this becomes a better category when combined with the target. 
However, when presented in context action becomes a stronger source for 
categorisation, and is used at least as much as taxonomic information.  
One suggestion regarding the format of the triads in Experiment 1, was that 
the presentation of only the target as an image may have occluded both the shared 
actions between the objects, and the context effect. This may in fact be the case since 
comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 showed that action scores in the context-rich 
condition were higher in Experiment 2. 
As outlined in Section 2.6, previous research has indicated that the effects of 
action are not only strong, but consistent across participants and across item trials 
(Borghi, 2004; Borghi et al, 2012; Bub & Masson, 2006, 2010, 2012; Bub et al., 
2008; Chao & Martin, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001). However, the possibility 
existed that perceptual characteristics were driving categorical choices on the triad 
task rather than the shared actions. The reported experiment sought to address this 
through the development of the PCO triads. If participants were selecting the action 
item on the triads because of the shared perceptual characteristics between them, then 
action choices on the PCO triads where perceptual similarity was manipulated to be 
particularly salient in one choice item that did not share any action with the target, 
would be low in comparison to the other triad conditions. However, the action choices 
on the PCO triads was high, and there was very little difference overall between the 
SCO and PCO triads suggesting that action was used in categorising the target object.  
Even in the context-lean condition action seemed to show a reasonably high 
level of influence with choices at nearly a matched ratio between the two. This 
supports the notion that participants were using action to group the items together 
rather than shared perceptual characteristics. Had participants been using only shared 
perceptual features then a high level of perceptual choices would have been predicted. 
This was not the case, indicating that the context-lean condition may potentially 
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encourage participants to use a more ‘surface’ based approach on perceptual features, 
where the context-rich condition may encourage a deeper level of analysis based on 
how the stimuli influence the simulations generated by participants. This is in line 
with research on how participants report external and internal properties of as a result 
of noun-modifiers influencing simulations (Solomon & Barsalou, 2004; Wu & 
Barsalou, 2009).  
Overall, the triad task has shown that action is an influencing factor in an 
action-irrelevant categorisation task18. However, its effects do not overshadow other 
object properties, and the use of action in this task is dependent on the presence of a 
competing taxonomic relation. Action is only a strong influence either in combination 
with a taxonomic relation, or in its absence.  
An additional finding of the current experiment was that a significant effect of 
context was found, unlike in Experiment 1. Showing images of the objects within a 
functional context seemed to raise the salience of the action relation between the 
items in the sense that the chance of the action item being selected was significantly 
increased. Participants showed a strong preference for groupings based on taxonomic 
information on the DCO triads in the context-lean condition. However, when 
functional images were shown in the context-rich condition participants became more 
likely to group using action rather than taxonomic information. This effect has now 
been demonstrated across all triad types when the items were shown as a functional 
scenario. This supports the previous claim made with regard to Experiment 1 that the 
use of only a target image may have occluded the shared action between them. The 
most likely reason for this is that the context raises the salience of the shared actions 
between them.  
Simulation theory would predict that upon viewing the objects we generate a 
mental simulation of the objects (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). 
When the objects are presented in the context-lean condition it is possible that the 
‘vagueness’ of the image in not suggesting a specific context allows for participants to 
generate a wide possible variety of simulations that may not focus solely on the 
shared action element between them. For example, upon seeing water pistol this may 
instantiate a ‘buying’ rather than a ‘using’ context. What the context-rich condition 																																																								
18	The potential exists that this is not a categorisation task due to the instructions of “goes best” used 
here which does not specifically invite a category decision. Please see Section 2.14 for a counter-
argument to this.  	
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does is to refine this potential simulation from a wide variety of possible scenarios to 
a more specific one, where the action is not only included, but may also constitute the 
primary focus of this simulation. As a result, participants were more likely to select 
the shared action item with the target given that they were directly simulating using 
the objects.  
Overall, the results here show that action has a strong influence on categorical 
decisions. The salience of action is heightened by the functional context in which it is 
presented and it becomes more likely to be used in category decisions than taxonomic 
information alone. When action is presented alongside taxonomic information it has 
an additive effect in highlighting such items as being stronger category members, 
irrespective of the context in which it is presented. Furthermore, the current data shed 
light on the notion that participants draw upon the action relation between the items 
rather than drawing upon perceptual properties that may exist between the items as a 
result of the design process. However, in order to test this fully a new set of triads 
would need to be developed in which items were matched to a target based on 
taxonomic and action relations between them but did not share perceptual properties. 
Unfortunately such items do not exist (or are very rare) since members of the same 
category already often share perceptual properties and this becomes even more 
prevalent when the items also share an action between them (see Chapter 7 for more 
details).  
The aim of the next two experiments was to rule out two potential 
confounding variables that might bias the participants to one particular choice over 
the other. Experiment 3 aimed to rule out the influence of object typicality on the 
items. On the SCO triads participants were given the chance of selecting one of two 
choice options that all shared category membership with the target. For example, 
participants were presented with orange as the target and had to choose between 
banana and strawberry. The results showed that participants were most likely to 
choose the option that shared an action, e.g. choose banana with orange. However, on 
such triads where all the items belonged to the same category it is possible that 
participants selected the option that was more typical of the category. For example, it 
might be that bananas are more typical of fruit than strawberries. There is seen to be a 
monotonic relationship between typicality and categorisation, objects that are more 
typical of a category are more likely to be classed as members of that category 
(Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Simpson & Miller, 1976).  
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The more properties that an object has in common with other category 
members, the more typical it has been argued to be. However, this is not always the 
case and research has shown differences in how participants judge typicality and 
category membership. Rips (1989) gave participants a scenario where they judged the 
size of the average quarter (approx. 1 inch) and the size of the average pizza (approx. 
12 inches). Pizzas do naturally vary in size and are therefore ‘variable’ whereas the 
quarter is ‘fixed’ because its size is governed and does not vary. Participants were 
then asked to imagine a fictitious 3-inch object and were either asked which of pizza 
and quarter is the 3-inch object more likely to be, more typical of, and more similar 
to. The results showed that the participants were more likely to classify the object as a 
pizza given their knowledge of how pizzas can vary in size while quarters cannot. 
However, when asked which is it more typical, a 50/50 choice between the fixed and 
the variable category was seen.  
This shows that there are differences in categorisation and typicality decisions 
and that the two processes do not always track each other (see Chapter 6 for more 
details of this experiment using categorisation, typicality and similarity instructions). 
However, for many real world objects typicality does influence category membership 
and theories of categorisation do place an emphasis on typicality (Rosch & Mervis, 
1975). For example, category examples that are most typical of a category are often 
seen as being “better” members (Rosch, 1975). Therefore, the aim of Experiment 3 
was to remove this as a possible confounding variable on the SCO triads. In order to 
ascertain if participants were selecting the object on the SCO triads because they were 
more typical than the opposing choice, Experiment 3 collected typicality ratings of the 
items.  
Experiment 4 examined the possibility that participants were biased towards 
the action choice because of the task instructions, and to ensure that participants were 
using a categorisation strategy during the task. Task instructions are particularly 
important in the experiments reviewed thus far, but these are inconsistently 
formulated. Research has shown that variations in the task instructions lead to 
different choices selected on the triad task as shown by Lin and Murphy (2001) when 
participants were asked to select the item that “goes best” or “goes best to form a 
category”. Simmons and Estes (2008) also showed different levels of thematic 
preference across different experiments when participants were instructed to select the 
item “most similar to” (46%), “most different to” (39%) or “most like to” (57%). 
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Mirman and Graziano (2012) specifically used the instructions of “goes best” so as 
not to cause a taxonomic bias within the task.  
While the triad task is seen as a categorisation task (Estes, Golonka & Jones, 
2011; Golonka & Estes, 2009; Lin & Murphy, 2001; Murphy, 2001; Simmons & 
Estes, 2008), the task appears to favour a thematic strategy until participants are given 
more explicit category instructions. However, such instructions are somewhat unclear 
in what they ask participants to do given that they do not specifically ask participants 
to categorise the objects. It could be that participants, rather than categorising the 
objects, are selecting the item most similar to the target.  
While categorisation and similarity are seen as related processes, where 
models of categorisation rely on similarity and those exemplars most typical to the 
category are often most similar to other members (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Rosch & 
Mervis; 1975; Rosch et al., 1976), there are dissociations between them and can act 
independent of one-another (Goldstone, 1994; Rips, 1989; Smith & Sloman, 1994). 
Following this line, there are two potential criticisms of Experiment 2; first, that the 
instruction of “goes best” could favour an action rather than a categorisation strategy, 
and second, that the task itself does not reflect a categorisation task. Therefore, the 
aim of Experiment 4 was to test the processes involved in the use of the triad task by 
manipulating task instructions. 
 
2.10 Experiment 3 
Assessing How Action-Based Triad Choices Are Biased By Object Typicality 
  
2.11 Method 
2.11.1 Participants 
Forty-six undergraduate students (36 females) from the University of 
Hertfordshire with a mean age of 23.07 (SD = 6.13, age range: 18-50) took part in the 
experiment.  
 
2.11.2. Design 
The experiment was composed of a typicality rating task where participants 
were presented with the items in the triads (the target and the choice objects) used in 
the SCO triads of Experiment 2 in a within-subjects design. The dependent variable of 
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interest was the typicality ratings given on a scale of 1 (low typicality) to 9 (high 
typicality).  
 
2.11.3 Materials  
The items presented were taken from the SCO triads (targets and both choice 
options) of Experiment 2, which comprised 30 items. The items were presented along 
with their category heading taken across the categories FRUIT, TOOLS, 
STATIONERY, KITCHEN UTENSILS, LITERATURE, GARDEN TOOLS, 
ELECTRONICS, FURNITURE, ENTERTAINMENT, CONDIMENTS and 
KITCHEN WARE. Within each category the items were presented in alphabetical 
order, however, there was not an even number of items within each category set. 
Alongside each item was a scale presented from 1 to 9 where 1 was indicated as a 
poor example of the category, and 9 was indicated as an excellent example of the 
category. 
 
2.11.4 Procedure 
The experiment was completed online using Qualtrics. Participants were sent 
the online link and once they had consented moved through the questionnaire at their 
own pace. Participants were instructed that they would see the name of a category at 
the top of the page with a list of items belonging to that category underneath. They 
were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (poor example) to 9 (excellent example) as to how 
good an example that item is of the named category. It was decided to avoid using the 
word ‘typicality’ in the instructions to the participants as in previous experiments19 
participants tend to not fully understand this notion, so were instead asked to rate the 
items on how good an example of the named category they were. The questionnaire 
lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. 
 
2.12 Results 
The typicality ratings of the items can be seen below in Table 2.5. For each 
pair, a repeated measures t-test was conducted on the typicality ratings of the two 
choice options. As can be seen in the table below, only three of the pairs were cause 
for concern showing differences between the pairs. For the poster/newspaper (leaflet) 																																																								
19 Unpublished work completed by the research team.  
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triad, the action choice was rated as significantly higher for typicality than the 
taxonomic only choice (p < .001). For the elastic band/paintbrush (pencil) triad and 
the screw/plug (pin) triad, the taxonomic only choice was rated as significantly more 
typical than the action choice (pencil: p = .014, pin: p < .001).  
 
2.12.1 Experiment 2 Data Re-analysed 
The purpose of the next section was to re-analyse the data from Experiment 2, 
while bearing in mind differences in the typicality ratings. This was completed in two 
steps; first, looking at the distributions of choices on the triads where differences in 
typicality were seen between the choice items, and second, the mean of the SCO 
triads was recalculated without those items where significant differences were found 
between the choice options (hence referred to as the SCOadjusted triads). Table 2.6 
shows the percentages of the choice items on the pencil, pin and leaflet triads where 
significant differences were found between the typicality of the choice items. The pin 
triad is the only one of concern here. The participants used here rated screw as more 
typical of the category TOOLS than plug, and participants of Experiment 2 where 
more likely to choose screw (72%)20. In the leaflet triad, newspaper was seen as more 
typical but there was very little difference between the percentages of the choice items 
selected from Experiment 2. The pencil triad further shows that the choice option 
identified as more typical (elastic band) was in fact the least likely option to be 
chosen from Experiment 2 (10%).  
 
 
																																																								
20 The pin triad is also of further concern because while participants in Experiment 8 identified pins as 
being a tool, but are more commonly associated with stationery. Therefore, this technically may not 
conform to the rules of the SCO triads.  
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Table 2.5  
The Mean Typicality Ratings (Standard Deviations) for the Objects used in the SCO Triads.  
Target Taxonomic 
choice 
TC Mean (SD) Action choice AC Mean (SD) t value p value 
Pencil Elastic band 5.04 (2.44) Paintbrush 3.89 (2.31) 2.57 .014 
Glass Jug 7.89 (1.70) Cup 7.87 (2.00) -.60 .55 
Spatula Can opener 8.20 (1.36) Saucepan 8.53 (1.24) -1.83 .08 
DVD player Television 8.13 (1.60) CD player 8.15 (1.43) .11 .92 
Bed Sofa 8.54 (1.11) Wardrobe 8.80 (.54) 1.63 .11 
Orange Strawberry 8.35 (1.14) Banana 8.50 (1.11) .80 .43 
Ketchup Salt 7.31 (2.35) Vinegar 7.49 (2.54) -.62 .54 
Pin Screw 5.50 (2.90) Plug 4.17 (2.63) -4.03 <.001 
Spade Shears 8.22 (1.43) Trowel 8.30 (1.28) -.50 .62 
Leaflet Poster 4.02 (2.30) Newspaper 6.57 (2.20) 7.33 <.001 
. 
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For the second analysis the SCOadjusted means were calculated from those SCO 
triads where no differences were shown in the typicality ratings for the choice 
options. The overall means for the SCOadjusted triads were similar to those seen in the 
SCO triads, and in fact were slightly higher (see Figure 2.1 below). A mixed ANOVA 
was conducted using context as a between-subjects factor and triad type as a within-
subjects factor consisting of the DCO, PCO and SCOadjusted triads. The pattern of the 
results was exactly the same as the previous analysis, with a significant main effects 
of context, F (1, 48) = 43.56, p < .001, η2 = .48, a significant main effect of triad type 
using the Greenhouse Geisser adjustment21, F (1.76, 84.29) = 31.19, p < .001, η2 = 
.39, and a non-significant interaction between the two, F (1.76, 84.29) = 1.69, p = .19, 
η2 = .04.  
 
Table 2.6 
The Percentage of Choice Items Selected on the Triads in Experiment 2 That Showed 
Significant Differences in Typicality. 
Target Taxonomic 
choice 
TC Percentage Action choice AC Percentage 
Pencil Elastic band* 10% Paintbrush 90% 
Pin Screw* 72% Plug 28% 
Leaflet Poster 52% Newspaper* 48% 
*The choice item identified as more typical of the category.  
 
																																																								21	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was found to be significant; χ² (2) = 7.03, p = .03, and therefore the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .88.	
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Figure 2.1. The proportion of action choices selected on the SCO triads and SCOadjusted triads.  	
2.13 Discussion 
The typicality data collected was important because of the possibility that on 
the SCO triads participants were selecting the object that was most typical as a 
category member. The data rejects this as a possibility. In only three triads were 
differences found in the typicality of the choice options, and in only one case of the 
triads was it found that participants were more likely to select the item that was more 
typical of the category. Exclusion of these triads showed that the same pattern of 
results was found between the triads, and in fact the means on the SCO without such 
were significantly increased. Therefore, the results show that object typicality played 
little role in how participants made their decisions on the triad task.  
 
2.14 Experiment 4  
Shakers and Maracas: Action-based Categorisation Choices In Triads Are 
Influenced By Task Instructions 
 
2.15 Introduction 
As previously discussed in Section 2.9, the aim of Experiment 4 was to test 
the strategy that participants are using when engaging in the triad task. The same 
triads from Experiment 2 were used and again presented either in the context-lean or 
context-rich conditions. However, three sets of instructions were used where 
participants were asked either to select the item that “goes best” (as used in 
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Experiments 1 and 2), “goes best to form a category”, or “is most similar to the 
target”. If it is the case that participants on the triad task intuitively use a 
categorisation strategy then there should be little difference in action-based choices 
between “goes best to form a category” and “goes best”. If it is the case that “goes 
best” biases participants towards using an action strategy, then the action choices 
using such should be higher compared to using “goes best to form a category”. In 
addition, if it is the case that participants are completing the triad task using a 
similarity strategy, then there should be little difference between “goes best” and “is 
most similar to”.  
 
2.16 Method 
2.16.1 Participants 
Ninety undergraduate Psychology students from the University of 
Hertfordshire (65 females, Mage = 21.19, SD = 6.12, age range: 18-43) took part in the 
experiment in return for course credit. The sample size was calculated following an a 
priori power analysis using G*Power. Assuming α =.05 and 1 – β =.80, the a priori 
power analysis indicated that a similar effect size to that found in Experiment 1 would 
be detected using a sample of 66 participants. 
 
2.16.2 Design 
The same forced-choice triad task used in Experiment 2 was presented in a 
3x2x3 mixed design with one within-subjects (triad type) and two between-subjects 
factors (context and instructions). All participants saw the same SCO, DCO and PCO 
triads used in Experiment 2 (within-subjects) presented either in the context-rich or 
context-lean conditions (between-subjects). The instructions given to the participants 
differed between the conditions (between-subjects) where participants were either 
asked to select the choice items that “goes best with the target”, “goes best with the 
target to form a category” or “is most similar to the target”. The dependent variables 
of interest were again the response time on the triads and the frequency of which the 
participants selected the action choice on the DCO, SCO and PCO triads.  
 
2.16.3 Materials 
The same 30 triads (10 SCO, 10 DCO, 10 PCO) triads used in Experiment 2 
were used. The triads were once again present in either the context-lean or context-
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rich conditions. No differences were present in the program used except for the 
instructions given at the beginning.  
 
2.16.4 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 2. Once allocated to 
their condition, participants were either instructed to select the choice item that “goes 
best with the target”, “goes best with the target to form a category” or “is most similar 
to the target”. In the same manner as Lin and Murphy (2001), participants in the 
category instruction condition were presented with a category definition in order to 
emphasise the nature of the task. Participants were told that “A category is defined as 
a set of things that share some communalities - be it functions, purposes, physical and 
perceptual characteristics, or behavioural predispositions". Participants in each 
condition were then allocated to one of the two context conditions and ran through the 
Superlab program as in previous experiments.  
 
2.17 Results 
2.17.1 Reaction Times 
Reaction times were calculated overall on the SCO, DCO and PCO triads for 
each participant and between the context and instructions used of goes best (GB), 
goes best to form a category (GBFC) and most similar (MS). As with the previous 
experiments, participants appeared quicker overall on the SCO (M = 2303.97, SD = 
1198.47) and the DCO (M = 2107.12, SD = 1351.99) triads compared to the PCO 
triads (M = 2841.74, SD = 1462.49). In addition, participants appeared faster in the 
context-lean condition (M = 2290.02, SD = 1010.93) than the context-rich condition 
(M = 2733.98, SD = 1482.37), and faster when given the GB instructions (M = 
2212.48, SD = 714.13) and MS (M = 2229.76, SD = 1057.25) compared to GBFC (M 
= 3093.76, SD = 1698.37).  
A 3x2x3 mixed factor ANOVA was conducted using triad type (SCO vs DCO 
vs PCO) as a within-subjects variable and both context (lean vs rich) and instructions 
(GB vs GBFC vs MS) as between-subject variables. A significant main effect of triad 
types was found, F (2, 168) = 32.28, p < .001, η2 = .28. Follow up procedures using 
the Bonferroni adjustment showed that there was no difference between the reaction 
times on the SCO and DCO triads (p = .71) but the PCO triads were significantly 
slower than both the SCO (p < .001) and the DCO triads (p < .001). In addition, the 
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main effect of instructions was significant, F (2, 84) = 5.37, p = .006, η2 = .11. Using 
the Bonferroni adjustment it was found that the instructions to select item that GBFC 
was significantly slower then both the GB (p = .016) and the MS instructions (p = 
.019). No difference was found between the GB and MS instructions (p = 1.). The 
main effect of context was not significant, F (1, 84) = 3.13, p = .08, η2 = .04, nor was 
the two-way interactions between triads and instructions, F < 1, the two-way 
interaction between context and instructions, F (4, 168) = 1.82, p = .13, η2 = .04, and 
the three-way interaction between triads, context and instructions, F (2, 84) = 2.56, p 
= .08, η2 = .06. However, the two-way interaction between triads and context was 
found to be borderline significant, F (2, 168) = 2.92, p = .057, η2 = .03. The data 
indicated that in all three triad types reaction times were higher in the context-rich 
condition, but the difference was only significantly so on the DCO triads (p = .019).  
The reaction time data was further analysed for outlying scores and normality. 
After removing the outlying scores (x4) the reaction time on all of the triad types was 
positively skewed, SCO: D(86) = .14, p = .002; DCO: D(86) = .12, p < .001; PCO: 
D(86) = .12, p = .002. A square root transformation was applied and a 2x3x3 mixed 
ANOVA was conducted using context and instructions as between-subject factors. 
The analysis found that the main effect of triad type was significant, F(2, 160) = 
41.66, p < .001, η2 = .34. Follow up analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed 
that the reaction times on the PCO triads were significantly longer than the SCO (p < 
.001) and the DCO (p < .001), but no difference was found between the latter (p = 
.23). The main effect of instructions was significant, F(2, 80) = 3.29, p = .044, η2 = 
.08. Follow up analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that the reaction 
times using the GBFC instructions was borderline significantly longer than the MS 
instructions (p = .052) but no different to the GB instructions (p = .17). No difference 
was found between the MS and GB instructions (p = 1.0). Therefore, the strong main 
effect found in the previous analysis was partially removed once the reaction times 
were normalised. The main effect of context was not significant, F(1, 80) = 1.93, p = 
.17, η2 = .02, nor any of the two-way and three-way interaction effects. 
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Table 2.7.  
Mean Reaction Times (Standard Deviations) Across Triad Types, Context and 
Instructions. 
Instructions Context N Triad Type 
 SCO DCO PCO 
Goes Best Lean 15 1859.49 
(622.45) 
1793.71 
(570.81 
2365.47  
(959.09) 
Rich 15 2135.23  
(792.69) 
2458.55  
(789.15) 
2662.43  
(867.98) 
Goes Best to 
Form 
Category 
Lean 15 2477.03 
(1088.66) 
2235.97  
(823.49) 
2836.12 
(1160.50) 
Rich 15 3201.19 
(1961.85) 
3648.93 
(2423.38) 
4163.33 
(2036.43) 
Most 
Similar 
Lean 15 2147.49 
(1146.42) 
2196.60 
(1087.71) 
2698.31 
(1743.90) 
Rich 15 2003.40  
(712.07) 
2007.97  
(794.74) 
2324.81  
(946.92) 
  
2.17.2 Action Choices  
The mean proportion of action response choices was calculated for the SCO, 
DCO and PCO triads across context and instructions. As was found in Experiment 2, 
participants showed a tendency to select the action choice more often with the SCO 
(66%) than with the PCO (57%) and DCO (54%) triads, and more so in the context-
rich (67%) condition than context-lean (51%).  
A 3x2x3 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of context with a 
higher number of action choices in the context-rich condition, F (1, 84) = 44.70, p < 
.001, η2 = .35. The main effect of triad type was also significant, F (2, 168) = 17.91, p 
< .001, η2 = .18. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment found that the 
action responses on the SCO triads were significantly higher than both the DCO triads 
(p < .001) and the PCO triads (p < .001). No difference was found between the DCO 
triads and the PCO triads (p = .86). The main effect of instructions was not 
significant, F (2, 84) = 2.70, p = .073, η2 = .06, nor was the two-way interaction 
between context and instructions, F < 1. The two-way interaction effect between 
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context and triads was significant, F (2, 168) = 11.47, p < .001, η2 = .12. The results 
showed that in all three triad types, the mean percentage of choices was higher in the 
context-rich condition than in the context lean condition, but the effect was stronger 
in the SCO (p < .001) and PCO triads (p < .001) than in the DCO triads (p = .035). 
The two-way interaction between instructions and triads was also significant, F (4, 
168) = 2.51, p = .044, η2 = .06. Post hoc analysis showed that the only differences 
were found on the PCO triads where GBFC led to a higher mean proportion of action 
choices compared to GB (p = .033) and MS (p < .001). The difference between GB 
and MS was marginally significant (p = .051). 
However, of main interest here is the three-way interaction between context, 
instructions and triads which was significant, F (4, 168) = 5.01, p = .001, η2 = .11. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the mean percentage of action choices in each triad type 
across the different instructions, and spilt across the two contexts. Looking at the 
proportion of action choices in the context-lean condition (see Fig. 2.2) no differences 
were found between the instructions on the SCO triads. Post hoc analysis found that 
on the DCO triads the category instructions (GBFC) led to higher action choices than 
GB (p = .028). In addition, on the PCO triads the similarity instructions (MS) led to 
lower action choices than both GB (p = .006) and GBFC (p = .003). 
Examining the context-rich condition (see Fig. 2.3), no differences were found 
on the DCO triads. On the SCO triads the MS instructions led to significantly lower 
action choices than GB (p = .049) and GBFC (p = .0.36), but no difference was found 
between GB and GBFC (p = .90). In addition, on the PCO triads the category 
instructions (GBFC) led to higher action choices than GB (p = .006) and MS (p = 
.006). The data here shows that under no conditions did the GB instructions lead to 
statistically higher action choices than the GBFC instructions, and the similarity 
instructions led to proportionally lower action choices overall. 
 
2.17.3 Age and Gender 
The influence of the participant’s age was examined using a 2x3 mixed 
ANOVA after removing those participants whose age was more than two standard 
deviations above mean (N = 5)22. The ANOVA showed that the same patterns found 																																																								
22 The age of the participants was significantly correlated with the number of action choice on the PCO 
triads, R = .32, p = .002, showing a positive correlation. However, age was not correlated with the 
number of action scores on the SCO (p > .05) or DCO triads (p > .05) and therefore it was decided that 
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in the previous analysis were replicated. This included the main effects of triad type 
(p < .001) and context (p < .001), and the three-way interaction effect (p = .003) as 
described above in Section 2.17.2. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment 
showed that on only a few comparisons did the GB and GBFC instructions 
significantly differ, and at no point did the GBFC instructions lead to lower action 
choices compared to the GB instructions. The only difference found was that the main 
effect of instructions was no longer significant as it was in the previous analysis, F(2, 
79) = 2.58, p = .082, η2 = .06.  
Gender was examined by conducting using a 3x2x3x2 mixed ANOVA with 
triad type as a within-subjects factor, and context, instructions and gender as between-
subject factors. The same patterns found previously regarding the main effects and 
interaction effects were again replicated. Of importance here, the main effect of 
gender was not significant, F < 1, indicating that general selection of the action choice 
was consistent between males and females. In addition, gender did not interact with 
either triad type, context or instructions (for all comparisons, F < 1). However, the 
three way interaction between triad type, context and gender was significant, F(2, 
156) = 4.40, p = .014, η2 = .05. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment 
showed that the only difference between males and females occurred on the DCO 
triads in the context-lean condition where males were more likely to select the action 
choice than the females (p = .027)23. This might indicate that there is some preference 
for males to select the action choice more than women. However, this pattern is not 
consistent across the other triads, nor in the previous experiments, and the results 
therefore do not show a reliable gender effect.   
 
 
																																																								
it was not appropriate to perform an ANCOVA because the effects were not consistent and violate the 
ANCOVA assumptions.   
23 Within the remaining chapters, the effects of age and gender were analysed using the same 
procedures outlined within the current chapter, but are only reported when significant patterns have 
been found (see Experiment 7, Section 4.8.1 and Experiment 8, Section 5.6.1).  
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Figure 2.2. Mean percentage of action choices in the context-lean condition with the Same Category Object (SCO), Different Category Object (DCO), and 
Perceptual Category Object (PCO) triads between the Goes Best (GB), Goes Best to Form a Category (GBFC) and Most Similar (MS) instructions. Error bars 
are standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 2.3. Mean percentage of action choices in the context-rich condition on the Same Category Object (SCO), Different Category Object (DCO), and 
Perceptual Category Object (PCO) triads between the Goes Best (GB), Goes Best to Form a Category (GBFC) and Most Similar (MS) instructions. Error bars 
are standard errors of the mean.
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2.18 Discussion 
The results reported here replicate those of Experiment 2. The reaction times 
on the triads were faster on the DCO and SCO triads compared to the PCO. As with 
Experiment 2 this is presumably because participants find it more difficult to 
categorise objects in the absence of taxonomic information. With regards to the 
instructions, and after accounting for the normality of the data, no difference was 
found on the reaction times between the GB and GBFC instructions. This suggests 
that engaging with both instructions does encourage the participants to use a 
categorical strategy in assessing the triads. This is in line with previous research 
which does view the use of the ‘goes best’ instructions as reflecting a categorical 
decision (Estes et al., 2011; Lin & Murphy, 2001; Mirman & Graziano, 2012; Sachs 
et al., 2008).  
The data on the action choices was also in line with that found in Experiment 
2. Participants were more likely to select the action choice on the SCO triads when it 
also shared taxonomic information. This is in comparison to the DCO and PCO 
triads where choices were lower, but greater than 50%.  
The main effect of context was also replicated from Experiment 2 where 
action choices were significantly higher when the items were shown in a functional 
context compared to shown in isolation. Although a significant increase due to 
context was seen in all three triad types, this effect was strongest for the SCO and 
PCO triads compared to the DCO triads. This data is in line with the explanation of 
Experiment 2. When participants are simulating the objects in use the shared actions 
between the objects becomes more salient given that the context narrows the range of 
potential simulations to one that shows the item in use, and thus the simulation 
becomes more focused on the object’s motoric component. The context-lean 
condition has the potential to create a wide variety of possible simulations which 
may not focus on the shared actions between the objects and hence makes the shared 
actions less salient, and less likely to influence the choices made. However, it should 
be noted that not all participants use action in their choices, and not on all the triads.  
However, of main interest was the effect of task instructions. A potential 
criticism of the results reported in Experiment 2 was that the use of the “goes best” 
instructions might have encouraged participants to use a non-categorical strategy on 
matching the triads, and led to more reliance on action. The significant three-way 
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interaction reported here deflects this as a potential criticism. If it were the case that 
participants were not using a categorisation strategy, then action choice preferences 
with GBFC instructions would be significantly lower than with the GB instructions. 
Overall, the GB instructions did not lead to significantly higher action choice 
frequencies than the GBFC instructions. In contrast, there are examples within the 
triads where GBFC instructions actually led to higher action choice frequencies than 
GB instructions. Therefore, rather than the more ambiguous GB instructions inflating 
action choice frequencies, it appears that these instructions are, if anything, reducing 
the probability of picking the action item.  
A second possibility on the triad performance was that participants were not 
specifically categorising the objects, but using overall similarity to judge the items 
and therefore selecting the object most similar. If it were the case that participants 
were using a similarity rather than a categorisation strategy, then the MS instructions 
would result in choice preferences more similar to those obtained with the GB 
instructions. However, the results show that action frequencies were lower when 
participants were invited to select the most similar item. This is supported by 
previous evidence from Iachini, Borghi and Senese (2008) who showed that action 
influences category decisions, but not similarity ratings24. This further suggests that 
the triad task is a categorisation task and not one that reflects only assessments of 
similarity. Overall, the results help to refute this possibility outlined from Experiment 
2. Given that the results of the ‘goes best’ instructions were not significantly higher 
than those to directly form a category, the criticism that participants were biased, and 
not engaging in a categorisation task, has been negated.  
An interesting finding here relates to the use of the GBFC instructions on the 
DCO triads. With these triads and instructions, the overall frequency of action 
choices was higher in the context-lean than in the context-rich condition. 
Theoretically speaking, it would be predicted that action choice frequencies should 
be fairly low with DCO triads when participants are asked to group by category 
when the taxonomic item was designed to share category membership with the 
target, and the action choice was not. For example, the rifle and sword are both 
weapons and therefore when asked “goes best to form a category” participants 																																																								
24 See Chapter 6 for additional support with similarity ratings on the stimuli developed in Experiment 
2.  
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should be more likely to select sword over water pistol. However, in both conditions 
the participants were more likely to select the action choice compared to the 
taxonomic choice.  
There are two possible explanations for this pattern. The first is that the 
definition of a category given to the participants emphasised perceptual 
characteristics as being a source of commonality. As discussed in Section 2.4, 
perceptual characteristics are potentially a source of bias on the DCO triads given the 
shared ergonomics between the action choice and the target. Therefore, when the 
participants are instructed to make a category, and clearly given perceptual 
characteristics as a reason to do so, they select the action choice on the triad. The fact 
that the action choices were higher in the context-lean condition could be explained 
by the design format of the triads. Objects shown in the context-rich condition are 
partially obscured by the agent holding the object. For example, in the 
rifle/sword/water pistol example the handle of the rifle and the water pistol are 
obscured by the person holding it. Therefore, as such elements are blocked from the 
agent’s view then perceptual properties might be less likely to influence the choice 
made compared to the context-lean condition where the objects are shown un-
obscured. Overall, participants were less likely to use perceptual reasons to make 
their choices in the context-rich than context-lean condition, and hence less likely to 
select the action choice in the former. This would also be in line with the higher 
action choices found on the PCO triads in the context-rich condition. Participants 
would be less likely to use perceptual properties and hence were more likely to pick 
the action choice (as was found in the data).  
The second possible explanation is that participants were creating goal 
derived, rather than functional categories. For example, participants might be 
grouping screwdriver with key because of the general goal of ‘opening’ rather than 
their specific function. This is highlighted by the context shown and therefore, in 
combination with lower perceptual features, might increase the salience of such goal-
derived categories. This would also explain why a high percentage of action choices 
were seen in the PCO triads where none of the items shared category membership 
with the target, when participants was explicitly asked to group the objects into a 
category. An example of this would be with a triad with cocktail shaker as the target 
and maracas as a choice option where participants would not put them together 
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based on shared functions (one makes a drink and one makes music) but derived on 
the ad hoc notion of “things that are shaken”. The most likely option however is that 
both of these explanations work together when participants make their choices. This 
is further investigated in Chapter 5 using protocol analysis.  
In conclusion, the results showed that participants were more likely to select 
the action-related item in the triads when given specific category instructions. 
Previous concerns that action choices were inflated by the “goes best” instructions 
have been alleviated following the comparison of such instructions with choice 
preferences elicited with “goes best to form a category” instructions. However, what 
is not clear here is the type of category participants create on the fly when engaging 
with a triad tasks, whether these are categories that cohere in terms of their semantic 
or goal derived features.  
 
2.19 General Discussion 
The reported research aimed to show how action may be used to group 
objects together in an action-irrelevant, conceptual task. The triad task requires no 
physical action for task performance and therefore if participants match items 
together based on shared actions, then this would show how such knowledge is 
automatically recruited and used in such categorisation tasks. There were two main 
findings of interest from the work reported in this chapter. The first was that 
participants were more likely to base their choices on action when the items are 
presented in context. This is not unexpected given that previous research shows 
object properties, including action, are more salient when presented within context 
(Barsalou, 1982; Borghi et al., 2012; Kalénine et al., 2014). This would leave two 
possibilities in interpreting the data, that either action is not automatically recruited 
in such tasks or that action is automatically recruited, but this does not necessarily 
mean it will be used to base such categorisation decisions. Given that previous 
research (Borghi, 2004; Campanella & Shallice, 2012; Chao & Martin, 2001; Myung 
et al., 2006; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001) has shown implicit effects in action-based 
responses it is unlikely that the action is not automatically simulated when thinking 
about objects. What is more likely here is that such knowledge is recruited when 
thinking about objects, but this does not guarantee that it will influence category 
decisions in all cases. It is the simulation (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2016b) that 
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determines which features participants focus on for making category decisions. The 
simulation is determined by the context presented and therefore participants in the 
context-rich condition are given a salient context that narrows and specifies the 
simulation generated, hence participants are more likely to use action as a source of 
categorisation.  
The second main finding is that action is less likely to ground category 
membership on its own, particularly when competing against shared taxonomic 
information. However, what the results do show is that action has an additive effect. 
When items are matched on their taxonomic relation participants are more likely to 
select the option that also shares an action. Experiment 3 has removed the possibility 
that participants were selecting the item that was more typical of the category. What 
can be seen across the triads is that participants are not always consistent in how they 
respond in this task. For example, it is not the case that participants always use action 
in basing their choices. If this were the case then participants would always select the 
action choice across all the triads. Instead, participants’ performance is modified by 
the stimuli used, and the context within each specific trial. As such they may not 
always use the same strategy across each trials.  
Simmons and Estes (2008) also found, when using the triads of Lin and 
Murphy (2001), that there were individual differences across the triads with some 
participants showing around a 50% chance of selecting either the thematic or the 
taxonomic choice. It is therefore clear that participants do vary in their global and 
local strategies across the triad task. It is most likely, especially in the context of the 
current experimental work, that participants engage in a local strategy across the triad 
task where their reasoning and strategy for completing each trial varies given the 
nature of the stimuli. For example, the same participant might choose banana for 
orange because of the shared action, but then might choose elastic band for pencil 
because of the shared taxonomic relation. Even within the same triad type 
participants do not use the same strategy, further exemplified but the fact that there is 
a wide variation in participants’ scores between 0% and 100% on each triad type.  
There is also the possibility that participants are using strategies outside of 
taxonomic, action or perceptual, for example choosing banana over strawberry 
because they do not like strawberries (personal preference). While it is believed that 
such circumstances are limited, it is still a possibility (see Chapter 5 for supportive 
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evidence for this). There is, additionally, the possibility that participants are not 
making semantic categories but are, in fact, forming ad hoc categories (Barsalou, 
1983). Given the embodied view of cognition, which posits that concept knowledge 
is ‘grounded’ across multimodal representations, participants can be influenced by a 
wide range of activated systems (as opposed to relying on a static feature list) of 
which action is only one potential feature and so these may affect choices 
differentially for participants.  
In the next chapters, the experimental work has sought to identify other 
circumstances under which actions are likely to influence decisions in the triad task 
(Chapters 3 and 4), but also sought to identify the types of strategies that participants 
use across the two contexts (Chapter 5).  	 	
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Chapter 3 
What Counts as the ‘Context’? 
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Experiments 2 and 4 have both demonstrated that the likelihood of 
participants selecting the action item in the triads, significantly increased when the 
items were presented in context. The context images, while confirming to the design 
remit, themselves do vary in nature. A visual analysis of the items used suggested 
that those images where the hands were clearly using the objects were more likely to 
lead to the action choice in the triad task, suggesting that participants were looking 
more at the hands than the objects. However, simulation theory would predict that 
participants focus on the image as a whole, rather than the individual elements (i.e. 
the object itself or the hands holding it). This was measured using eye-tracking 
software, which showed that participants do not particularly focus on the hands, and 
spend little time looking at the objects. Rather, participants focus on the image as a 
whole supporting a ‘simulated’ view of task performance.  
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3. Experiment 5 
Using Eye-Tracking to Assess Which Elements of the Context are most Likely to 
Drive Action-Based Choices 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown that, within the triad task developed in 
Chapter 2, participants were more likely to select the action choice when the items 
are shown in context. Definitions of context vary across subject areas and disciplines 
and the notion of context is therefore difficult to constrain (Bazire & Brézillon, 2005; 
Brézillon, 1999). Bazire and Brézillon (2005) suggested that it is difficult to 
understand context based on knowing what is included within the context, and 
whether the context should include the person, the task, the situation or even the 
interaction between all of them. Despite such difficulties in defining the term, it has 
been clearly demonstrated that participants ‘benefit’ in task performance (across 
various cognitive tasks) by presenting items in context (Barsalou, 1982; Borghi et al., 
2012; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Kalénine et al., 2013; 
Palmer, 1975; Roth & Shoben, 1983; Smith, 1994; Smith & Vela, 2001).  
The data presented in Chapter 2 suggested that the effects of context were not 
consistent across the triads. Stronger contextual influences were seen on some triads 
compared to others. For those others, context appeared to have no effect on 
increasing selection of the action choices. The primary explanation offered in 
Chapter 2 for the context effect, was that the context images help to reduce and 
narrow the simulation produced by the participants from a possible ‘bank’ of 
scenarios involving the objects (Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). It was suggested that when 
participants view the triads in the context-lean condition, participants are able to 
generate a wide range of possible simulations given that the context does not specify 
anything particular. However, the context-rich condition suggests a specific context 
and this in turn should influence the simulations so that participants generate their 
own scenario based on the image seen. For example, seeing the images of a person 
peeling and orange and a banana should influence the participants to generate their 
own simulation based on peeling fruit. This would include the action of the object 
and hence make this more salient for choosing an item in the triad.  
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This explanation implies that when participants are viewing the images they 
are focusing not only on the objects in the picture, but on the agent as well. In 
essence, participants view the scene as a whole rather than focusing on individual 
elements. A visual analysis of the materials used in Chapter 2 indicated that those 
triads in which participants were more likely to select the action choice was clearer 
in terms of the hand being seen grasping on the objects. Therefore, this might 
indicate that participants’ attention is drawn to how the objects are used, along with 
the object itself.  
The aim of the following experiment was to examine which aspects of the 
images participants spent more time looking at. Participants should, theoretically, be 
looking at the image as a whole and processing the scene being acted out (according 
to simulation theory and the explanation posited above). However, the visual analysis 
indicated that participants might focus more on the agents holding the objects than 
the objects themselves. From a situated perspective it would be predicted that 
participants look at the image as a whole since instantiating a given situation requires 
taking in all aspects of the image. However, it is possible that participants focus on 
more specific elements of the images used. In analysing the images used in 
Experiment 2 it was noted that those that were more likely to lead to the action 
choice clearly displayed the hands holding/using the objects. The images used in the 
triad task show the agent interacting with the objects in a specific manner. Therefore, 
it would be expected that the participants look at the hands of the agent as well as the 
objects in order to help understand the context in the image, which cannot be done by 
just looking at the object alone.  
In order to assess which elements of the pictures participants spent more time 
looking at, eye-tracking was used while participants performed the triad task. As the 
research was interested in how participants spent time looking at the context images, 
the triad task was conducted using only the context-rich condition. The context-lean 
images consisted of only the object, and therefore, only a single point of interest. In 
general terms, preferential looking should predict selection of the choice item. 
Therefore, it was predicted that the choice item participants spend more time looking 
at should (positively) correlate with selection of that choice item. More specifically, 
it was of interest if participants focus on using the objects as much as they focus on 
the objects themselves (i.e. looking at the hands on the objects as much as looking at 
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the objects), and as much as they focus on the image as a whole. Therefore, it was 
predicted that no differences would be found between looking times for the object 
and the agent. In addition, it was further predicted that the triad pattern seen in the 
previous experiments would be replicated here, with lower action choices on the 
DCO triads compared to the SCO triads.  
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-seven undergraduate students from the University of Hertfordshire 
took part in the experiment. Participants were recruited through opportunity sampling 
and consisted of 4 males and 23 females with a mean age of 19.44 (SD = 1.69, age 
range: 18-27).  
 
3.2.2 Design 
 The experiment consisted of a forced-choice triad task using the same 30 
triad items as in Experiment 2 (10 x SCO, 10 x DCO, 10 x PCO). However, unlike 
Experiment 2, triads were only shown to participants in the context-rich condition. 
There were five dependent variables measured. As with the previous triad 
experiments, the number of action choices for each type of triad was recorded. In 
addition, using the eye-tracking software Areas of Interest (AoI’s) were set up on 
each triad for the object label of the triad, the object itself, the hands of the agent on 
the object as well as on the image as a whole. This allowed for the recording of how 
long participants spent looking at each AoI (in seconds). 
 
3.2.3 Materials 
 The same 30 triads (objects only) used in Experiment 2 (10 x SCO, 10 x 
DCO, 10 x PCO) were again used and presented using Tobii Studio v.3.2.1 software 
on a Tobii X2-30 portable Eye Tracker system. As the software cannot randomize 
the trials, they were presented using a Latin Square design ensuring that triads of the 
same type did not precede each other. All triads were presented within the context-
rich condition only.  
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
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Experiment 5 was set up so that it resembled Experiment 2 as closely as 
possible. The Tobii portable Eye Tracker unit was a relatively small device (18.4 x 
2.8 x 2.3cm) mounted on top of 15” Dell laptop and therefore unobtrusive to the 
participant (unlike other eye tracking systems, no additional headwear was required 
of the participant). The laptop was placed directly in front of the participants and the 
participants were asked to sit so that they were comfortable with a clear view of the 
screen, and could easily operate the keyboard. In this way, the set-up of the 
experiment, including the display and the participant’s distance from the screen, 
matched the experiment set up used in the previous experiments. The only 
differences being the software used to present the triads, and the order in which they 
were presented (see Section 3.2.3). However, the software utilised the images and 
arrangement of those in the previous experiments and therefore the visual display 
seen by the participants in the current experiment was the same as those in the 
previous. The experiment took place in a (University of Hertfordshire) campus lab 
room and therefore the physical context (including lighting and the 
participant/experimenter seating arrangement) matched that of the previous 
experiments.    
Before engaging in the experiment participants were calibrated to the Tobii 
software to track eye movements. This involved the participant following a dot 
around the screen and took less than 30 seconds to complete. Following this the 
procedure was the same as that of Experiment 2 in which participants were shown 
the triads and instructed to select the option that “goes best” with the target object. 
The triads were shown using the Tobii software with the same timings as in 
Experiment 2 (fixation cue = 1000ms, target only = 1500ms, target and choice 
options = until participant key press). Unlike the previous experiments where 
participants responded using designated keys, they were instructed to press the space 
bar as soon as they had made a decision, which would remove all the triad items 
from the screen, and they would then state their choice verbally. This was recorded 
by the experimenter. The participant would then press the space bar again to begin 
the next trial.  
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Choice Analysis 
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 The frequency of action choices on the DCO, SCO and PCO triads are 
reported below in Table 3.1. As can be seen, a high frequency of action choices was 
recorded in all of the triad sets with scores ranging between 64% on the DCO triads 
and 74% on the PCO. In the previous experiments, the DCO action choices were 
lower than the SCO and the PCO triads. A 1x3 repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the data using the triad type as the within-subjects factor. The main 
effect of triad type was significant, F (2, 52) = 3.96, p = .03, h2 = .13. Planned 
comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that the difference between the 
DCO and the PCO triads approached significance (p = .07) but did not cross the 
alpha threshold. No difference was found between the DCO and SCO triads (p = 
.73), nor between the SCO and the PCO triads (p = .73). These results showed that a 
high level of action-based choices was made overall, and there were no differences 
between the triad types.  
 
Table 3.1  
Mean Percentage (Standard Deviations) of Action Choices Across Triad Type.  
Triad Mean percentage of choice (SD) 
DCO 64% (17%) 
SCO 69% (13%) 
PCO 74% (11%) 
 
3.3.2 AoI Analysis 
 The results of the time participants spent looking at the choice options can be 
seen below in Table 3.2. Across all of the triads, participants spent more time looking 
at the choice option that shared an action (M = .25, SD = .03) than the taxonomic-
based choice (M = .20, SD = .02). In addition, participants looked at the PCO triads 
(M = .28, SD = .04) triads longer than the SCO (M = .21, SD = .02) and the DCO 
triads (M = .19, SD = .02). Of particular interest in this experiment was the time 
participants spent looking at the three Areas of Interest (the hands, objects and the 
object labels), measured using eye-tracking software. From the data in Table 3.2, it 
appears that participants spent longer looking at the labels of the triads (M = .48, SD 
= .08) than the objects (M = .14, SD = .02) and the hands (M = .06, SD = .01).  
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A 2x3x3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data using the 
choice options (action vs taxonomic), triad type (DCO vs SCO vs PCO) and AoI 
(hand vs object vs title) all as within-subjects factors. The main effect of choice 
option was significant showing that the participants spent longer looking at the action 
related item than the competitor, F (1, 26) = 12.19, p = .002, h2 = .32. The main 
effect of triad type was also significant using the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment25, F 
(1.2, 31.16) = 12.68, p = .001, h2 = .33. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni 
adjustment showed that participants spent longer looking at the PCO triads than the 
DCO (p = .002) and the SCO triads (p = .013). In addition, participants spent longer 
looking at the SCO triads than the DCO (p = .017). The main effect of AoI was 
significant using the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment26, F (1.03, 26.81) = 28.09, p < 
.001, h2 = .52. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that 
participants spent longer looking at the labels of the triad than either the object (p < 
.001) or the hands interacting with the object (p < .001), and they looked at the 
objects longer than they did the hands27 (p < .001). At face value this would suggest 
that labels play a strong role in how participants make their choices on the triads and 
that the hands interacting with the objects play a rather weak role with little attention 
paid to them. Section 3.4 will consider why this may not be the appropriate 
interpretation.  
The interaction between the choice items and the triad type was not 
significant, F (2, 52) = 1.53, p = .23, h2 = .06, nor was the interaction between triad 
type and AoI28, F (1.49, 38.70) = 2.84, p = .09, h2 = .10. However, the interaction 
between the choice type and the AoI was significant using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
adjustment29, F (1.5, 39.07) = 6.87, p = .006, h2 = .21. Post hoc comparisons using 
the Bonferroni adjustment showed that participants spent significantly more time (p 
= .005) looking at the objects in the action choice (M = .16) than in the competitor 
																																																								25	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant; χ² (2) = 27.64, p < .001, and therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .60. 26	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant; χ² (2) = 70.14, p < .001, and therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .52.	
27 This pattern was true for the majority of the triads seen, but not for all of them.  28	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant; χ² (2) = 78.10, p < .001, and therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .37. 	29	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant; χ² (2) = 10.05, p = .007, and therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .75. 	
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item (M = .11). In addition, participants spent significantly more time (p = .004) 
looking at the labels of the action choice (M = .53) than of competitor item (M = .43). 
However, no difference was found between the time participants spent looking at the 
hands in the action choice (M = .06) and the taxonomic choice (M = .07, p = .46). 
The ANOVA further revealed that the three-way interaction between choice type, 
triad type and AoI’s was not significant, F (4, 104) = 1.37, p = .25, h2 = .05.  
 
Table 3.2  
Mean Time (Standard Deviations) in Seconds Spent Looking at the Area of Interests 
(AoI) Across Choice Option and Triad Type. 
Triad AoI Choice Option 
Action Taxonomic 
DCO Hand .03 (.04) .06 (.05) 
Object .17 (.13) .08 (.06) 
Label  .45 (.37) .35 (.29) 
SCO Hand  .05 (.06) .05 (.06) 
Object  .11 (.08) .10 (.10) 
Label .53 (.42) .45 (.26) 
PCO Hand  .10 (.07) .09 (.08) 
Object  .20 (.17) .16 (.11) 
Label .62 (.64) .49 (.47) 
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Figure 3.1. The mean time (seconds) spent looking at the Areas of Interest across triad type 
on the action choice. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
Figure 3.2. The mean time (seconds) spent looking at the Areas of Interest on the choice 
items (collapsed across all triad types). Error bars present the standard error of the mean. 		
The initial analysis showed that participants spent more time looking at the 
labels of the words than they did looking at the hands of the agent and the objects in 
the picture. However, it is important to note that the images used consisted of more 
than just the object and the hands on them, but represented a visual scenario. 
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Therefore, as well as analysing the individual elements of the picture, it was 
important to examine how participants looked at the image as a whole. To do this, 
the time participants spent looking at the title of the words was compared against the 
image used as a whole picture. The results can be seen below in Table 3.3. It appears 
that participants spent more time looking at the image as a whole compared to the 
title of the words.  
A 3x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the mean looking 
times using triad type, choice and AoI as within-subjects factors. The results showed 
that the main effect of triad type was significant using the Greenhouse Geisser 
adjustment30, F (1.28, 33.33) = 6.64, p = .010, h2 = .20. Post hoc analysis using the 
Bonferroni adjustment showed that the mean looking times between the SCO (M = 
.57) and the DCO triads (M = .56, p = 1.0) did not differ, but that participants looked 
more at the PCO triads (M = .66) than both the SCO (p = .031) and the DCO triads (p 
= .046), replicating that found in Experiments 2 and 4 where longer reaction times 
were seen on the PCO triads. The main effect of choice was also significant, F (1, 
26) = 20.37, p < .001, h2 = .44, with greater looking times for the action choice (M = 
.65) than the competitor item (M = .55). In addition, the main effect of AoI was also 
significant, F (1, 26) = 7.96, p = .009, h2 = .23, with greater looking times for the 
image as a whole (M = .72) than the label of the objects (M = .47). None of the two-
way or the three-way interaction effects were significant.  
Correlational analysis was conducted on the time that participants spent 
looking at the images on the triads and the percentage of the action choice selected. It 
was initially predicted that the time spent looking at a choice objects should correlate 
with selection of that choice. For all three triad types it was found that the time spent 
looking at the action choice image did not correlate with the percentage of action 
choices made (DCO: r = .27, p = .17; SCO: r = -.16, p = .43; PCO: r = .05, p = .80). 
This therefore suggests, that there is no relationship between how long participants 
spent looking at the choice items and whether or not they selected the action choice.  
 
																																																								30	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant; χ² (2) = 20.54, p < .001, and therefore the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .64.	
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Table 3.3  
Mean Time (Standard Deviations) in Seconds Spent Looking at the Area of Interests 
(AoI) Across Choice Options and Triad Type. 
Triad AoI Choice Option 
Action Competitor* 
DCO Image .72 (.30) .72 (.32) 
Title  .48 (.38) .35 (.30) 
SCO Image .74 (.28) .61 (.28) 
Title  .50 (.41) .38 (.26) 
PCO Image .82 (.34) .72 (.36) 
Title  .62 (.64) .49 (.47) 
*Note. For the DCO and SCO triads the competitor shared a taxonomic relation where as for the PCO 
triads it shared a perceptual relationship.  
 
3.4 Discussion 
The aim of the Experiment 5 was to investigate which of the elements of the 
context-rich images participants spent more time looking at. Simulation theory would 
predict that participants focus on the whole image because rather than processing the 
individual elements of the image, participants should process the context. However, 
it was still possible that participants would focus more on the objects, and on the 
hands holding/using the objects, rather than the scene as a whole.  
Participants overall spent very little time looking at the hands and no 
difference was found between the action and the opposing choice item. In contrast, 
participants spent more time looking at the objects in the images compared to the 
hands. In particular, participants looked at the object for longer in the action choice 
compared to the opposing (taxonomic/perceptual) choice item. The data on the triad 
type shows that participants spent more time looking at the PCO triads than the SCO 
or DCO. This reflects the reaction times seen in Experiments 2 and 4 where 
participants were slower to respond to the PCO triads. In both cases, the most 
probable explanation is that the PCO triads are naturally more difficult to categorise 
given that no clear functional relation and/or no clear category label presents itself 
when confronted with all three items. Hence, participants were slower to respond and 
spent more time looking at the PCO triads.  
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The time spent looking at the areas of interest (AoI’s) shows that overall, 
participants spent the longest amount of time looking at the titles on the images 
compared to the objects and the hands. The face value interpretation of this is that 
participants were influenced more by the words than the images. However, given the 
relatively short times here (participants spent on average under half a second looking 
at the words) it is believed that this most likely reflects their natural reading time of 
the word.  
What the results do suggest is that the selection of the action choice is not 
influenced by the single elements within the images used, but by the image as a 
whole. Participants spent more time looking at the whole image rather than the words 
or the individual elements within it. In addition, participants spent more time looking 
at the images on the action choice than on the competitor. However, while this was 
the case, the results rather surprisingly do not suggest that selection of the action 
choice was linked to the time spent looking at it. Despite this participants were more 
likely to select the action choice in all three triad types.  
What can be determined from the consistent effect of context in enhancing 
the number of the action choices (found in Experiments 2 and 4), is that viewing the 
image does in some way influence the choice made. The eye tracking data does not 
indicate that this is the result of particular visual attention to the hands interacting 
with the objects, as was originally anticipated when designing the triads, but more on 
overall appraisal of the entire image. This supports the view that participants focus 
on the scene as a whole rather than the individual elements, which in turn should 
influence their simulations of the objects. However, while the data does show how 
participants spend their time viewing the objects, it is not able to tell us exactly why 
participants select these items after viewing them. It might be expected that the 
length of time participants spend looking at the objects should be reflected in the 
simulation they create and hence be more likely to select the action item (since they 
spend more time looking at it). The highest amount of action choices were selected in 
the PCO triads which were also the triads that participants spent more time looking at 
(and the previous experimental work shows longer reaction times on such). However, 
no correlation was found between the time taken looking at the objects and selection 
of the action choice.  
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An interesting point here, is whether potentially visual attention to the areas 
of interests prevents visual attention to other ‘neighbouring’ elements of the images. 
While it could be that certain elements of the images draw participants’ attention, it 
is believed to not be a detrimental factor here. The images used were relatively small 
and chosen to highlight the intended action of the object. Therefore, the only 
elements visible were part of the design manipulation. No additional background 
information was included in the images which could have drawn attention away from 
the intended focus of the research. Additionally, many of the images used were close 
up and highlighted the action, while not supplying other ‘distractor’ information. The 
‘looking’ data in Table 3.3 suggests that participants were not just looking at the 
specific elements but at the image as a whole, which all occurred within a relatively 
short space of time. The context images were selected to imply the specific action 
where all aspects of the image were relevant to this, which would not imply that 
areas fixations would have a detrimental impact.  
While varying the contextual images used should influence the simulations 
the participants make, this does not guarantee that the action choice is selected. Nor 
is it guaranteed that the action choice is selected for that reason itself. The aim of 
Chapter 4 was to investigate the effects of physical interaction on the objects in the 
triads. The previous chapters have shown (some of) the circumstances under which 
action becomes influential for categorisation in an action-irrelevant task. In 
Experiments 1 to 5, participants were not required to make any physical action 
before or during the task outside of pushing a button. And yet, action was still 
influential in the task. Therefore, Chapter 4 aimed to measure the effects on the triad 
task when participants were required to perform relevant physical actions before 
undertaking the same triad task. 	
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Chapter 4 
Turning Passive into Active: Using Physical Actions to Prime Action-Based 
Triad Responses 
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The previous chapter showed how action is used in a passive categorisation 
task. In particular, action is most likely to be used when it is presented alongside 
taxonomic information, and when shown within a dynamic context. The results are 
important for two reasons; (i) they show that action is used as a source of information 
for categorisation and (ii) they show that action is influential even under action-
irrelevant conditions where action is not necessary for task performance. The results 
are discussed within the framework of simulation theory. In such a view, thinking 
about objects would partially instantiate those neurons that were active at the initial 
encounter with the objects.  
The aim of Chapter 4 was to see if action choices could be decreased, or 
increased through physical actions. Experiment 6 attempted to increase action 
choices on the triad task by first requiring participant to physically use the objects. 
Prior to the triad task, participants engaged in one of three priming tasks either (i) 
functionally using the objects, (ii) sorting the objects into groups, or (iii) moving the 
objects. It was predicted, based on simulation theory and previous research, that 
recent (but not concurrent) actions should activate a simulation based on such 
interaction. Therefore, recently using the objects in a functional manner should raise 
the saliency of action information, and in turn increase action choices on the triad 
task. The results followed this prediction and are discussed in light of simulation 
theory.  
Based on simulation theory, and the notion that neurons are partially re-
activated, Experiment 7 attempted to decrease action choices on the triad task. It was 
predicted that performing concurrent, manual actions should activate the motor 
cortex and ‘block’ the conceptual system from reinstantiating such neurons when 
simulating the objects in the triad task. By preventing simulation, and hence 
preventing such action information from being simulated, participants should be less 
likely to select the action choice in the triads. The results showed that performing 
concurrent actions did not influence action choices. The results are discussed in light 
of the ‘dual-process’ nature of the triad task.  
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4. Experiment 6  
Orange Goes with Banana Because I’ve Just Peeled One: The Influence of 
Physical Priming on Categorical Choices 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The research reviewed in the previous chapters has shown that knowledge of 
action is highly influential in a range of cognitive tasks. This lends support to the 
claim that action information is incorporated into our conceptual representations of 
objects. It is widely agreed that one of the primary functions of concepts is to support 
inferences and predictions. While functional, perceptual and thematic information are 
valuable in concepts, action might arguably be perhaps the most important in being 
able to navigate the environment (Franks & Braisby, 1997). Therefore, research 
should focus not only on using action-irrelevant tasks to show when action 
knowledge influences task performance but also tasks where participants are required 
to physically interact with objects. This should be a primary focus in research given 
that such knowledge is not incorporated into concepts simply for the purpose of 
possessing such knowledge, but to act as a guide in later situations when it is 
necessary to perform relevant actions.  
Empirical evidence has, to date, shown that there are differences in task 
performance comparing the intention to interact against physically interacting with 
objects. For example, using the Stroop paradigm with congruent and incongruent 
actions, Bub et al. (2003) showed only differences in response latencies when 
participants were asked to perform the associated gesture to use the objects rather 
than simply naming them. This is supported by further research that has found action 
knowledge to be influential in task performance when participants are given physical 
training phases prior to task onset (Borghi et al., 2007; Bub & Masson, 2006), but not 
under passive conditions. Such research might suggest that action only influences 
task performance under conditions where the participants are required to make (or 
trained with) physical actions.  
In contrast, Vainio et al. (2008) showed that action information was 
influential in a task when participants responded both verbally and physically. This 
was demonstrated using dynamic, as opposed to static, primes. In their task, 
participants saw a prime of a hand making a precision or a power grasp, followed by 
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an object superimposed on top of the prime. Participants made a categorical decision 
in deciding if the target object was natural or man-made. Participants were faster on 
object congruent trials than incongruent trials. The same results were found when 
participants responded verbally or physically mimicked the precision and power 
grasps (see Chapter 1 for more details).  
Jax and Buxbaum (2010) and Osiurak et al. (2013) provide strong evidence 
for differences in task performance based on the intention to act versus physically 
interacting with objects. Jax and Buxbaum presented participants with conflict and 
non-conflict items and asked participants to place their hands on the objects as 
though they would either pick them up and use them or grasp them and pass them to 
the experimenter (use and grasp was within-subjects and was counterbalanced for 
order). The results showed that, for the conflict objects, participants were slower to 
make use-based actions than grasping the objects. In addition, they also showed that 
grasping the objects first had no effect on later using the objects. However, when 
participants had to use the items first for their function they were then slower 
afterwards to grasp the conflict items. This effect was not found for the non-conflict 
items. The authors suggest activation of functional knowledge is relatively long 
lasting and results in a long-term use-on-grasp interference effect because functional 
information is stronger and requires semantic activation31 whereas structural 
information can be accessed independent of this.  
Osiurak et al. (2013), however, found the opposite results. In a partial 
replication of Jax and Buxbaum (2010), they required participants to physically pick 
up and use or pick up and pass the objects to the experimenter rather than simply 
putting their hand on them. They found that, in contrast to Jax and Buxbaum, 
participants were faster to pick up and use the objects than to grasp them and pass 
them to the experimenter. The most likely explanation for the difference in results is 
that physically carrying out the action requires activation of non-spatial information 
such as weight and fragility, which is not required in simply putting your hand on the 
object. In addition, the act of passing it to another person also includes allocentric 
information such as the location of the receiver. Further research using similar 																																																								
31 It should be noted here that the authors discuss this as a general activation of semantic information. 
It could theoretically be supposed that this activation represents a ‘Barsalouian’ simulation. Though 
Jax and Buxbaum (2010) do not suggest this, it is assumed in the thesis that such activation represents 
a simulation.  
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methodologies supports the differences between gestures to use or to transport with 
faster initiations times for transporting rather than using objects (Chainay, Brüers, 
Martin & Osiurak, 2014; Osiurak, Bergot & Chainay, 2015; Sartori, Straulino & 
Castiello, 2011; Valyear, Chapman, Gallivan, Mark & Culham, 2011). Only Osiurak 
et al. (2013) has found evidence for faster reaction times for use over grasp actions.  
A factor that has been shown to influence priming effects is the type of prime 
used. Priming studies typically use visual stimuli (Borghi et al., 2007; Bub & 
Masson, 2006, 2010; Bub et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2013; Vanio et al., 2008) and have 
been shown to be more successful in priming action-based responses compared to 
using words. For example, Bub et al. (2008) showed that visual primes increased 
reaction times when participants responded to them on the graspasaurus (see Chapter 
1 for more details). However, the same objects shown as words had no priming effect 
demonstrating that passive reading of words cannot act as a prime. Masson et al. 
(2008) however, showed that functional actions were primed by reading sentences 
containing no reference to manual action. For example, “kicking the calculators” 
which does not suggest a (direct) manual action still facilitated grasp-based responses 
on the graspasaurus. The same effect was not found for volumetric/structural actions 
linked to movement. However, one key difference to note here is the use of words 
alone against whole sentences as Bub et al. (2008) did not find action-based 
facilitation effects using only words. Clearly priming is only effective in the context 
of comprehending sentences as opposed to reading words alone. Perhaps this occurs 
because the sentences contain both an action and a verb, hence suggesting a clear 
situation and therefore evoking a simulation. However, research has demonstrated 
that simulations can be evoked from words alone (Barsalou et al., 2008; Santos et al., 
2011; Simmons et al., 2008). It is possible that both sentences and words alone can 
evoke simulations, but that simulations following from the sentences are ‘richer’ in 
detail given the additional information provided.  
Osiurak et al. (2015) directly compared visual primes against words using a 
gesture to use/transport task. In their task participants performed both tasks where 
they either picked up a bottle of water to pour it into a glass (use) or moved it to a 
target destination (transport). The weight of the bottle was manipulated depending on 
whether it was one-third full (light) or two-thirds full (heavy) and participants were 
primed either with a word prime which they had to read aloud (Experiment 1) or 
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passively viewed a visual object (Experiment 2). The results demonstrated that 
participants were always faster in the transport condition than the use condition, 
supporting previous research on differences in use and transport actions (Chainay et 
al., 2014; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). Of main interest here was that no priming effects 
were found for the words used in Experiment 1. However, using the visual primes in 
Experiment 2 showed that initiation times were fastest in the use condition for the 
light compared to the heavy object. No priming effects were seen for the transport 
condition. In line with the findings of Bub et al. (2008), the results demonstrate that 
the use of words created no priming effects and as such passive viewing of words 
does not evoke potential actions. However, it does appear that target words in the 
context of sentence comprehension do instantiate potential actions as was found in 
Masson et al. (2008) and Lee et al. (2013).  
Experiment 6 investigated whether action choices on the triad task could be 
influenced through physical interaction. In the same manner as Experiment 2, the 
triads were presented within-subjects but divided between the context-lean and 
context-rich conditions. However, prior to completing the triad task, the participants 
assigned to one of three priming tasks. For the priming tasks all, of the items in the 
triads were physically collected and placed on a centre table when participants 
walked in the room. Participants were either asked to use the items for their 
functional purpose (action priming), group them into categories (taxonomic priming) 
or simply move them from one table to another (movement priming). The aim of the 
latter was to engage participants in interacting with the objects, but not to use them 
for their functional purpose. Therefore, the movement priming reflected a more 
‘structural/volumetric’ condition (Bub et al., 2008; Bub & Masson, 2010, 2012; Jax 
& Buxbaum, 2010). Three main predictions were made based on the previous 
experimental work included within the current thesis and also based on the previous 
research:  
(i). The proportion of action choices should be highest on the SCO triads 
replicating the “additive” effect of action found when combined with 
taxonomic information in Experiments 2 and 4 and lowest on the DCO 
triads  
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(ii). The proportion of action choices should be highest when the items are 
presented in the context-rich condition, replicating the context effect found 
of Experiments 2 and 4.  
(iii). The proportion of action choices should be highest following the action-
priming phase compared to after the other two priming activities. If it is 
the case that use-actions have a long-term effect (as found by Jax and 
Buxbaum, 2010), this long-term activation of functional actions should 
make participants more likely to select the action choice on the triads 
compared to those in the taxonomic and the movement priming.  
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-six undergraduate Psychology students (47 females) with a mean age of 
22.87 (SD = 6.34, age range: 18-45) from the University of Hertfordshire took part in 
the experiment in return for course credit. The sample size was calculated following 
an a priori power analysis using G*Power. Assuming α =.05 and 1 – β =.80, the a 
priori power analysis indicated that a similar effect size to that found in Experiment 1 
would be detected using a sample of 66 participants32. 
 
4.2.2 Design 
The forced-choice triad task was presented in a 3x3x2 mixed design. All 
participants saw the same SCO, DCO and PCO triads used in the previous 
experiments (within-subjects factor) presented either in context-lean or context-rich 
(between-subjects factor). Prior to undertaking the triad task, participants were 
assigned to one of three priming tasks (between-subjects factor) consisting of three 
levels; action, taxonomic and movement. In the action priming the participants 
interacted with the items in a functional manner using the same action as depicted in 
the context-rich images. In the taxonomic priming participants were asked to sort all 
of the objects out into categories. In the movement priming the participants 
interacted with the objects in terms of moving them from one table to another but not 
using them for their intended purpose. The dependent variables of interest were, once 
																																																								
32 Due to complications with the equipment/materials, recruitment did not reach the intended target.  
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again, the response time on the triads and the frequency with which the participants 
selected the action choice on the DCO, SCO and PCO triads.  
 
4.2.3 Materials 
The SCO, DCO and PCO triads from Experiment 2 were used in Experiment 
6. It was not feasible, due to physical constraints of the items (e.g. fax machine, bed, 
piano) or to ethical considerations (rifle, saw, axe) to include all the triad items used 
in the previous experiments and so five of the SCO triads (spatula, DVD player, bed, 
spade, ketchup), four of the DCO triads (fax machine, rifle, computer, knife) and five 
of the PCO triads (axe, baseball bat, clarinet, nut, gun) were removed from the 
Superlab program and not used in this particular experiment. The remaining 16 triads 
were presented in the same fashion as the previous experiment. All of the 48 items 
were then physically collected for use in the priming tasks. The action-priming task 
was designed so that participants were presented with a list of tasks that involved 
using each item in its functional capacity such as writing their name with a pencil or 
reading a passage from a book (a full list of tasks used here can be seen in Appendix 
Z).   
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
All participants saw the 48 items used in the triads presented on a table and 
were assigned to one of the three priming tasks. Those in the action priming 
condition were read out a list of tasks by the experimenter one-by-one and asked to 
complete before moving on to the next task. Each task involved using the object in 
its functional capacity and could either be completed on its own (e.g. “tie the 
shoelace on the shoe”, “open the book on any page and read out the top line”) or 
were presented with additional resources (e.g. “write your name on a piece of paper” 
– where paper was provided to the participant though was not a triad item). 
Participants were instructed to move at their own pace and that there was no time 
limit to this task.  
Participants in the movement priming were simply asked to pick up each item 
and move it to the next table along so that they interacted with the object but not in 
its intended function. Again, no time limit was imposed and participants performed 
at their own pace.  
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Participants in the taxonomic priming were asked directly to sort the items 
into categories. They were told that they could sort them however they liked 
providing that each group had a minimum of two members and that they would also 
have to explain their groupings afterwards. They were also told that each sorting 
must have a valid reason behind it and no items should be grouped together based 
simply on being remaining items that did not fit into other categories. After the 
priming task concluded, participants in each condition were allocated into either the 
context-rich or context-lean conditions and sat in front of a 15” Macintosh laptop to 
undertake the triad task using the same instructions to select the item that “goes best” 
with the target as was used in Experiment 233. Response times for the triads and the 
frequency of action choices were recorded for analysis.  
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Response Time 
The overall mean response time on the SCO, DCO and the PCO triads are 
reported in Table 4.1. Participants appeared faster at responding to both the SCO (M 
= 1952.59, SD = 886.79) and the DCO triads (M = 2008.78, SD = 874.70) than the 
PCO triads (M = 2157.70, SD = 1030.58). A 3x2x3 mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on the reaction times using triad type as a within-subjects factor and both context and 
priming as between-subjects factors. The analysis revealed that the only significant 
main effect found was of triad type using the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment34, F 
(1.69, 84.54) = 5.35, p = .01, η2 = .10. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni 
adjustment showed that the response time on the SCO triads was significantly 
quicker than on the PCO triads (p = .03) and the difference between the DCO and 
PCO triads was borderline significant (p = .063). No difference was found between 
the SCO and the DCO triads (p = 1.0). No other main effects and no significant 
interaction effects were found.  
The reaction time data was further analysed for outlying scores and 
normality. After removing the outlying scores (x3) the reaction time on the SCO and 																																																								
33 Despite differences between the instructions, that the “goes best to form a category” instructions led 
to the highest percentage of action choices in Experiment 4, it was decided here to use the “goes best” 
instructions. This was to keep the main instructions consistent and to allow for data comparison across 
experiments.  
34 Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was found to be significant; χ² (2) = 9.59, p = .008, and therefore the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .85. 
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the PCO triads were statistically normal, SCO: D(53) = .07, p > .05; PCO: D(53) = 
.08, p > .05, however the reaction time on the DCO triads was positively skewed, 
D(53) = .15, p = .003. A square root transformation was applied and a 2x3x3 mixed 
ANOVA was conducted using context and priming as between-subject factors. The 
analysis found that the main effect of triad type was significant, F(2, 94) = 7.01, p = 
.001, η2 = .34. Follow up analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that the 
reaction times on the PCO triads were significantly longer than the SCO (p = .003), 
but no difference was found between the PCO and DCO (p = .14), nor the SCO and 
DCO triads (p = .22). No other main effects or interaction effects were significant. 
Therefore, the results of the previous analysis were replicated.   	
Table 4.1.  
Mean Reaction Time (Standard Deviations) Across Triad Type35.  
Triads Response time 
Mean (milliseconds) SD 
SCO 1952.59 886.79 
DCO 2008.78 874.70 
PCO 2157.70 1030.58 
 
4.3.2 Action choices 
The mean proportion of action responses on the SCO, DCO and PCO triads 
across context and priming are reported in Table 4.2. The results appear similar to 
those in Experiment 2 with lower levels of action responses in the DCO triads in both 
the context-lean (43%) and context-rich (45%) conditions. Higher levels of action 
responses were seen in the SCO and PCO triads (compared to DCO) with the highest 
seen in the context-rich conditions (56% and 67% respectively). Table 4.2 also 
shows the action responses across the three priming conditions. Action responses 
were highest in the action priming where participants interacted with the objects in a 
standard functional manner (M = 59%, SD = .18) than in the taxonomic (M = 48%, 
SD = .13) or movement priming (M = 48%, SD = .13).  
																																																								
35 The means are collapsed across context and priming given that the main effects, nor the interaction 
effects, were statistically significant.		
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A 3x2x3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the mean number of action 
choices using triad type as a within-subjects factor and both context and priming as 
between-subjects factors. As predicted (hypothesis No. i), the main effect of triads 
was significant, F (2, 100) = 6.74, p = .002, h2 = .12. Post hoc analysis using the 
Bonferroni adjustment found that the action responses on the DCO triads were 
significantly lower than both the SCO triads (p = .046) and the PCO triads (p = .004). 
No difference was found between the SCO triads and the PCO triads (p = 1.). The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of context (hypothesis No. ii) with higher 
action choices in the context-rich condition, F (1, 50) = 5.25, p = .026, h2 = .1. The 
main effect of priming (hypothesis No. iii) was also significant, F (2, 50) = 3.84, p = 
.028, h2 = .13. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment revealed that the 
difference between the action and taxonomic priming (p = .063) and the action and 
movement priming (p = .066) approached significance. The difference between the 
taxonomic and movement priming was not significantly different (p = 1.).  
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2 the two-way interaction effect between context 
and triads was statistically significant, F (2, 100) = 4.58, p = .012, h2 = .08. Post hoc 
analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment (see Figure 4.1) found that action responses 
were significantly higher on the PCO triads presented in the context-rich condition 
than they were context-lean (p < .001). No differences were found between the 
contexts on the DCO triads (p = .92) and the SCO triads (p = .45). The two-way 
interaction between priming and triads was not found to be significant, F (4, 100) = 
2.02, p = .10, h2 = .08, nor the two-way interaction between priming and context, F 
(2, 50) = 1.72, p = .19, h2 = .06, or the three-way interaction between context, 
priming and triads, F < 1.  
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Table 4.2.  
Mean Proportion (Standard Deviations) of Action Choices Across Triad Type, 
Context and Priming.	
Context Priming N Triad Type 
DCO SCO PCO 
Lean Action 10 .53 (.25) .48 (.23) .48 (.19) 
Taxonomic 10 .32 (.23) .60 (.21) .50 (.11) 
Movement 8 .46 (.25) .48 (.10) .40 (.19) 
Rich Action 10 .58 (.20) .66 (.23) .78 (.25) 
Taxonomic 10 .35 (.27) .54 (.13) .58 (.15) 
Movement 8 .40 (.25) .48 (.21) .65 (.21) 
 
 
	
Figure 4.1. The percentage of action choices across triad type and context. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.  	
4.3.3 Data Re-Analysed 
In order to compare the effects of action priming, the data from those 
participants who were primed with the functional actions of the objects was analysed 
against the means on the same selection of 16 triads from Experiment 2. In all other 
respects the experiments were the same with the exception of the priming of the 
current experiment. A 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the mean proportion 
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of action choices using triad type as a within-subjects variable and both context and 
experiment as between-subjects variables. As with the previous experiments the main 
effect of context was significant with higher action choices in the context-rich than 
the context-lean conditions, F (1, 66) = 22.25, p < .001, h2 = .25. The main effect of 
triad type was also significant, F (2, 132) = 6.18, p = .003, h2 = .09. Post-hoc 
analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that action choices on the DCO 
triads were significantly lower than the PCO triads (p = .005) and borderline 
significantly lower than the SCO triads (p = .065). No difference was found between 
the SCO and PCO triads (p = .87). There was a main effect of experiment, F (1, 66) 
= 6.70, p = .012, h2 = .09, with higher action choices in the current priming 
experiment (59%) compared to the action means from Experiment 2 (50%). All of 
the two-way interactions and the three-way interaction were non-significant. 
Therefore, the results show that action choice on the triad was most likely to be 
selected when it was presented within context and following priming with the action, 
but these factors did not interact with each other.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
The results of the current experiment revealed three main findings. The first 
is the replication of the triad effect from Experiment 2. The action choice was least 
likely to be selected on the DCO triads when choosing between a taxonomic and an 
action choice compared to the SCO and PCO triads. This shows that, as with the 
previous experiments, action information alone is less likely to be favoured as the 
basis for category membership when the alternative is taxonomic information, 
particularly when viewed in the context-lean condition. The action item was most 
likely to be selected with the SCO and the PCO triads. The results on the SCO triads 
support the notion of action having an ‘additive’ effect making such items sharing 
both action and a taxonomic relation as ‘better’ category members. The PCO triads 
further show that when no taxonomic relation is present as an alternative, participants 
are more likely to use action than perceptual properties to group items together. This 
was particularly the case when shown in context, and the action choices on the PCO 
triads were particularly high compared to compared to the previous experimental 
work.  
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The second main finding is the partial replication of the context effect from 
Experiment 2. While previously it was found that across all three triads the action 
choice was most likely to be selected in the context-rich condition, this effect was 
limited with the PCO triads in this experiment. The most likely reason for this is the 
exclusion of certain triads from the original set used in Experiment 2. It is possible 
that these triads removed were more likely to lead to the action choice than other 
triads. For example, the rifle/sword/water pistol triad (DCO) was removed from the 
present experiment for practical reasons, however it has been shown to be 
particularly influenced by context (see Chapter 5). Therefore, those triads used here 
might be less susceptible to context effects than those removed.  
The third main finding from this experiment is the effect of priming 
conditions. The results showed that participants were more likely to choose the 
action related item in the triads following the action priming where all the items were 
used in their functional capacity. It is possible that such functional activations 
facilitate how we think about the objects used in the triads. When participants engage 
in the triad task and think about objects they mentally simulate the items within a 
specific situation (Barsalou, 1999, 2003). This simulation is based on a partial 
activation of the neurons that were active at the initial time of learning including 
those within the motor cortex responsible for actions. Barsalou (2003) and Yeh and 
Barsalou (2006) suggested that the simulation is not the same every time but is 
dependent on factors such as how recently the object has been encountered, or acted 
upon. Therefore, prior engagement with the objects in the priming task should have a 
direct influence on the simulations made and on the choices in the triad task.  
Therefore, the question becomes why do the action responses become higher 
after functional priming only? The priming tasks used here can be separated into two 
distinctive sets of actions, functional actions related to functional use and 
volumetric/structural actions related to general movement and interacting with the 
objects in a non-functional manner (Bub & Masson, 2012; Bub et al., 2008; Jax & 
Buxbaum, 2010; Osiurak et al., 2013). The priming effects appear to be limited to 
performing the functional actions on the objects and this effect can be explained by 
the Two Action Systems (2AS) model (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum & 
Kalénine, 2010).  
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The 2AS model posits that the brain has separate action systems for the 
processing of functional and structural actions. The dorso-dorsal stream is 
specialized for acquiring information based on the structure of objects and their 
affordances. This “Structure” system becomes active by objects without activation of 
conceptual/semantic knowledge. The ventro-dorsal system is specialized for the 
retrieval of representations. Therefore, this “Function” system is heavily intertwined 
with conceptual knowledge. While these two systems interact with each other both 
systems can be activated independent of each other and functional activations tend to 
be long lasting and can cause interference effects on later actions (Bub & Masson, 
2012; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). Structural activations occur more quickly than 
functional, but decay rapidly and do not cause later interference effects.  
Jax and Buxbaum showed that when participants performed a functional 
action on an object and then later performed a grasp action, response latencies were 
significantly longer than when they performed the grasp action first. This 
interference effect as a result of functional activation lasted for approximately 20 
minutes during the entire task. While this functional activation had an interference 
effect on the use/grasp task, it is possible that this has a facilitation effect on the triad 
task. The partial re-activation of the neurons during simulation of the objects in the 
triad should be facilitated by the current activation of the functional system. As such 
the simulation itself should make the action element more salient between the triad 
objects and participants will therefore be more likely to select the action choice. This 
is further amplified by the concurrent activation of conceptual knowledge with the 
functional system of the ventro-dorsal stream as proposed by Buxbaum and Kalénine 
(2010). The same facilitation effect does not occur following the movement prime as 
the structural activations of the dorso-dorsal stream dissipate quickly. Hence, only 
the long lasting functional activations as a result of the Action priming should lead to 
higher action choices in the triad task.  
There are two ways in which this ventro-dorsal facilitation effect could be 
tested and supported. First, the frequency of action choices could be analysed as the 
participants progress through the triad task. As functional activations of the ventro-
dorsal system decay slower than their structural counterparts it is possible that given 
the time it takes to complete the checklist task, and the length of time such 
activations last (potentially more than 20 minutes, Jax & Buxbaum, 2010), then trials 
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at the beginning of the triad task might be more influenced than those completed 
towards the end. Therefore, a trend could be found in which action choice 
frequencies decrease through the trials. A potential difficulty, however, might be that 
as the trials are randomised and as some trials are more likely to lead to an action 
choice (see Chapter 5), a trend might be difficult to predict. The second way in which 
the ventro-dorsal facilitation effect could be tested here would be to use the full 
range of triads from Experiment 2. As explained above, the full range of triads was 
not used in this experiment because of ethics and feasibility of priming how 
participants use certain objects such as sword. If it is the case that functional 
activations of the ventro-dorsal system facilitate simulations of the objects, then in 
the triad task used here this should result in higher action choices on the primed 
objects and lower action choices for those objects not primed.  
In conclusion, Experiment 6 has demonstrated that the triad effect found in 
Experiment 2 has been replicated. Participants were more likely to use action as a 
source of categorisation on the forced-choice triad task when the shared actions were 
combination with taxonomic information, and when it was presented within a 
functional context. The results further imply that priming participants with the 
functional rather than structural actions of the objects led to increased action choices 
on the triad task. Such results are in line with the view that interacting with objects 
leads to long lasting potentiation effects (Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; Ellis & 
Tucker, 2000; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004), which in 
turn facilitates how objects are mentally simulated (Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Yeh & 
Barsalou, 2006).  
 
4.5 Experiment 7 
Playing Patty-Cake to Deter the Water Pistol:  
Using Concurrent Manual Actions to Prevent Object Simulation.  
 
4.6 Introduction 
Experiment 6 showed that when participants physically interacted with the 
objects, they were then more likely to select the action choice in the triad task. The 
results are explained within the framework of simulation theory. Simulation theory 
suggests that the most recent interaction with an object should influence how it is 
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simulated on the next occasion. As participants interacted with the objects 
functionally, this influenced the simulation (basing it directly on action) and hence 
was used in categorising the objects.  
Simulation theory suggests that in simulating an object, those neurons active 
in the initial encounter become (partially) reactivated. Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman and 
Thompson-Schill (2013) showed evidence that concurrent manual actions can 
prevent access to conceptual representations, and this has a direct influence on task 
performance. Yee et al. instructed participants to perform either a mental rotation 
task or a manual “patty-cake” task while classifying words as either concrete or 
abstract. The results showed that the patty-cake task slowed down response times for 
the concrete objects, but not for abstract concepts. The most interesting finding was 
for those objects with greater levels of manual experience. Yee et al. asked 
participants to rate the objects on a scale of one to seven, based on how much 
previous manual experience they have with the object. For the participants who 
performed the patty-cake task, the interference effect seen was greatest when they 
had greater previous manual experience. This therefore shows that performing 
manual concurrent actions alongside making category decision, was able to disrupt 
access to semantic information.  
While Yee et al. did not discuss it in such terms, the suggestion made here is 
that (given the evidence showing how objects are simulated) the patty-cake task 
disrupted how participants simulated the objects36. This is based on the notion that 
simulations of objects are based within sensorimotor experience. Activating the 
motor system (via the patty-cake task) was able to disrupt access because the 
simulation system was not able to draw upon those neurons necessary to simulate the 
objects. Such neurons were already engaged in the concurrent task and thus were not 
readily available to simulate the objects. If this is the case, then engaging in a 
concurrent manual task while undergoing the triad task should lead to lower action-
based choices.  
The aim of the next experiment is to see if action choices on the triads can be 
decreased by “blocking” the simulation process. In order to do this, participants were 																																																								
36 Two possibilities exist here, (i) the concurrent actions prevented the simulation system from 
simulating the objects, or (ii) the objects were simulated, and the concurrent actions prevented 
retrieval of such information. Given the notion that the simulation system relies on re-instantiating the 
neural system, it is believed that the former is the most likely. This is the view adopted in the thesis.  
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instructed to perform concurrent manual tasks while completing the triad task. 
Participants performed one of three tasks; either completing a hand ‘patty-cake’ task 
(similar to that used in Yee et al., 2013), a leg extension (foot) task, or simply keep 
their hands flat on the table (still condition). Situating objects results in a partial re-
activation of those neural pathways active upon previous encounters with them. 
Since (nearly) all of the objects in the triads are hand-operated, then engaging in 
concurrent manual tasks with the hands should prevent participants from simulating 
in the same manner since the neural pathways for using the hands are already 
engaged. In comparison, performing a concurrent leg extension task should not 
interfere with simulating the objects since different neural pathways should be used. 
Therefore, if the concurrent hand actions do block the simulation process then 
participants should be less likely to select the action choice on the triads in 
comparison to the foot task. However, it is possible that performing concurrent hand 
actions might actually facilitate the simulation effect, since simulating and partial 
neuron re-activation might be facilitated by the fact that those neurons are already 
active. In such a case the action scores on the triads would be greater following the 
hand condition.  
In addition, there is a third possibility here. It might be the case that 
performing any task at the same time as undertaking the triad task might present a 
drain on attentional resources since participants have to engage in two tasks 
simultaneously. For this reason, the hand and foot tasks were designed to be as 
simple and repetitive as possible, and the still hand condition was introduced. If this 
is the case, then performing any action should result in lower action choices. 
Therefore, based on such three different predictions can be made:  
(i). If it is the case that concurrent hand actions block the simulation process, 
then the hand condition should result in lower action scores overall 
compared to the foot and still condition.  
(ii). If it is the case that concurrent hand actions facilitate the simulation 
process, then the hand condition should result in greater action scores 
overall compared to the foot and still condition.  
(iii). If performing any concurrent task presents a drain on attentional 
resources, then the hand and the foot condition should both result in 
lower action scores overall than the still condition.  
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All three of these predictions are possible. However, given the previous research 
from Yee et al. (2013) and the fact that no known research to date shows that 
concurrent actions facilitate the simulation process, it is most likely that the first 
prediction will be observed. Under these circumstances it is strongly predicted that 
the concurrent actions will block the simulation process, and result in lower overall 
actions scores compared to the foot and still condition. Unlike the previous 
experimental work only the context-rich condition was used here. This was because 
participants in such a condition are more likely to create action-based simulations 
and therefore concurrent hand actions should have the strongest impact on such 
trials.  
4.7 Method 
4.7.1 Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate students (53 females) from the University of 
Hertfordshire took part in the experiment with a mean age of 21.33 (SD = 5.62, age 
range: 18-42). Participants were recruited through opportunity sampling and received 
course credit for participation. The sample size was calculated following an a priori 
power analysis using G*Power. Assuming α =.05 and 1 – β =.80, the a priori power 
analysis indicated that a similar effect size to that found in Experiment 1 would be 
detected using a sample of 45 participants. 
 
4.7.2 Design 
The experiment consisted of a forced-choice triad task using the same 30 
triad items as in Experiment 2 (10 x SCO, 10 x DCO, 10 x PCO). However, unlike 
Experiment 2 triads were only shown to participants in the context-rich presentation. 
Therefore, the experiment consisted of a 3x3 mixed design with triad type as the 
within-subjects factor and physical task as the between-subjects factor. A pilot study 
using twelve participants, who did not take part in the main study, was conducted in 
order to check how the physical task might interfere with the main task. In a 
counterbalanced manner the participants completed each of the physical tasks while 
engaged in a counting task for one minute. Participants were presented with a 
passage of text and asked to count how many times the letter ‘e’ appeared on the 
page. Afterwards participants were asked to rate how difficult they felt the task was, 
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and how much they felt the movement tasks interfered with their performance37 on a 
scale of 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult). Repeated measures t-tests on the 
difficulty ratings showed that the participants considered the still condition (M = 
2.75) much easier to complete compared to the hand (M = 4.83, t = -4.80, p = .001) 
and the foot task (M = 5.75, t = -3.45, p = .005). Most importantly, no difference was 
found between the hand and foot task (t = -1.48, p = .17) suggesting that both tasks 
are equal in terms of ease of completion. In addition, no difference was found 
between the interference ratings for the hand (M = 5.83) and the foot task (M = 6.42, 
t = -.87, p = .40) suggesting that both tasks equally interfered with the task.  
The dependent variable in the main experiment was the percentage of action 
choices on each of the triads. Unlike Experiment 2, reaction times were not collected 
as the participants gave verbal responses that were recorded by the experimenter and 
do not reflect an accurate timing. The experiment was conducted like this to free up 
the participants’ hands in order for them to perform the physical task.  
 
4.7.3 Materials 
The same 30 triads from the previous experiments were used. However, 
participants only saw them within the context-rich condition only.  
 
4.7.4 Procedure 
The participants sat in front of an external screen attached to a 15” Macintosh 
laptop. The laptop was faced towards the experimenter in order for the program to be 
manipulated. The participants were given the task instructions to read, displayed on 
the screen. The triad task ran in the same manner as described previously using the 
task instructions to select the choice item that “goes best” with the target. During the 
triad task participants performed one of three physical tasks: 
(i). Still condition: Participants sat still with their hands palm down on the 
table in front of them.  
(ii). Hand condition: Participants performed a ‘patty cake’ task patting the 
table and clapping their hands together repeatedly.  
																																																								
37 Interference ratings were not collected for the still condition since such interference should be 
minimal.  
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(iii). Foot condition: Participants step/extension task with their legs one at a 
time.  
The tasks were performed simultaneously while participants performed the triad task. 
Participants responded verbally and their answers were recorded by the 
experimenter. After the participants stated their answer on each trial, the next trial 
was initiated by the experimenter. The timings and procedural run through of the 
triad program remained the same as in Experiment 2.  
 
4.8 Results 
4.8.1 Choice Analysis 
The mean percentage of action choices in the triads can be seen below in 
Table 4.3. The results show a similar pattern to the previous experimental work, as 
the means appear lowest overall in the DCO triads with little difference between the 
SCO and the PCO triads. However, there appears to be little difference between the 
means of the physical tasks. The mean percentage of action choices were compared 
with a 3x3 mixed ANOVA using triad type as a within-subjects variable and physical 
task as a between-subjects variable. The results showed a significant main effect of 
triad type, F (2, 122) = 11.47, p < .001, h2 = .16. Post hoc analysis using the 
Bonferroni adjustment showed that action choices were lower in the DCO triads 
compared to the SCO (p < .001) and the PCO triads (p = .002), but no difference was 
found between the latter (p = 1.). The main effect of physical task was not 
significant, F < 1, nor was the interaction effect between physical task and triad type, 
F < 1. 
 
Table 4.3.  
The Mean Proportion of Action Choices Across Triads and Physical Task. 
Physical 
Task 
N Triad Type 
 DCO SCO PCO 
Still 22 .52 (.21) .64 (.13) .65 (.15) 
Hand 21 .58 (.17) .70 (.13) .63 (.13) 
Foot 21 .53 (.18) .62 (.12) .65 (.18) 
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The data above shows that performing concurrent actions while undergoing 
the triad task had no effect on the action scores compared to performing no action. In 
addition, no difference was seen between participants who performed a task with 
their hand or their feet. However, the triad data shows the same pattern found with 
the previous experimental work (see Chapters 2 - 4) that participants were less likely 
to use action for categorisation when it appears on its own, but it did appear to have 
an additive effect.  
The analysis on the choice data was repeated as a 3x3x2 mixed ANOVA 
which also included gender as a between-subjects factor. The results showed that the 
main effects and interaction effects were the same as previously found above. In 
addition, the main effect of gender was non-significant, F < 1, as was the interaction 
effect between condition and gender, F < 1. However, the interaction effect between 
triad type and gender was significant, F (2, 116) = 3.30, p = .040, h2 = .05. Follow 
up analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that there were no differences 
between the three triad types for the males (for all comparison, p < .05). Significant 
differences were found on the females where the DCO triads were significantly 
lower than both the SCO (p < .001) and the PCO triads (p = .001), but no difference 
was found between the latter (p = .32). While selection of the action choice was 
fairly high and greater than 50% in all conditions, this result might indicate that the 
‘additive’ effect exists only for females. However, this result has not been replicated 
in the remaining experimental work. In addition, there was no effect of age on the 
selection of action choices.  
 
4.9 Discussion 
The results above replicate the standard triad effects found in Experiment 2. 
Participants were less likely to select the action choice on the DCO triads in 
comparison to both the SCO and PCO triads. This supports the position that action is 
less likely to be used as a basis for categorisation on its own, in comparison to 
sharing both an action and a taxonomic choice with the target. This supports the 
additive effect seen in the previous experiments for objects that already share a 
taxonomic relation. Under such circumstances, the notion that the objects share a 
taxonomic relation is made stronger by the shared action (and presumably perceptual 
characteristics) between them. Furthermore, when taxonomic relations are removed 
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from the stimuli, participants prefer to group objects together based on shared actions 
between them rather than shared perceptual characteristics.  
Of most interest here was the prediction that performing concurrent hand 
actions would decrease (or possibly increase) selection of the action choice on the 
triads. It was argued that the simulations generated by participants could be 
interfered with if participants performed concurrent hand actions (but not concurrent 
feet actions). The results did not support this prediction. No differences were found 
between the participants who performed current actions throughout the triad task. In 
addition, the results also showed that attentional resources were not decreased during 
the task because the hand and foot conditions did not significantly differ from the 
still condition.  
The important question that now must be addressed is why no differences 
were found between the physical task conditions. There are two possible 
explanations: (i) either participants are not simulating when they undergo the triad 
task or (ii) participants are simulating but the physical tasks failed to have any effect 
on such simulations. The best way to test between the two could be to test 
participants on the standard triad task (used in Experiment 2) using fMRI 
techniques38. If it were the case that participants are simulating on the triad task, then 
a similar pattern of brain activation would be found compared to the results of Kan et 
al. (2003) and Simmons et al. (2008). This would then demonstrate that participants 
are in fact simulating while performing the triad task, and the lack of an effect found 
in Experiment 7 could potentially be because the tasks simply failed to interfere with 
the simulation process. This is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of the current 
experimental work.  
However, there is much evidence to suggest that the first explanation is 
implausible and the stance taken here is that participants are simulating upon 
thinking about the objects in the triad task. Given the previous research on findings 
that participants simulate upon viewing words (Barsalou, Solomon & Wu, 1999; 
Borghi, 2004; Santos et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004; 
Wu & Barsalou, 2009), use situational strategies in generating category exemplars 
(Vallée-Tourangeau, Anthony & Austin, 1997) and can access word meaning in less 																																																								
38 It would not be possible to replicate Experiment 7 while undergoing fMRI scans because 
participants would not be able to remain still during testing.  
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than 200ms (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Ilmoniemi, 2005), it is most likely the case 
that participants are simulating the objects shown on the triads. Simmons et al. also 
argued that research in this field has “suffered an over-reliance on words” (2008, p. 
117) and that visual cues such as that used in the triads would increase the likelihood 
and speed with which participants simulate. In such a view, the situating system 
might become active faster that the linguistic system when using experiential stimuli 
because the simulation would be more similar in nature to the information presented 
by the cue. Therefore, given the previous research in the area it is believed that 
participants do in fact simulate in this task, aided by both word and pictorial nature 
of the stimuli.  
Given the argument made above, the second explanation must be adopted 
here that participants were in fact simulating but the tasks used failed to interrupt the 
simulation. This seems surprising at face value given the previous research showing 
that current actions can slow down and “block” access to semantic information (Yee 
et al., 2013). It is possible that the reason for the difference found between Yee et al. 
and the current data lies in the time frame of the experimental task. Verification and 
identification tasks emphasise speed and accuracy from participants whereas 
participants in the current experimental work are explicitly told that speed is not 
important for task performance. In the task of Yee at al., participants responded very 
quickly to the abstract/concrete judgement task with mean response times around one 
second. From the point of view of the LASS theory, and according to the time line of 
responses found in Santos et al. (2011), only the linguistic system will have reached 
its peak at this point. Therefore, on such a task participants are not using the 
simulation system to respond, but using the linguistic system and bypassing 
conceptual information. The time frame of such differs considerably in comparison 
to what happens here on the present task. Responses on the triads varied across triad 
type but response times were generally between 2 and 3 seconds (responses are 
longer on the PCO triads, see Chapter 2). However, response times on the triad 
program are calculated not from initial onset of the triad but from the moment that all 
three items appear together. The target appears on its own initially for 1.5 seconds 
prior to onset of the choice items and therefore the target is actually seen for between 
3.5 and 4.5 seconds. At this point, according to the LASS theory and the time line of 
Santos et al., the simulation system should have peaked and been at full saturation 
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(for all of the objects, but particularly the target). Therefore, the suggestion here is 
that concurrent manual actions do interrupt the simulations created by participants in 
conceptual tasks, but that such interference only occurs while the linguistic system is 
in use and the simulation system has not peaked. Therefore, while concurrent actions 
influence the early stages of the LASS theory, their effects might become diminished 
by the time that the simulation system is in full effect. A potential way in which to 
test this would be to redesign the triads so that all the items appear at the same time 
and the choice items are analysed by time. The simulation system should be 
interfered with by manual actions only when the triads have short reaction times. 
Reaction times were not collected due to the design of the current experiment where 
participants had to respond verbally and the choices were recorded by the 
experimenter. As such the above prediction cannot be tested because the reaction 
times do not reflect accuracy.  
In conclusion, the aim of the experimental work here was to see if action 
scores on the triad program could be decreased by ‘blocking’ the simulation process 
through concurrent manual actions. The results showed that participants performing 
concurrent actions with either their feet or hands had no effect on their choices in the 
triad task. In comparison to previous research, which has shown manual actions to 
interfere with category decisions, this could be due to task differences and the time 
frame in which participants respond on the task.  
 
4.10 General Discussion 
The experimental evidence reported in previous chapters measured the 
circumstances in which action becomes influential source of categorisation, on an 
action-irrelevant task. The notion of the action-irrelevant task is particularly 
important given that much of the previous evidence has shown the influence of 
action to be task dependent. The aim of Experiments 6 and 7 was to measure the 
influence of action information on the triad task, after additional action tasks were 
added to the action-irrelevant task either preceding it or concurrent with it. The 
results have showed that interacting with objects prior to categorising them 
influenced how the objects were categorised. When participants interacted with the 
objects in a functional manner, they were then more likely to select the action choice 
on the triad task. When participants interacted with the objects in a more general 
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manner, while they did select the action choice on the triad task, they were less likely 
to do so compared to those who had used the objects functionally.  
The results are discussed in light of simulation theory, that the recency of the 
interaction influenced the simulation during the triad task. In order to test if this was 
the case, Experiment 7 attempted to see if the simulations could be ‘blocked’ by 
concurrent actions. The results showed that performing concurrent actions (either 
with hands or feet) did not have an effect on the triad scores. It is possible that the 
concurrent actions are only influential in the early stages of simulation, before the 
simulation system is at its peak strength. What the results clearly show, is that 
manual actions do influence subsequent category judgements. However, what is most 
important is that such actions are specifically related to the functional use of the 
objects rather than such ‘generic’ actions.  
In Chapter 5, the triads were individually analysed in more detail. What is 
evident from the data in the previous experiments is that some triads were more 
likely to lead to selection of the action choice than others. The triads were analysed 
to investigate which examples were more likely to lead to the action choice, and 
some of the potential reasons behind why this might have been the case. In addition, 
the reasons behind why the participants select the choices in the triads may vary 
between participants. The strategies that participants used while engaging in the triad 
task was analysed using protocol analysis.  
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Chapter 5 
Why Water Pistol Over Sword? An Analysis into Selection Strategy and the 
Individual Choices Made on the Triad Task. 	 	
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The previous chapters have demonstrated that action knowledge can 
influence categorical decisions, but under specific circumstances. While action did 
have an influence across all the triads, the strongest effect was seen when objects are 
matched on action and taxonomic information, and when the objects are presented in 
a functional context. However, this effect was not consistent and for some triads 
action was used as a sole reason for categorising the objects, even presented out of 
context. In addition, some triads seem quite ‘strong’ in the sense that they are highly 
likely to lead to selection of the action choice, while others appear ‘weak’.  
The aim of Chapter 5 was to analyse the triad items individually. Of 
particular interest was the strategies used by participants in categorising the triads, 
and to examine the optimal conditions for encouraging an ‘action-based’ strategy. 
This was completed in two steps. First, the data from the previous studies was re-
analysed with the focus on the individual triads, and the percentage of action 
selection seen across the experiments. Second, Experiment 8 used protocol analysis 
to examine participants strategies used in the triad task. Analysis of the protocols 
showed that, for the majority of the triads, participants reported use of functional, 
perceptual and action-based strategies to select their choices. However, there was 
variation between the triads and participants seemed to draw upon a variety of 
strategies for task completion. The results demonstrate the “rich” and “fluid” nature 
of categorisation, and the usefulness of protocols in such research.  
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5. Analysing the Triad Task: Why are Some Triads More Likely to Lead to 
Action-Based Choices? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The results reported thus far have shown that participants were more likely to 
select the action choice on the triads when they were (i) presented in context, and (ii) 
shared both an action and a taxonomic relation. For example, in Experiment 2 
participants were more likely to select banana with orange on the SCO triads than 
they were to select water pistol with rifle on the DCO triads. However, in studies 
drawing on stimuli of the type used in this programme of work, responses may 
always be open to varying degrees of influence from the actual items chosen for 
inclusion in the studies. As intimated in Chapter 4, the necessary omission of certain 
triads from Experiment 6 may well have led to the previously unseen differences in 
performance on the SCO and DCO triads with and without context. Wisniewski and 
Bassok (1999) showed higher similarity ratings for item pairs sharing both 
taxonomic attributes and a theme compared to those pairs a sharing attributes only. 
However, only half of the item pairs had higher ratings than their counterparts in the 
attribute only condition so the effect of enhancement through a shared theme was not 
reliable for all items. 
The purpose of the work reported in the current chapter was to perform an 
item analysis on each of the triads. This is not only in the interests of framing claims 
of generalisability, but with a view to investigate whether there was a pattern that 
would allow inferences to be drawn about why certain item combinations encourage 
action choices in this task. This would help further understand the precise conditions 
under which action may influence choices in this action-irrelevant task. This was 
undertaken in two steps: 
(i). Reanalysing the data from the previous experiments: Selection of the 
choice items on each triad and the proportion of choices was analysed 
against chance levels using a binomial distribution. The context 
images were also analysed based on what the context image consisted 
of. Some items showed only the hand on the object while others 
showed more of the agent. These were compared to see if this had 
any bearing on the choices made.  
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(ii). Protocol analysis: Given that the reasons for selecting the choice 
items is inferred, based on the design of the triads, protocol analysis 
was used to assess the reasons participants gave for selecting each 
item. For example, participants might be selecting banana over 
strawberry based on the notion of peeling (as assumed here), but may 
in fact be selecting banana simply because they prefer them. 
Therefore, participants were asked to make their choices and then 
give their reasons for doing so to assess if they did seem to have 
based their choices on action.  
 
5.2 Data Re-analysed 
The purpose of the next section was to re-analyse the data from Experiments 
2 and 439,40 in order to investigate which of the triads were “best” in terms of 
maximising the chances of participants selecting the action choice. This was 
achieved by examining each of the triads individually, and looking at the proportion 
of action and non-action choices. In particular, it was important to look at when 
choices for the action and competition item did not differ from chance and merely 
represented a 50/50 choice. In addition, to further investigate which of the triads best 
encouraged selection of the action choice the context effects were examined to see 
which of the triads had a significant increase in selection of the action choice as a 
result of the context-rich condition. As such, the analysis was completed in two 
stages. First, the choice proportions on the triads were analysed using a non-
parametric Binomial test to see if the proportions significantly differed from a 50/50 
ratio, as would be predicted if the choices were merely selected by chance. Second, 
the context effects on each of the triad types was analysed to investigate which triads 
were most affected by context using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA).  
 
 
																																																								
39 The priming experiment of Chapter 4 was not included here because it did not employ the full set of 
triads as used in Experiments 2 and 4.  
40 The data from the “most similar” instructions was not used here given that this reflects a different 
task. The data from the “goes best” and the “goes best to form a category” instructions was pooled 
together since no quantitative differences were found between them.  
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5.2.1 Choice Proportions 
As stated above, the proportions of the choices selected were analysed for all 
thirty triads using a Binomial test. The proportions can be seen below in Tables 5.1, 
5.2 and 5.3, separated by triad type. Of main interest here was to examine which 
proportions did not significantly differ from a chance proportion. Cause for concerns 
might occur in two ways; (i) items that are not significantly different in only one of 
the previous experiments, and (ii) items that are not significantly different in either of 
the previous experiments.  
Given that there are individual differences in tasks such as those used here 
(Lin & Murphy, 2001; Mirman & Graziano, 2012; Simmons & Estes, 2008; Estes et 
al., 2011), those items which only differed in a single experiment were less cause for 
concern and allowed to continue in further testing/analysis. Items for which choices 
did not differ from chance in either experiment (or led more consistently to the non-
action choice) were removed from the subsequent analysis. These were six DCO 
(deodorant, book, computer, drink bottle, rifle, screwdriver), four SCO (DVD player, 
leaflet, glass, pin), and five PCO triads (axe, gun, nut, peppermill, present). These 
triads were removed from the overall means for each experiment and the analysis of 
the choice data was repeated in the same manner as previously conducted. The 
analysis revealed that the means on the triads from Experiment 2 (see Fig 5.1) was 
similar to that conducted previously where the main effect of triad type, F (2, 96) = 
3.07, p = .051, h2 = .06, was borderline significant and the main effect of context, F 
(1, 48) = 18.68, p < .001, h2 = .28, was once again significant. The interaction effect 
was also significant, F (2, 96) = 3.23, p = .044, h2 = .06, where previously it had not 
been. Post-hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that context 
significantly increased action choices on the DCO (p = .004) and the PCO triads (p = 
.004), but not for the SCO triads (p = .87).  
The analysis on the triads from Experiment 4 (see Fig 5.2) was similar to the 
analysis previously conducted in Chapter 2 in that the main effect of triad type was 
borderline significant, F (2, 116) = 2.92, p = .058, h2 = .05, and the main effect of 
context, F (1, 58) = 5.40, p = .024, h2 = .09, was once again significant. The 
interaction effect was also significant, F (2, 116) = 4.37, p = .015, h2 = .07, where 
previously it had not been. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed 
that the context significantly increased action choices only for the PCO triads (p < 
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.001) and not the SCO (p = .68) or DCO triads (p = .78). Consistent across both 
experiments was the finding that once those triads which did not differ from chance 
or encouraged selection of the non-action choice were removed, the proportions of 
action choices increased in comparison to the original means. In fact, removal of 
such triads led to very high selections of the action choices ranging between 60% and 
90%. Therefore, in those remaining triads the shared actions were particularly salient 
and seemed to exert more influence on the choices made.  
It is noted however, that there are variations in performance across items 
within each triad set. Certain triads seemed to lead more consistently to participants 
selecting one choice over the other. For example, in Experiment 2 the overall 
proportion of participants selecting banana with orange was .70 and paintbrush with 
pencil was .90 (see Table 5.1). In contrast the proportion of CD player with DVD 
player was only .52. Therefore, there are variations in the proportions of the action 
choices selected within each triad, and within each triad set. In addition, there are 
variations in the triads as to the effect of context. In some of the triads, context had a 
significant effect in increasing the action choice selected but this effect was not 
consistent across all of them. For example, the proportion selecting water pistol 
significantly increased from the context-lean to context-rich condition, however, the 
proportion selecting banana did not. Therefore, the context effect was also not 
consistent across all of the items. This may be the result of inconsistencies in the 
context pictures used in developing stimuli that reflected everyday scenarios (see 
Chapter 3 for more details).  
Overall, the current analysis shows that a small number of the items did not 
engender an overall preference for one choice item over the other and that selection 
of such choices did not differ from chance. After the removal of these items, and 
those that led to higher proportions of selecting the non-action choice, the same 
results were found whereby action choices were always highest when shown in the 
functional, context-rich, condition and were lowest on the triads in the DCO 
compared to the SCO and PCO conditions. However, despite being the lowest 
overall, action choices were still high across all three triad types.  
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Table 5.1 
Proportion of Choice Items Selected on the DCO Triads in Experiments 2 and 4. 
Target  
Item 
Experiment 2 Experiment 4 
Tax Action p Tax Action P 
Book .76 .24 <.001 .43 .57 .366 
Calculator .30 .70 .007 .17 .83 <.001 
Computer .90 .10 <.001 .73 .27 <.001 
Deodorant .60 .40 .203 .43 .57 .366 
Drink bottle .82 .18 <.001 .70 .30 .003 
Fax 
machine 
.22 .78 <.001 .37 .63 .052 
Knife .18 .82 <.001 .10 .90 <.001 
Paperclip .46 .54 .672 .30 .70 .003 
Rifle .58 .42 .322 .65 .35 .027 
Screwdriver .86 .14 <.001 .53 .47 .699 
 
Table 5.2 
Proportion of Choice Items Selected on the SCO Triads in Experiments 2 and 4. 
Target 
Item 
Experiment 2 Experiment 4 
Tax Action p Tax Action p 
Bed .22 .78 <.001 .10 .90 <.001 
DVD 
Player 
.48 .52 .888 .42 .58 .245 
Glass .60 .40 .203 .63 .37 .052 
Leaflet .52 .48 .888 .45 .55 .519 
Ketchup .24 .76 <.001 .25 .75 <.001 
Orange .30 .70 .007 .17 .83 <.001 
Pencil .10 .90 <.001 .07 .93 <.001 
Pin .72 .28 .003 .75 .25 <.001 
Spade .04 .96 <.001 .03 .97 <.001 
Spatula .24 .76 <.001 .37 .63 .052 
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Table 5.3 
Proportion of Choice Items Selected on the PCO Triads in Experiments 2 and 4. 
Target 
Item 
Experiment 2 Experiment 4 
Perc. Action p Perc. Action P 
Axe .52 .48 .888 .48 .52 .897 
Baseball 
Bat 
.10 .90 <.001 .18 .82 <.001 
Clarinet .30 .70 .007 .45 .55 .519 
Cocktail 
shaker 
.36 .64 .065 .18 .82 <.001 
Gun .56 .44 .480 .52 .48 .897 
Handbag .18 .82 <.001 .25 .75 <.001 
Nut .48 .52 .888 .55 .45 .519 
Peppermill .72 .28 .003 .78 .22 <.001 
Present .78 .22 <.001 .72 .28 .001 
USB stick .10 .90 <.001 .10 .90 <.001 
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Figure 5.1. Mean percentage of action choices between the original Experiment 2 data and the current analysis with removal of those items where selection 
of the action item did not differ from chance. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
00.1
0.20.3
0.40.5
0.60.7
0.80.9
1
DCO_original DCO_binomial SCO_original SCO_binomial PCO_original PCO_binomial
Pr
op
or
ti
on
	o
f	A
ct
io
n	
Ch
oi
ce
s
Triad	Type
Context-leanContext-rich
		 149	
	
Figure 5.2. Mean percentage of action choices between the original Experiment 4 data and the current analysis with removal of those items where selection 
of the action item did not differ from chance. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
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5.2.2 Context Analysis 
 Performance on the triads in Experiments 2 and 4 was analysed to see on 
which trials was selection of the action choice significantly higher when presented in 
context. The analysis was completed by blocking the triads together for each 
experiment and completing separate 2x10 MANOVA’s using context as a between-
subjects factor and analysing performance on the ten triads in each set41. 
Comparisons of the contexts can be seen below in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. The 
results show that not all of the triads are enhanced by the context-rich condition. Of 
interest were those triads that did not increase the action choices in either 
experiment. Context had no significant influence in either Experiment 2 or 4 on 
twelve triads. The remaining 18 triads showed a significant increase in action choice 
in one, or both, of the previous experiments. This included five DCO (calculator, 
computer, deodorant, rifle, screwdriver), six SCO (DVD player, glass, leaflet, 
ketchup, orange, pin) and seven PCO triads (axe, clarinet, gun, handbag, nut, 
present, USB) showing significant increases in action scores between the contexts.  
 
																																																								41	The	DCO	triads	in	Experiment	4	were	analysed	using	separate	independent	samples	t-tests	as	the	overall	context	effect	on	the	MANOVA	was	not	significant,	F	(10,	49)	=	1.04,	p	=	.43.			
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Table 5.4 
Proportion of Action Choices Selected on the DCO Triads Between Context in 
Experiments 2 and 4.  
 Experiment 2 Experiment 4 
Item Lean Rich p Lean Rich p 
Book .28 .20 .518 .60 .53 .610 
Calculator .52 .88 .005 .87 .80 .497 
Computer .00 .20 .018 .13 .40 .019 
Deodorant .20 .60 .003 .47 .67 .122 
Drink bottle .12 .24 .279 .23 .37 .267 
Fax 
machine 
.76 .80 .739 .57 .70 .292 
Knife .72 .92 .068 .93 .87 .298 
Paperclip .44 .64 .162 .67 .73 .581 
Rifle .24 .60 .009 .30 .40 .425 
Screwdriver .00 .28 .004 .43 .50 .612 
 
Table 5.5 
Proportion of Action Choices Selected on the SCO Triads Between Context in 
Experiments 2 And 4. 
 Experiment 2 Experiment 4 
Item Lean Rich p Lean Rich P 
Bed .72 .82 .316 .87 .93 .398 
DVD 
Player 
.24 .80 <.001 .33 .83 <.001 
Glass .32 .28 .257 .17 .58 .001 
Leaflet .52 .44 .580 .40 .70 .019 
Ketchup .88 .64 .048 .77 .73 .770 
Orange .60 .80 .128 .73 .93 .038 
Pencil .88 .92 .646 .93 .93 1.00 
Pin .20 .36 .216 .10 .40 .007 
Spade 1.00 .92 .155 1.00 .93 .155 
Spatula .76 .76 1.00 .67 .60 .599 
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Table 5.6  
Proportion of Action Choices Selected on the PCO Triads Between Context in 
Experiments 2 And 4. 
 Experiment 2 Experiment 4 
Item Lean Rich P Lean Rich P 
Axe .28 .68 .004 .33 .70 .004 
Baseball 
Bat 
.84 .96 .164 .80 .83 .744 
Clarinet .48 .92 <.001 .23 .87 <.001 
Cocktail 
shaker 
.68 ,60 .565 .87 .77 .325 
Gun .28 .60 .022 .33 .63 .020 
Handbag .68 .96 .009 .63 .87 .037 
Nut .48 .56 .580 .30 .60 .019 
Peppermill .20 .36 .216 .13 .30 .121 
Present .16 .28 .316 .07 .50 <.001 
USB stick .80 1.00 .018 .83 .97 .088 
 
Of main interest at this point, was to investigate the reasons why context 
increased the action scores across only certain triads. The most obvious explanation 
lay in the images used which were categorised dependent on whether action scores 
were significantly increased by context. Across certain examples of the triads used 
the hands appear clear on the action-related objects in a similar manner to the target. 
However, obvious differences can be seen in how the agent is presented. For 
example, some of the triads showed only hands on the objects whereas some of the 
triads show more of the agent. In order to assess if this influenced whether or not the 
action choice was chosen the whole set of triads (DCO x 10, SCO x 10, PCO x 10) 
were coded as to whether or not an agent was clearly visible in the images used (i.e. 
the person’s body and face could be seen), or if just hands were seen. This led to 
eight levels created as to whether a not an agent was present in: 
• None of the items (handbag, pin, peppermill, nut, calculator, spatula, 
paperclip, spade) 
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• Target only (book, ketchup) 
• Action item only (cocktail shaker, pencil, knife) 
• Taxonomic item only (gun, USB, computer, present, DVD player) 
• Target and action item (clarinet, baseball bat, glass) 
• Target and taxonomic item (screwdriver) 
• Taxonomic and action item (orange, drink bottle, fax machine) 
• All three (axe, deodorant, bed, rifle, leaflet) 
It could be expected that selection of the action choice would be highest when the 
target and action choice are most similar in their visual appearance. The means for 
the levels can be seen below in Figure 5.3. The figure shows that selection of the 
action choice was highest for the triads in which an agent’s body and face were 
visible in the action choice only, and visible in the target and action choice. The 
highest peaks in the mean selection of the action choice are on the triads where an 
agent was seen in the action choice only, the target and the action choice, and when 
the agent was seen in all three images. This would indicate that participants would be 
more likely to select the action choice if the image used shows a full agent using the 
object rather than just the hands on the object. The exception to this is the triads 
where no agents were seen, and all three images showed only hands on the object. 
Such triads led to a high percentage of the action choices being selected in both 
contexts. This might suggest that any simulations (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Yeh 
& Barsalou, 2006) generated when the participants view the images are more likely 
to centre on the shared actions when an agent is visible. This would support the 
dynamic nature of the simulations that they include not only the object themselves, 
but are based within, and centred around, interaction with objects in a functional 
manner.
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Figure 5.3. Mean percentage of action choices in Experiments 2 and 4 based on the presence of a full agent in the triads in either none of the objects 
(None), the target object only (Tar), the action choice only (Act), the taxonomic choice only (Tax), the target and the action choice (Tar + Act), the target 
and the taxonomic choice (Tar + Tax), both the choice objects (Act + Tax) or all three objects (Tar + Act + Tax). Above the .5 line indicates an action 
preference, below the .5 line indicates a taxonomic preference. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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5.3 Experiment 8 
Using Protocol Analysis to Assess Strategies for Making Forced-Choice 
Categories 
 
5.4 Introduction 
Up to this point, the results of the experimental work have shown two main 
findings from the use of the triads designed here. First, action scores tend to be 
highest in the SCO triads where the target item and the action choice share a 
taxonomic/category membership with each other. For example, participants are more 
likely to group orange with banana over strawberry because they are both fruit but 
also share an action with one another. Selection of the action item is lowest in the 
DCO triads where action is pitted against taxonomic information. For example, 
participants are more likely to group rifle with sword because of the shared 
taxonomic relation rather than with water pistol because of the shared actions 
between them. In such circumstances, action is less frequently used to base category 
membership on its own, but does appear to have an additive effect when it is already 
matched with a taxonomic relation. However, it is has been shown that this is not 
consistently the case. While overall selection of the action choice in the DCO triads 
was lowest, for some cases the action choice was selected over category 
membership. For example, in the knife triad the action choice (saw) was consistently 
chosen over the taxonomic choice (ladle) in both Experiments 2 and 4. The second 
main finding here is the context effect. Showing the objects being used by an agent 
in a functional scene significantly increased the likelihood that participants would 
select the action choice in the triads. This effect has been shown across all of the 
triad types. 
The purpose of the Experiment 8 was to further investigate the reasons why 
participants select the choices they made on the triad task. One of the main criticisms 
behind using the triad task is the inferred nature of the results based on the design 
format. For example, Lin and Murphy (2001) designed 38 triads based on sharing 
either a taxonomic or a thematic response. The results are therefore inferred based on 
which selection they make. For example, participants who selected spider web to go 
with spider are inferred to have done so because of the shared thematic relation 
between them. However, participants may have selected the thematic choice because 
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of the shared linguistic property as both contain the word ‘spider’. In a similar 
manner, the reasons behind the responses made on the triads used in this thesis are 
inferred based on the design manipulation of the triads. For example, participants 
who selected banana with orange are inferred to have done so based on the shared 
action between them. However, this may not be the case and there may be more 
‘richness’ to the categorisation strategy used here.  
The conceptual system contains a wide variety of information regarding 
objects which is not just limited to functional, perceptual and action information, and 
can be drawn upon to make categorical decisions. It is therefore possible that 
participants in the previous experiments might be selecting banana because of other 
reasons outside of action and taxonomic relations, such as personal preference or 
autobiographical reasons. Equally, participants might have selected strawberry with 
orange because of the biological basis of the two in that both have seeds. As such, it 
is difficult to establish the reasons why participants made their choices when only 
drawing inferences based on the design of the triads. Therefore, Experiment 8 aimed 
to further establish in which cases the participants were actually responding based on 
shared actions between the items. In order to do this Experiment 8, ran the triad task 
along with collecting written protocols from the participants asking them to explain 
their reasons for making their choices in the task.  
The use of protocols as introspective data has been used in topics such as 
categorisation (Smith & Sloman, 1994; Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 1998) and problem 
solving (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony & Wynn, 2007; 
Newell & Simon, 1972; Russo, Johnson & Stephens, 1989). A long-standing debate 
exists in the literature on the use of protocols as data and whether or not participants 
can report accurately on higher-order cognitive processes. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
reported an experiment where word associations given by participants were directly 
influenced by previously seen word pairs. However, when participants were asked to 
report how they came to their answers they, generally, did not report the word pairs 
as influencing their choice. Nisbett and Wilson take this, along with other 
experimental work, as evidence that participants cannot introspect on higher-order 
processes. In their view, participants cannot introspect, but rather create a priori 
theories based on links between the stimulus and response. Therefore, protocols are 
nonveridical because they do not accurately reflect the cognitive process under 
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investigation. When the protocols happen to match task performance it is purely 
incidental.  
Smith and Miller (1978) have counter-argued that Nisbett and Wilson’s 
criterion for judging accurate introspection in their data was too strict. In Smith and 
Miller’s view, participants cannot be expected to introspect accurately because to do 
so would require the participant to understand the design manipulation of the 
experiment and the variables manipulated, particularly in a between-subjects design 
such as that used by Nisbett and Wilson. Only in such a manner where the participant 
knows the manipulation design can they accurately report their own mental 
processes. They further go on to cite research using within-subject designs that does 
appear to show experimental conditions under which self-reported protocols appear 
to be accurate (Berl, Lewis & Morrison, 1976; Newell & Simon, 1972). Smith and 
Miller further state that research should not focus on whether or not participants can 
introspect, but on the conditions which lead introspection to be accurate. However, 
despite the counterarguments of Smith and Miller, the debate does raise an important 
question as to whether or not participants have access to their higher order cognition. 
While recognising the limitations of this methodology for the reasons described 
above, protocols have been used previously with a good level of confidence 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Gilhooly et al., 2007; Newell & Simon, 1972; Smith & 
Sloman, 1994; Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 1998). The aim of Experiment 8 was to 
collect written protocols on each of the triads to ascertain the reasons why 
participants were selecting each of the choices. The triads were analysed individually 
to see which of the items are ‘good’, in the sense that participants report having 
selected the action item because of the shared action. It also aimed to find those 
triads where participants selected the action choice, but seemed to have used 
alternative strategies for doing so.  
 
5.5 Method 
5.5.1 Participants 
 A total of 253 undergraduate Psychology students (209 females) from the 
University of Hertfordshire took part in the experiment as part of their Research 
Methods module with a mean age of 20.04 (SD = 4.03, age range: 17-54). The 
sample size was calculated following an a priori power analysis using G*Power. 
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Assuming α =.05 and 1 – β =.80, the a priori power analysis indicated that a similar 
effect size to that found in Experiment 1 would be detected using a sample of 52 
participants. 
 
5.5.2 Design 
 The experiment consisted of a forced-choice triad task using the same 30 
triads as employed in Experiment 2 across the context-lean and context-rich 
conditions. To ensure a high quality of the responses, the triads were divided into 
two sets in a random order. The participants were divided into two groups and each 
saw only 15 (5 x SCO, 5 x DCO, 5 x PCO) of the 30 triads. It was believed that due 
to the length of the experiment if participants saw all 30, then the quality of their 
responses would deteriorate towards the end. The number of triads was consequently 
halved and participants only saw 15 (of 30) triads. Participants were then allocated to 
one of the triad sets (A or B), and to one of the contexts (lean or rich: see Table 5.7). 
Therefore, the experiment employed a 3x2x2 mixed design using triad type as a 
within-subjects factor, and triad set and context as between-subjects. As with the 
previous experiments the number of action choices on each triad type was recorded 
to give an action score for each. In addition to this, each participant gave a written 
protocol after each trial in response to the heading “reasons for making this 
choice…what sort of things were you considering?” This phrasing was used so that 
participants saw this more as reporting their thoughts rather than explaining their 
decision (Russo et al., 1989).  
An important question in the design of this experiment, was when 
participants would generate the protocols. Research generally uses one of two 
methods: concurrent (‘think aloud’) or retrospective verbalisation. Both methods 
have advantages and disadvantages but have varied in their use depending on the 
nature of the research. Reactivity is one of the main concerns with participants 
generating protocols, that the act of generating a protocol invariably changes the 
cognitive process under investigation. This is particularly a problem when using 
‘think aloud’ or concurrent verbalisation methods. For example, Schooler, Ohlsson 
and Brooks (1993) found that generating concurrent verbal protocols had an 
interfering effect on insight problem solving. They suggest that this is because 
participants tend to verbalise those processes which are easier to explain, but do not 
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help in the solution of the problem. In contrast to concurrent verbalisation, reactivity 
does not become an issue when participants generate protocols retrospectively. 
Therefore, the decision was taken that participants would generate their protocols 
retrospectively so that verbalising would not interfere with the decision. This in turn 
would reflect a similar performance to that of the previous experiments, where 
participants would make their decisions without any potential external influence.  
 
Table 5.7 
The Number of Participants in Experiment 8 Across Context and Triad Set. 
Context Triad Set  
A B Total 
Lean 72 67 139 
Rich 37 77 114 
Total 109 144 253 
 
5.5.3 Materials 
 The SCO, DCO and PCO triads from Experiment 2 were used here with the 
triads being randomly divided into two sets (see Table 5.8). Each participant was 
presented with a response sheet that provided enough room for them to write down 
their choice as well as their reason for choosing it.   
 
5.5.4 Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 2. All of the 
participants within each group were tested in two sessions where all participants 
completed the task simultaneously. The experiment ran on a 15” Macintosh laptop 
using Superlab and shown on an overhead projector. On the presentation of each 
triad the fixation point was presented for 1000 milliseconds followed by the target 
being shown for 1500 milliseconds, after which the target image was joined by the 
two choice items. Presentation of each triad (after onset of the choice items) lasted 
for 75 seconds. Participants were asked to make their choice and then give a written 
response to “what sorts of things were you considering?” Rather than responding on 
the Superlab program as with the previous experimental work, participants were 
provided with response sheets that provided spaces for their choice and protocol (see 
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Appendix AC). The program ran through the SCO, DCO and PCO triads after which 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
Table 5.8		
List	of	the	Triads	Presented	in	Set	A	and	Set	B. 
Set  Triad type 
 SCO DCO PCO 
A Pencil Fax machine Axe 
 Glass Screwdriver Baseball bat 
 Spatula Drink bottle USB 
 Pin Rifle Present 
 Ketchup  Book  Nut  
B Orange Computer Clarinet 
 DVD player Calculator Cocktail shaker 
 Bed Paperclip  Gun 
 Leaflet Deodorant Peppermill 
 Spade  Knife  Handbag  
 
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Choice Analysis 
 The participants’ responses were coded and the mean percentage of action 
choices selected were calculated for each of the triad sets. The results are shown 
below in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. As can be seen, the standard triad pattern found in 
Experiment 2 has been replicated here where the DCO triads have led to the lowest 
levels of the action choice selected, however, the pattern is much stronger with set A 
than set B. In addition, overall mean selections was higher in set A (M = .62) than in 
set B (M = .49). Therefore, the action scores were analysed individually for each set 
rather than pooling the data together. For each analysis a 3x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted using triad type as a within-subjects variable and context as 
a between-subjects variable.  
The analysis on the mean percentage of action scores for set A revealed that 
the main effect of context was significant, F (1, 107) = 45.44, p < .001, h2 = .30, 
with higher action scores in the context-rich (M = .72) than the context-lean 
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condition (M = .53). The main effect of triad type was also significant using the 
Greenhouse Geisser adjustment42, F (1.82, 194.60) = 22.27, p < .001, h2 = .17. Post 
hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that the mean action scores 
were significantly higher in the SCO triads compared to both the DCO (p <.001) and 
the PCO (p < .001) triads. The difference between the PCO triads and the DCO triads 
approached significance but did not cross the alpha threshold (p = .065). The 
interaction effect between context and triad type was also significant using the 
Greenhouse Geisser adjustment, F (1.82, 194.60) = 12.25, p < .001, h2 = .10. Within 
the context-lean condition, the mean percentage of action scores was significantly 
higher in the SCO triads compared to the DCO (p < .001) and the PCO triads (p < 
.001), but no difference was found between the latter (p = .94). A different pattern 
was found in the context-rich condition where the SCO triads were significantly 
higher than the DCO (p = .016), but not the PCO triads (p = .51). Post hoc analysis 
using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that context had a significant increase in 
action choices between the lean and rich conditions for the DCO (p < .001) and the 
PCO triads (p < .001), but not for the SCO triads (p = .25).  	
Table 5.9  
Mean Percentage of Action Choices Selected on Triad Set A. 
Context Triad type 
DCO SCO PCO 
Lean .44 (.26) .71 (.18) .44 (.23) 
Rich .63 (.26) .76 (.19) .78 (.18) 	
The analysis on the mean percentage of action scores for set B revealed a 
similar pattern to that of set A. The main effect of context was again significant, F (1, 
142) = 10.19, p = .002, h2 = .07, with higher action scores in the context-rich (M = 
.52) than the context-lean condition (M = .45). The main effect of triad type was also 
significant, F (2, 284) = 55.66, p < .001, h2 = .28. However, unlike set A, post hoc 
analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment revealed no difference between the SCO 
and PCO triads (p = .60), but both were significantly higher than the DCO triads 																																																								
42 Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant; χ² (2) = 11.13, p = .004, and therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .91. 
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(SCO-DCO: p < .001, PCO-DCO: p < .001). The interaction effect between context 
and triad type was also significant, F (2, 284) = 5.81, p = .003, h2 = .04. Within the 
context-lean condition the mean percentage of action scores was significantly higher 
in the SCO triads compared to the DCO (p < .001) but not the PCO triads (p = .17). 
The PCO triads were also significantly higher than the DCO triads (p < .001). In the 
context-rich condition the SCO triads were significantly higher than the DCO (p < 
.001), but lower than the PCO triads (p < .001). Between the contexts, post hoc 
analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that the context had a significant 
increase between the lean and rich conditions for the PCO triads (p < .001), but not 
for the SCO triads (p = .86) or DCO triads (p = .37).   
The data on both triad sets was further analysed for the effects of gender 
using a 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA with both context and gender as between-subject 
factors. The results on the main effects of triad and context, and the interaction effect 
between the two, remained the same as the previous analysis. Of main interest, was 
that a borderline significant main effect of gender was found on the data from set A, 
F (1, 105) = 3.78, p = .055, h2 = .04, showing that the percentage of action choices 
selected was higher for the males (69%) than for the females (61%). However, this 
effect was only found in set A and not replicated in set B, F (1, 1040) = 2.65, p = .11, 
h2 = .02. In neither set did gender significantly interact with context, nor was the 
three-way interaction effect significant (for both sets, F < 1).  Additionally, no effect 
if age was found after removing those participants greater than two SD’s above the 
mean.  	
Table 5.10 
Mean Percentage of Action Choices Selected on Triad Set B. 
Context Triad type 
DCO SCO PCO 
Lean .32 (.21) .54 (.17) .49 (.22) 
Rich .36 (.26) .55 (.20) .66 (.17) 
  
5.6.2 Protocol Analysis 
The protocols were analysed by the author and two independent coders. The 
coders read through the reasons from the participants and, using thematic analysis, 
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categorised it using a coding system. The coding system itself was developed prior to 
the analysis using common themes in categorising objects such as functional, 
thematic, action, perceptual and categorical reasoning. Additional reasons were also 
developed using a bottom-up approach during the initial stages of the analysis 
whereby the coding took place simultaneously by all three coders. The final set 
consisted of fifteen codes: 
1. Functional 
2. Action 
3. Perceptual 
4. Thematic 
5. Mediating link (the two objects are bound by a third, often non-
presented item).  
6. Same category 
7. Same material 
8. Personal 
9. Motion 
10. One can be the other 
11. Word feature 
12. Simile 
13. Autobiographical 
14. Biological 
15. Other (used to classify any reasons which did not fall into the above 
categories).  
All participants responded to fifteen triads and so the complete set of 
protocols consisted of 3795 protocols. The protocols were then subdivided into part 
protocols separating by the reasons given which is seen to provide a more accurate 
analysis and understanding of the cognitive processes involved during decision 
making (Bettman & Park, 1980; Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Kuusela & Paul, 2000). 
For example, if a participant selected banana with orange because “they are both 
fruit and both need to be peeled”, then this was divided into two separate protocols 
under the codes same category and action. In order to agree the application of the 
codes, the first 250 protocols were analysed by the three coders simultaneously and 
the bottom-up coding scheme was developed. The coders were then given the 
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protocols in packs and independently went through each protocol separating it into 
part protocols when necessary and assigning a code to the reason given by the 
participants. The final coding assigned to a part protocol was done so when at least 
two (of the three) coders assigned it with the same coding. On occasions where the 
coders gave all different reasons the disagreements were discussed until agreement 
was reached between the coders. If an agreement could not be reached, the protocol 
was removed from the final analysis. In order to ensure that the coders all agreed in 
their codings the next 250 codings were subjected to a reliability analysis and an 
alpha of .95 was achieved showing that there was high agreement between the 
coders.  
Overall, the results showed that functional (27.27%), perceptual (18.83%), 
action (11.43%) and thematic reasons (10.25%) accounted for the majority of the 
protocols. The coded protocols were identified as relating to an action choice or 
selection of the competitor for the purposes of comparison. The results below are 
separated into two stages. First, the percentage of protocols for the SCO, DCO and 
PCO triads were calculated overall. Second, the percentage of protocols for each 
individual triad was calculated to look at the main reasons given each choice, and to 
look at those triads where action was most influential43.  
Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.744 show the overall percentage of reported reasons for 
all of the protocols. It can be seen that on the DCO triads when participants selected 
the taxonomic choice participants were most likely to report functional, thematic and 
category reasons for making their choice. When participants selected the action 
choice they were most likely to report action, functional and perceptual reasons. 
While it was predicted that participants would report perceptual reasons for selecting 
the action choice (given that objects that share an action invariably share ergonomic 
and perceptual characteristics) it was not predicted that participants would give 
function as a reason for the action choice given that these pairs of objects do not 
share taxonomic information and are therefore not designed for the same use. 
However, this is discussed later with reference to the finding that participants would 																																																								
43 However the data from the individual triads is not presented here in the main body, but can be found 
in Appendix AD.  
44 Across all of the triad types, not all of the possible codes significantly contributed to the overall 
reasons used. Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 therefore only focus on those codes accounting for more than 
10% of the protocols given (except for the case of the ‘same category’ codings on the SCO triads 
which were left in for theoretical reasons).  
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often give goal related reasons (e.g. a rifle and a water pistol go together because 
they “shoot”). On the SCO triads when participants selected the taxonomic choice 
they were most likely to report functional, perceptual and thematic reasons45. 
However, when participants selected the action choice they were most likely to 
report action, functional and perceptual reasons. Selection of the choices on the PCO 
triads varied but the main results do comply with the design format of the triads in 
that they reported perceptual reasons for selecting the perceptual choice and action 
reasons for selecting the action choice.  
 
5.6.3 Protocols on the DCO Triads 
Figure 5.5 below shows the codings reported by participants, which 
accounted for more than 10% of the protocols in at least one condition on the DCO 
triads. As can be seen the majority of protocols reported functional reasons for 
making their choices. While this is not surprising for the taxonomic choice, given 
that by definition the taxonomic choices share some functional information, this is 
more surprising for the action choice. This will be discussed later as to the difference 
between the specific object ‘inter-action’ and the general ‘goal’ of the objects. When 
participants selected the taxonomic choice they were more likely to report ‘thematic’ 
as well as ‘same category’ reasons for doing so. Few protocols on the action choice 
gave a thematic reason for doing so. This goes some way to alleviating any concern 
that participants were selecting the action choice because of shared thematic relations 
given research that has suggested that actions are thematic associations since we only 
use objects in specific situations (Kalénine et al., 2009; Tsagkaridis et al., 2014). 
Figure 5.5 further shows that when participants selected the action choice they gave a 
high percentage of ‘action’ and ‘perceptual’ protocols. This supports the prior notion 
that objects which share an action will invariably share perceptual characteristics and 
hence becomes influential in the triad task.  
The analysis of the individual triads (see Appendix AD) shows that across the 
majority of triads participants reported the shared actions as a reason for selecting the 
																																																								
45 The terms “reasons’ and ‘strategies’ could potentially be used interchangeably here given that they 
are reporting their reasons for making their choice based on specific strategies (e.g. functional, 
perceptual, action). However, the term ‘strategies’ implies that the participants are fully able to 
introspect on their decision, rather than making post hoc justifications as suggested by Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977). Given the nature of this debate (outlined above) the term ‘reasons’ is used here.  
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action choice. However, there were three examples whereby selection of the action 
choice was not accompanied with action-based protocols. On the fax machine, 
calculator and knife triads participants rarely (if at all) reported action as being a 
primary reason for selecting the action choice. Rather, participants favoured 
alternative reasons and selection was coincidental. On both the fax machine and the 
knife triads participants favoured functional reasons for making their choice. On the 
calculator triad some participants did report action when selecting mobile phone in 
the context-rich condition only (13.90%). However, this is relatively low given that 
the majority of participants selected mobile phone because “a mobile phone has a 
calculator on it” (47.22%) and the action protocols were not consistent given that 
participants did not report such when selecting mobile-phone in the context-lean 
condition.  
 
5.6.4 Protocols on the SCO Triads 
The results below in Figure 5.6 show the percentage of codings given on the 
SCO triads. As can be seen, when participants selected both the taxonomic and the 
action choice they were highly likely to report using functional and perceptual 
reasons for doing so. Again, this is not surprising given that the objects all shared a 
taxonomic link with the target object, which includes both functional and perceptual 
information. Action reasons were reported when participants selected the action 
choice, but as can be seen action reasons were reported with lower frequencies 
compared to on the DCO triads. A small percentage of participants (7.44%) reported 
action reasons when selecting the taxonomic choice in the context-rich condition. 
These comments were action based, but not with the strict definition used here in the 
thesis and were related to grasping movements such as “I can pick them up with one 
hand”. Such reasons were classified as ‘action’. As can also be seen, participants 
reported thematic reasons for making their choices, but in relatively low quantities. 
In addition, very few participants reported using a ‘same category’ strategy despite 
the objects sharing category membership with each other.  
The analysis of the individual triads (see Appendix AD) shows that, across 
the majority of triads, participants reported the shared actions as a strategy for 
selecting the action choice. However, there were three examples where selection of 
the action choice was not accompanied with action-based protocols. On the spatula, 
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spade and ketchup triads participants rarely (if at all) reported action as being a 
primary reason for selecting the action choice. Rather participants favoured 
alternative strategies and selection was coincidental. In the DVD player triad also, 
participants used action reasoning to select the action choice in the context-lean 
condition, but not in the context-rich. This suggests that in this example, context does 
not increase the saliency of the shared action, but increases the saliency of other 
properties (functional and mediating links). These four triads were removed from 
subsequent analysis.  
The bed and leaflet triads showed the opposite effect where action was rarely 
used within the context-lean condition, but became a primary reason in the context-
rich condition (reported with a high percentage of action protocols). This supports 
the notion that the context increases the saliency of action and is more likely to be 
used when presented in context (but only on certain examples). The ‘best’ triads 
appear to be the pin and orange triad as participants relied heavily on action in both 
the lean and the rich contexts and both triad types resulted in a high percentage of 
action protocols reported. 
 For the pencil and glass triads it appears that participants did report the 
shared action to select the action item, however, these were not the primary reason 
for doing so in that participants favoured alternative reasons such as functional and 
perceptual. However, this does show that participants do recognise the shared action 
between the objects, and may use action as a supplementary reason for categorising 
the objects. Indeed, in both triad sets participants would often report action as being 
supplementary to other features. For example, participants would report that pencils 
and paintbrushes are “used to draw things by picking them up and grasping in their 
fingers”. Therefore the shared actions would be used to support the pre-existing 
relations between the objects, supporting the designed notion that the objects share 
both an action and a taxonomic relation and further supporting the “additive” effect 
that action has in category decisions.  
 
5.6.5 Protocols on the PCO Triads 
The data below in Figure 5.7 shows the percentage of each coding type given 
on the PCO triads. As can be seen, when participants selected the action choice, they 
were most likely to report action reasons for doing so. In addition, when they 
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selected the perceptual choice they reported perceptual reasons for doing so. Some 
participants also reported ‘motion’ reasons for selecting the action choice. These 
were limited to comments particularly on the axe and baseball bat triads where 
participants talked about the strength one would need in order to swing the objects. 
An interesting finding here as well is that some participants did report functional 
reasons for selecting both the action and the perceptual choice. This is a little 
surprising given that the triads were designed without taxonomic information. 
However, these comments were not centered on standard object functions, but were 
comments around overall goals that could be achieved with the objects. For example, 
participants selected mace with baseball bat because “they can both be used as 
weapons”, and participants selected car key with nut because “they both make cars 
work”.  
The analysis of the individual triads (see Appendix AD) shows that across the 
majority of triads participants reported the shared actions as a strategy for selecting 
the action choice. However, there were four examples whereby selection of the 
action choice was not accompanied with action-based protocols. On the gun, 
handbag, USB and present triads participants rarely (if at all) reported action as 
being a primary reason for selecting the action choice. Rather, participants favoured 
alternative strategies and selection was coincidental. This was particularly the reason 
in the case for the gun, handbag and present triads where participants used 
alternative strategies for selecting the action choice and when participants did use 
action it was not consistent. The USB triad is to be removed because it does not 
conform to the design format of the PCO triads. Participants would impose a 
superordinate category to the items and therefore this item is to be removed from the 
data pool prior to re-analysis.  
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 Figure 5.5. The percentage of reported protocols in the DCO triads. 
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 Figure 5.6. The percentage of reported protocols in the SCO triads.   
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Figure 5.7. The percentage of reported protocols in the PCO triads. 	
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5.6.6 Choice Data Re-analysed 
The previous section identified the ‘non-action reported’ items that may 
confound the interpretation of the data. The aim of the next section was to re-analyse 
the choice data from the current experiment after such items have been removed. 
This was done in two steps: first, the original data from Experiment 2 was re-
analysed following the removal of the ‘weak’ items and second, the choice data here 
from the current experiment was re-analysed in the same manner. Figure 5.8 below 
shows the results from Experiment 2. As can be seen the same pattern across the 
triads as was found in the original experiment is evident.  
The lowest action scores were on the DCO triads (Lean = .19, Rich = .43) and 
similar means were seen between the SCO (Lean = .50, Rich = .66) and the PCO 
triads (Lean = .49, Rich = .68). A repeated measures ANOVA on the mean 
percentage of action scores showed that the main effect of context was once again 
significant with higher action scores in the context-rich condition, F (1, 48) = 32.36, 
p < .001, h2 = .40. The main effect of triad was also again significant, F (2, 96) = 
37.95, p < .001, h2 = .44, with post hoc examination using the Bonferroni 
Adjustment showed that the DCO triads was significantly lower then both the SCO 
(p < .001) and the PCO triads (p < .001). No difference was found between the SCO 
and PCO triads (p = 1.0). As with the original analysis the interaction effect was not 
found to be significant, F < 1, suggesting that the context effect was consistent across 
all the triad types.  
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 below show the mean percentage of action choices 
analysed from the current experiment following the removal of the ‘poor’ items as 
identified from the protocol analysis. As with the previous analysis the data sets were 
analysed separately because the results showed different patterns between them. Both 
data sets were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA’s using triad type as the 
within-subjects factor and using context as the between-subjects factor. Figure 5.9 
shows the means for set A, and shows a very similar pattern to what has been seen 
previously from Experiment 2 (see Figure 5.8). The results showed that the main 
effect of context was significant with higher action choices in the context-rich 
condition, F (1, 107) = 30.30, p < .001, η2 = .22. The main effect of triad type was 
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also significant using the Greenhouse Geisser adjustment46, F (1.74, 186.91) = 25.70, 
p < .001, η2 = .19. Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that the 
DCO triads were significantly lower than the SCO (p < .001) and the PCO triads (p < 
.001), and the latter also significantly lower than the SCO triads (p = .036). Unlike 
the previous analysis in Experiment 2, the interaction effect was significant, F (1.74, 
186.91) = 7.35, p = .001, η2 = .06. Post hoc analysis revealed that the mean 
percentage of action scores was significantly higher in the context-rich compared to 
context-lean condition for both the DCO (p < .001) and the PCO triads (p = .001). 
However, there was no difference in the SCO triads between the two contexts (p = 
.46). This only partially replicates the data found previously where context was 
significantly increased on all three triad types.  
Figure 5.10 shows that the data for set B followed a similar pattern, however, 
overall scores were lower compared to set A (as found in the previous analysis). A 
repeated measures ANOVA found the same pattern of data as with set A where the 
main effects of context, F (1, 142) = 15.60, p < .001, η2 = .10, the main effect of triad 
type, F (2, 284) = 49.50, p < .001, η2 = .26, and the interaction effect, F (1, 107) = 
7.17, p = .001, η2 = .05, were all significant. However, there was a difference found 
on the interaction effect seen between the two data sets. For set B only the mean 
percentage of action choices on the PCO triads were significantly increased by 
context (p < .001). No differences were found between the contexts for the SCO (p = 
.21) and the DCO triads (p = .30). This again only partially replicates the context 
pattern found between in Experiment 2.  
 
																																																								46	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant; χ² (2) = 16.60, p < .001, and therefore the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .87.	
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Figure 5.8. The percentage of action choices across triad type and context from Experiment 
2 following removal of the ‘non-action reported’ items. Error bars present the standard error 
of the mean.  
	 	
	
Figure 5.9. The percentage of action choices across triad type and context from Experiment 
8 (set A) following removal of the ‘non-action reported’ items. Error bars present the 
standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 5.10. The percentage of action choices across triad type and context from Experiment 
8 (Set B) following removal of the ‘non-action reported’ items. Error bars present the 
standard error of the mean. 	
5.6.4 Comparing the Protocols with the Choice Proportions 
In the following section the protocol data found in Experiment 8 was matched 
up with the data reanalysed in Section 5.2. This includes the data on those triads 
where action choices were significantly greater than chance, and where action 
choices were significantly increased by context. The data is presented below in Table 
5.1147. As can be seen below, in only two examples (orange and clarinet) were the 
action choices significantly higher than chance and significantly increased by 
context. These might be considered as the optimal triads to encourage selection of 
the action choice. A further five triads (paperclip, bed, pencil, baseball bat and 
cocktail shaker) were significantly higher than chance, but not increased by context. 
This might suggest that these triads were already highly salient in encouraging 
selection of the action choice. Eight of the triads (computer, deodorant, rifle, 
screwdriver, glass, leaflet, pin and axe) showed a significant increase in context, but 
were no different to chance. These triads show that the context led to increased 
saliency in selection of the action choice, but were also influenced overall by other 																																																								
47 The data presented in Table 5.11 does not include those triads that were identified in Experiment 8 
as selecting the action choice, but not reporting the shared actions as a reason for doing so.  
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reasons in addition to the shared actions. This is primarily on the SCO and DCO 
triads where there is potentially more variation for other features to be used. For the 
PCO triads this is not as much the case since the items share less additional features 
in common. Additionally, in only four triads (book, drink bottle, nut and peppermill) 
were the action choices not different to chance, and not increased by context. While 
the protocol data does show that when participants are selecting the action choice 
they are doing so because of the shared actions, it might show that such triads are not 
“action favourable” and that participants favour the alternative choice based on 
alternative strategies.  
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Table 5.11  
The Individual Triads Matched Against the Protocol Data and Reanalysis of Section 
5.2.  
Triad Triad 
Type 
Action choices 
significantly 
greater than 
chance? 
Action choices 
significantly 
increased by 
context? 
Actions 
reported in 
protocols? 
Book DCO X X ✰ 
Computer  X ✰ ✰ 
Deodorant  X ✰ ✰ 
Drink bottle  X X ✰ 
Paperclip  ✰ X ✰ 
Rifle  X ✰ ✰ 
Screwdriver  X ✰ ✰ 
Bed SCO ✰ X ✰ 
Glass  X ✰ ✰ 
Leaflet  X ✰ ✰ 
Orange  ✰ ✰ ✰ 
Pencil  ✰ X ✰ 
Pin  X ✰ ✰ 
Axe PCO X ✰ ✰ 
Baseball bat  ✰ X ✰ 
Clarinet  ✰ ✰ ✰ 
Cocktail 
shaker 
 ✰ X ✰ 
Nut  X X ✰ 
Peppermill  X X ✰ 
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5.7 Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 8 was to examine participants’ reported reasons for 
their choices in the triads using protocol analysis. The analysis showed that in the case 
of certain triads, when participants selected the action choice, they reported reasons 
other than action for doing so. However, for the remainder of the triads participants 
did report the shared actions between the objects as being a potential reason for 
selecting the action choice. Those items where participants reported using alternative 
strategies were removed from the data pool and the choices were re-analysed for both 
the current experiment and the original experiment (Experiment 2). The same pattern 
was found again in the data set. Participants were always less likely to select the 
action choice on the DCO triads in favour of selecting the taxonomic choice. 
Participants were more likely to select the action choice on the SCO triads where the 
action choice already shared a taxonomic relation with the target.  
The effect of context has not been as consistent between the previous and 
current experimental work. The results from Experiment 2 showed a clear main effect 
of context, where the percentage of action scores on all three triad types was 
significantly increased by context. The current data showed that this effect was 
limited to only the DCO and PCO triads, and that no contextual increase on the 
selection of the action choice was seen in the SCO triads. This may be because the 
triads removed from the SCO set (as explained above because participants reported 
other reasons for selecting the action choice) were those most influenced by context. 
In particular, Table 5.5 above shows that the DVD player triad was the only SCO 
example where the action choices were significantly increased by context in both 
Experiments 2 and 4. Therefore, it might be possible that context is less influential on 
selecting the action choice as previously thought, particularly on the SCO triads.  
The results from the current experiment show how categorisation is both ‘rich’ 
and ‘fluid’. Rather than participants using more traditional methods to group objects 
in the triads (e.g. taxonomic/perceptual strategies) participants reported having used a 
wide range of reasons for selecting the objects. In addition, such reasons were not 
consistent. The more traditional views of categorisation would predict that 
participants should be relatively consistent in their strategies used and this is 
supported by research showing that while there are individual differences, participants 
are relatively consistent in the strategies they use (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Simmons & 
Estes, 2008). However, this is not what was seen here.  
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While it would be predicted that participants should be consistent within each 
triad type for example, participants used various methods not only across the triad 
types (predictable, given differences between the triads types and how they were 
designed), but also within each triad set. For a lot of the triads participants reported 
using the same strategy for choosing the action item in both contexts. However, in 
certain cases the use of the two contexts produced a between-context effect since it is 
clear that even on the same triad participants use different strategies for 
categorisation. For example, when participants selected mobile phone to go with 
calculator in the context-lean condition they mainly reported using perceptual 
strategies that the two objects look similar. However, in the context-rich condition 
participants were most likely to report that ‘one can be the other’ given that mobile 
phones have a calculator on them. Given that the effect of context was significant, this 
is in line with the notion that context increases the saliency of the shared actions, as 
well as other features, between the objects. In addition, even within the same triad sets 
participants used varying strategies to select the action or the competitor choice. For 
example, on the SCO triads while functional and perceptual strategies were fairly 
consistent through the triads action was only reported in seven (of ten) triads and 
there were examples of other strategies such as thematic, personal, autobiographical 
and the materials of the object which were used, but not consistently.  
Experiment 8 showed that participants used a variety of strategies in grouping 
objects together on the triads. This represents clear item effects since participants use 
such variety of strategies and have arisen because of the nature of how the triads were 
designed. Manipulating the design format of the objects would clearly impact on 
selection of the action choice. For example, in the rifle triad participants selected the 
taxonomic choice of sword because of the shared category link between the objects. 
However, both rifle and sword are highly typical and good examples of the category 
of weapons (Rosch, 1975). It would be predicted that the action choice would be more 
likely selected if the competitor was less typical of the category such as missile, tear 
gas or hatchet48.  
What should be kept in mind here, is the argument from Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977), that the protocols given do not reflect their actual processes, but post hoc 
																																																								
48 Examples taken from Rosch, 1975, as less typical examples of weapons compared to both sword and 
rifle.  
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justifications. There are, however, good reasons to have confidence that the protocols 
do genuinely reflect at least part of the cognitive process involved in making the item 
choice. This is particularly based on the short-nature of the experiment, and that 
participants are asked to generate their protocol immediately after making their 
choice. Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1993) suggest that what is key in producing 
protocols is that (i) subjects report contents straight from short-term memory (STM), 
and (ii) what is produced is phonetic in nature. They also suggest that protocols are 
more accurate in reflecting the cognitive processes involved, as opposed to fabrication 
and post hoc justifications, when the task itself does not place a heavy burden on 
short-term memory. Given that the triad task is a relatively simply one, not exhausting 
the demands of STM with the protocols being produced immediately after making 
their decision (i.e. from STM), it is suggested here that the protocols generated do 
reflect the cognitive processes involved during the decision making rather than being 
post hoc justifications. Furthermore, the participants were not aware of the design 
manipulation and would not be able to form a priori justifications (in line with the 
argument of Smith & Miller, 1978). However, it is still likely that the protocols 
provide only a partial account of their choice and that subconscious influences could 
not be reported. The argument here is not that participants have complete access to 
their cognitive processes, but that the protocols can be used as an empirical check in 
support of the action choice data.  
Experiment 8 shows that participants not only selected the action choice on 
the triads, but also then frequently reported the shared actions as the reason for having 
done so. However, what should also be kept in mind here is that not all participants 
reported the shared actions and this was not the case for every triad example. For 
those triads where participants reported the actions, it is possible that action was made 
more salient, and therefore more obvious, in the context-rich condition. The data 
further shows that many participants in the context-lean conditions also reported the 
shared actions between the objects, though the frequency of such was lower than in 
the context-rich condition. Therefore, just as participants are able to recognise the 
shared functional and thematic links between the items they are also able to recognise 
the shared actions. However, as stated above this was not the case for all participants, 
and for many items the frequency of reported actions was insufficient to result in a 
clear ‘advantage’ over the competitor.  
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5.8 General Discussion 
The work reported within this chapter has sought to address item differences 
among the triads. This was completed through (1) reanalysing the triad data from the 
previous experiments, and (2) using protocol analysis to assess the strategies used 
when participants engaged in the triad task. The overall findings are outlined below.  
 
5.8.1 Reanalysing the Triads 
The triads used in the previous experiments have shown a wide variation on 
whether or not the participants selected the action choice. The choice data from 
Experiments 2 and 4 was reanalysed focusing on the selection of the action choice 
against the competitor, and the selection of the action choice in both the context-lean 
and context-rich condition. For certain items, participants were consistently more 
likely to select the action choice over the competitor. Only a few items showed that 
participants were consistently more likely to select the competitor choice over the 
action item. For a number of items there was no difference between selection of the 
action and the competitor choice using a binomial distribution. This would imply that 
both options where chosen with a (roughly) 50/50 ratio which would therefore 
suggest that, under these circumstances, action information is equally likely to be 
drawn upon for categorisation as taxonomic or perceptual information.  
The proportion of action choices from the previous experiments was 
reanalysed after removing those items that did not differ, or led to a higher competitor 
choice, and showed a similar pattern of data compared to the previous analysis. 
However, after removing such items the context effect (lean vs rich) was limited to 
only the DCO and PCO triads (see Fig. 2 and 3). This would suggest that the context 
effect is strongest when the action choice does not present as a clear ‘winner’, but 
when shown in context the action is made more salient and hence more likely to be 
selected in the task.   
The use of the context images here is very important and is a crucial factor in 
determining whether or not participants selected the action choice. The context 
images were collected with the intention that they reflected a visual scene of the 
objects being used, but there was some variation in the images used in terms of what 
they ‘contained’. All of the images showed the objects being used for their functional 
purpose. The criterion in selecting these images was that the context reflected a 
natural scenario and included an agent. However, some of the images showed only a 
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hand holding the objects while others showed a whole person in the scene (see 
Appendix N, O and P). In addition, the objects varied in size and therefore confining 
the images to include specific elements (such as the body and the face of the agent) 
would result in perceptual variations, e.g. a USB stick would look smaller in the 
image compared to a piano). As such, there are wide variations in the images used and 
how they demonstrate the object being used.  
Part of the analysis above in Section 5.2.2 examined this by coding the images 
used as to whether the target, action choice and the competitor contained a whole 
agent (including the arms, face and body) or just showed the hands on objects. Figure 
5.3 showed that participants were more likely to select the action choice when the 
action item was shown with a full agent where the body and face were clearly visible. 
Perhaps this is because including a full agent includes more visual clues of the scene 
and emphasising the function, the action and the goal of the situation. This in itself 
suggests a very specific context, which encourages participants to simulate an event 
(either the specific event suggested or a similar one) where they are also using the 
objects. Hence the context increases the saliency of the shared actions between the 
objects and the participants should be more likely to select the action choice. Though 
it should be noted that this was not deterministic and even on cases where only a hand 
was shown, some participants were still likely to select the action choice. It is possible 
that selection of the action choice is not just determined by simulating the action, but 
simulating a specific scenario in which the objects are used for their functional 
purpose and as such would naturally include simulating how to use the object.  
 
5.8.2 Categorisation Strategies  
 The aim of Experiment 8 was to investigate the reasons participants would 
give for their selection of the items in the triads. These protocols were collected 
immediately after the participants made their choice on each of the triads. The 
protocol analysis revealed that for a few of the triads, participants were reliably 
selecting the action choice but not reporting the shared actions as their reason for 
doing so. It had been previously assumed that participants were selecting the choice 
items because of the shared action between them (as inferred from the manipulation). 
The protocol analysis supports this for the majority of the triads used (see Sections 
5.6.3 to 5.6.5), but does show that other factors were involved in participants’ 
reasoning for making their choices. On such items where participants did not report 
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the shared actions they used alternative strategies for making their selection. 
However, this was only the case in less than one-third of the triads. On the remaining 
triads participants both selected the action choice on the triad and reported the actions 
as the reason for doing so, though it should be noted that the majority of participants 
reported multiple reasons for selecting their choice. For example, one participant 
selected banana with orange because “both are fruit and need to be peeled to eat 
them”. This seems to be an example of the ‘additive effect’ seen in the SCO triads, 
discussed in Chapter 2. That is to say that where both choice items share category 
membership with the target, the one that also shares an action is more likely to be 
chosen. Given the findings above we can be reasonably confident that the protocols 
shed some light on the strategies used during the task, and that participants were 
drawing upon action information as a source of commonality for categorisation.   
The work presented thus far has shown that, under certain circumstances, 
action does have an influence on how participants make categorical decisions. It 
therefore stands to reason that if action can influence categorisation, then it might also 
influence other tasks that draw on categorical processes. The aim of Chapter 6 was to 
test this premise using the same stimuli as in the previous chapters, but using a 
different task. There is a close relationship between categorisation and similarity 
(Goldstone, 1994; Rips, 1989) and as such, Experiment 9 used a similarity judgement 
task different to that used in Experiment 4 (where similarity instructions were used on 
a forced task). Given the relationship that exists between the two processes, it was 
predicted that action should influence similarity in a similar manner as to how it has 
been demonstrated to influence categorisation.  
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Chapter 6 
Rifle Goes with Sword but is More Similar to Water Pistol: Assessing Action-
Based Dissociations in Categorisation and Similarity 
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The previous chapters have demonstrated how action information has an 
additive effect in categorisation judgements. Objects are more likely to be categorised 
together when they share both an action and a taxonomic relation (e.g. orange and 
banana) as opposed to just sharing a taxonomic relation (e.g. orange and strawberry). 
However, action is less likely to base category membership on its own when objects 
share an action but not taxonomic information (e.g. rifle and water pistol). Action 
choices overall were also shown to be higher when presented in the context-rich than 
context-lean condition. Furthermore, action influenced choices on the triad using the 
instructions to select the object that is “most similar” to the target. However, it is 
possible that the influence of action in similarity judgements is inflated by the 
“forced-choice” nature of the triad task. The aim of the present chapter was to assess 
how action influences similarity judgements using a standard rating scale, which are 
more commonly used in similarity research. The results showed an additive effect on 
judging similarity, as was previously found on the triad task. But unlike the previous 
findings, no main effect of context was found. In addition, the pairs developed from 
the PCO triads showed low similarity ratings for the items sharing only action 
information. The results are discussed in light of how sources of commonality are 
‘weighted’ in similarity judgments, and how the format of the triads result in different 
sources weighted as more salient than others.  
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6. Experiment 9 
The Role of Action in Assessments of Object Similarity 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Similarity is often seen as playing a key role in categorisation (Brooks, 1978; 
Goldstone, 1994; Hampton, 1995; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Specific theories on 
categorisation view items in the world as belonging to a category based on how 
similar they are to an exemplar/base item. For example, the prototype theory of 
concepts (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) suggests that details are 
abstracted from experience with objects to form a ‘prototypical’ case. New items are 
judged as being a member of the category based on how similar they are to the 
prototype, the more similar it is then the more likely it is that they will be judged as a 
member of the category. The details of the prototype are abstracted from the other 
category instances and therefore, form an amodal representation (Barsalou, 2003) 
focused only on the central tendencies/common features of the category. Such a view 
posits a “feature list” view where concepts are decontextualised and represented 
outside of the modalities in which they were experienced. Exemplar models (Brooks, 
1978, Medin & Schaffer, 1978) differ because they use specific category instances in 
order to judge membership to the category, but are also based on how similar the new 
instance is to the generated exemplar (see Murphy, 2016, for an argument against 
exemplar theories).  
It can be argued that similarity between entities does play a key role in 
categorisation because otherwise all members of a category would have equal status 
in terms of how ‘good’ an example they are. Rosch and Mervis (1975) showed that 
concepts have a ‘graded structure’ and that some category members are better 
members of the category than others. In support of the prototype theory they collected 
measures of ‘family resemblance’. They showed that some examples are rated as 
better members of the category than others, e.g. a robin is a better example of a bird 
than ostrich. However, similarity cannot be used to explain all concepts and there are 
examples where similarity cannot be used to assess new members of the category. 
Two clear examples support this; ad hoc, and mathematical concepts.  
Ad hoc concepts (Barsalou, 1983) are those that are developed in response to a 
specific goal such as things to take on holiday. Items within this category share very 
little in common except that they can be used to serve the relevant goal. For example, 
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passport and sun lotion share no functional or perceptual properties and are only 
linked by the goal (see Estes et al., 2009, for an explanation of why ad hoc categories 
can be argued to differ from thematic categories). While you could argue that these 
items are similar in one specific dimension (passports and sun lotion are both good 
items to take on holiday) similarity cannot explain how the category in constructed 
and cannot explain how items are assessed as belonging to the category or not 
(Hampton, 1995, 1997).  
Mathematical concepts also are also cases when similarity cannot be used to 
define and categorise new stimuli. Rather such elements are governed by explicit 
rules. For example, a triangle is governed by the explicit rule that it must have three 
sides where the internal angles add up to 180o. While certain triangles might be more 
similar to each other this is not used in the categorisation of such a shape, rather it 
must meet the defining criteria. Prime numbers are another example, where similarity 
plays no rule in defining it. They are governed by the specific criteria of being 
divisible by 1 and itself. While the number 2 might be more similar to 3 than to 997, 
this is not taken into account when defining such as numbers as being a prime or not.  
Overall, this shows that while similarity might play a key role in category 
construction, it cannot be used to explain all concepts. Goldstone (1994) has argued 
that similarity may ground some categories, but not all. From an evolutionary 
perspective, Franks and Braisby (1997) have argued that similarity is a spandrel, or 
“by-product”, and has little use in cognition. They have argued that concepts have 
developed for the purpose of guiding potential actions and that this is their primary 
purpose. While similarity plays a role on how concepts are formed they argue that it 
has no role outside of concept formation. If similarity were an adaptation to the 
environment, then it would play a strong role on its own, which in their view it does 
not. Therefore, it is simply a by-product of concept formation and serves no other 
purpose.   
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Figure 6.1. Models of categorisation organised by their dependence on similarity (taken from 
Rips, 1989). 	
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, models of categorisation vary in their 
dependence on similarity. If it is the case that categorisation is dependent on the 
judgment of how two objects are similar, then this would predict a monotonic 
relationship between the two (Braisby, 2004). As similarity between two objects 
increases then so should the likelihood of them being categorised together. However, 
tasks using the same stimuli for categorisation and similarity tasks do not always track 
each other and such dissociations between the two show that there is more to 
categorisation than similarity. For example, Medin, Goldstone and Gentner (1993) 
report an experiment where participants rated Doberman Pinscher as being more 
similar to a raccoon than a shark. However, they were more likely to be put into the 
group [bear, lion, shark] than [bear, lion, raccoon]. This is because of the ferocious 
nature of the former triplet that emerges as a salient property in the context of the 
animals presented. Rips (1989, Experiment 1) has demonstrated one of the clearest 
dissociations between the two processes where he demonstrated that some objects are 
more likely to be categorised with item X, but more similar to item Y (see Chapter 2).  
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In an additional experiment, Rips further showed this dissociation when 
participants were told about a bird-like animal that had gone through a physical 
change after an environmental accident and now looked more insect-like. When asked 
to make judgments of similarity and categorisation, participants viewed the creature 
as more similar to an insect, but more likely to be a bird. This shows clear evidence 
that tasks of similarity and categorisation do not always track each other, and that 
there is more to categorical decisions than assessing how similar the items are as 
participants were using rules to govern categorisation. It is now more generally 
accepted that categorisation can be both similarity based (this is a dog because it is 
similar to other dogs) and theory based (this is a fruit because it contains seeds).  
An interesting distinction in similarity research is the difference between 
features that are necessary for categorisation, and those that are characteristic of the 
object, but not necessary. Smith and Sloman (1994) have argued that the dissociation 
occurred in Rips’ experiment because the descriptions (Experiment 1) contained the 
necessary feature obstructing the fixed over the variable category, but this feature was 
not characteristic of either category. They distinguish between the necessary-feature 
hypothesis where categorisation is made by rules in the absence of any characteristic 
information encouraging a rule-based strategy, and the characteristic-feature 
hypothesis where necessary features included alongside shared characteristics would 
encourage a similarity-based categorisation strategy.  
Smith and Sloman (1994) showed that, under certain circumstances, 
participants do use both strategies to categorise objects. They used the same task as 
Rips (1989), only presented participants with sparse object descriptions (as used by 
Rips, 1989) and rich descriptions. The sparse descriptions encouraged participants to 
select the variable category by definition that the target item could not be a member of 
the fixed category based on size (e.g. a round, three-inch cannot be a quarter). For the 
rich descriptions, a characteristic of the fixed variable was also included to test the 
characteristic-feature hypothesis (e.g. circular object with an X-inch diameter that is 
silver coloured). The necessary-feature hypothesis would predict that if participants 
only categorise by rules then they should always favour the variable category. If, 
however, they do take characteristics features into account and categorise the objects 
by a similarity-based strategy then they should be less likely to select the variable 
category with the rich descriptions. The results of Experiment 1 supported the latter 
prediction as the participants were more likely to select the fixed category with the 
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rich descriptions which does not fall in line with the ‘rule’ imposed by the objects, 
suggesting that they relied on the characteristics of the object and engaged in a 
similarity-based categorisation strategy. Most interesting in their results was the 
finding that sparse descriptions (the same as used in Rips, 1989) failed to replicate the 
categorisation/similarity dissociation. In both tasks participants showed close to a 
50/50 distribution in selecting the fixed and the variable category. The authors suggest 
that this was because they inhibited participants from talking out loud as they had 
done in Rips’ experiment. Therefore, in their second experiment, they encouraged 
participants to talk out loud and recorded verbal protocols while participants engaged 
in both tasks. Only under these conditions did they replicate the findings of Rips 
(1989). Participants given the sparse descriptions were more likely to select the 
variable (rule) category in the categorisation task than they were in the similarity 
task49. In addition, the same pattern was found as in Experiment 1 where the 
proportion of selecting the variable category (which they should do if using rules to 
categorise the objects) was overall very low, suggesting that they engaged in a 
similarity-based strategy. The results therefore show, that not only do participants 
show evidence in engaging in both rule and similarity-based strategies for 
categorisation, but also that the dissociation between the two is not well replicated. 
Thibaut, Dupont and Anselme (2002) have further supported this, showing that 
participants are more likely to base categorisation on deep, necessary features where 
similarity judgments are based more on characteristic features.  
Braisby (2004) also argued that such dissociations are not easily replicated and 
can be reduced if participants are given a specific context in which to frame their 
similarity judgments. Using a similar method to that used by Thibaut et al., Braisby 
(Experiment 1, 2004) presented statements to participants regarding natural objects 
that varied in their appearance (characteristic) and genetic (necessary) factors. For 
example, an apple which after genetic modification had either retained/lost its genetic 
properties and retained/lost its appearance/taste. Therefore, the statements could either 
be congruent (A+G+, A-G-) or incongruent (A+G-, A-G+). Participants first judged 
the category membership of the objects and then judged the typicality of the 
exemplars relative to the category label. A double dissociation was found between the 
																																																								49	However the dissociation was not as strong as previously. Rips (1989): Mcategorisation = .63, Msimilarity 
= .31; Smith & Sloman (1994): Mcategorisation = .67, Msimilarity = .50.  
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A+G- and A-G+ items on the tasks. Participants used the necessary features when 
judging category membership and judged the items sharing genetic, but not 
appearance, properties as more likely to be a member of that category than those 
which did not share genetic properties. In contrast, participants used the characteristic 
features when judging typicality and found that those that shared an appearance, but 
not genetic properties, were more typical of the category than those that did not share 
an appearance. Therefore, the double dissociation found by Rips (1989) in judging 
categorisation and similarity was replicated using natural stimuli that differed in their 
necessary and characteristic features.  
Braisby (2004) further showed, in two additional experiments, that the double 
dissociation could be reduced and that such judgements are context-dependent. The 
same procedure as in Experiment 1 was repeated, only participants were either asked 
to “imagine being a sculptor” (increasing attention to the appearance properties of the 
items, Experiment 2) or to “imagine being a biologist” (increasing attention to the 
genetic properties, Experiment 3). In both Experiments 2 and 3, the double 
dissociation was not found between the incongruent pairs and only a difference was 
found for the A+G- items where typicality ratings were higher than the categorisation 
scores. Overall, Braisby demonstrated that judgements of categorisation and similarity 
of natural objects do dissociate, but that the dissociations are context/perspective-
dependent. Braisby further argues that “similarity-based models should be seen as 
models of categorisation-in-context” (Braisby, 2004, p. 155), and that categorisation 
models should first explain “categorisation-in-context” before explaining judgments 
of categorisation that are “context-free”. However, it should be noted that the situated 
simulation view would take that stance that “context-free” categorisation does not 
exist. The context in which stimuli is provided can be limited, similar to the context-
lean condition used in the previous chapters, but thinking about objects is never 
devoid of any context. Rather, participants’ instantiate their own context on the 
objects based on the prior knowledge and previous experience with the concepts.   
To date, little research has focused on how similarity judgments are affected 
by action knowledge. However, further dissociations between categorisation and 
similarity have also been shown by Iachini, Borghi and Senese (2008) by 
demonstrating how action is recruited and used in such tasks. Iachini et al. 
(Experiment 1) presented participants with an array of cups that differed in their 
shape, size and grip (had a handle or not). Participants were shown the cups on a table 
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and performed both a sorting task and a similarity task, where pairs were shown and 
participants verbally rated similarity on a scale of 1 to 7. The results showed that the 
grip of the object was used more in sorting the objects but the size of the objects was 
most prominent for similarity judgments. This pattern was also seen in Experiment 2 
where novel objects (boxes with intact or broken handles) were shown to participants 
and again varied in their shape, size and grip. The results showed that the sorting task 
was most influenced by the shape and grip of the objects where the similarity task was 
most influenced by the shape only. Across both experiments the same results were 
shown depending on whether participants physically interacted with the objects, 
looked at the objects only, or watched the experimenter interact with the objects 
(mirror-neuron condition). This shows that the properties used in categorisation and 
similarity differ according to the goal, but that in line with the embodied view of 
cognition, categorisation is grounded within, and aimed towards, action.  
However, according to Iachini et al., while this might be true of categorisation 
the same cannot be said for assessments of similarity. The results previously found 
here in Experiment 4, following the manipulation of task instructions on the triad task 
(to either pick the item ‘most similar’ or that ‘goes best to form a category’), showed 
that participants were less likely to pick the action choice when using the similarity 
instructions. However, despite this, selection of the action choice using the similarity 
instructions was fairly high (over 50%) under certain conditions, particularly when 
shown within the context-rich condition. In the context-lean condition the similarity 
instruction led to high action choice on the SCO triads when the items also shared 
taxonomic, and arguably perceptual, information with the target (pencil and 
paintbrush). Action choices were lowest on the PCO triads where participants were 
more likely to select the perceptual choice (cocktail shaker and vase) than the action 
choice (cocktail shaker and maracas). This would support the findings of Iachini et al. 
who found that similarity is based more on perceptual features and that knowledge of 
action has little influence in such a task.  
The aims of the present experiment were to use the same stimuli as in 
Experiment 2 to further assess how actions are used in judging similarity, and whether 
the same context effects can be replicated here. Iachini et al. (2008) showed how 
action is used in categorisation but not in the assessment of similarity using a within-
category paradigm, since the only objects they used were various cups. Therefore, it 
is possible that action might not be used to judge similarity between items within the 
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same category. Such similarity judgments might be more dependent on the visual 
characteristics (size and shape) to distinguish between such category exemplars. 
Using the same stimuli as the triad task of Experiment 2 it is possible to gauge how 
participants use similarity in a between-category paradigm. Therefore, the primary 
aim here was to use the same stimuli as the triad task to see if participants would use 
action as the basis for judgments of similarity. Furthermore, studies into similarity 
more commonly use rating scales rather than a forced-choice task, which arguably 
allows for a finer grain of measurement.  
A potential criticism of Experiment 4 is that it might be the case that the 
forced-choice paradigm biases participants to select one item which they might not 
feel is as similar to the item as the results imply. For example, in the pencil/elastic 
band/paintbrush example participants might think that overall similarity between the 
pencil and paintbrush is low, but still more similar than between the pencil and the 
elastic band and hence they do not select it. Therefore, while the results would show 
that participants picked the action choice the design of the task might be inflating 
what is actually already quite low.  
Given the findings of Iachini et al. (2008), along with what was found in 
Experiment 4 and the previous work showing a dissociation between similarity and 
categorisation (Braisby, 2004; Rips, 1989; Roberson, Davidoff & Braisby, 1999; 
Smith and Sloman, 1994; Thibaut et al., 2002), it was predicted that action will not be 
as influential on the similarity ratings as it was in the triad task. However, given that 
similarity is dynamic and subject to context effects (Braisby, 2004; Goldstone, 1994; 
Goldstone, Medin & Halberstadt, 1997; Medin et al., 1993), it was predicted that a 
main effect of context would be found with higher overall similarity ratings for the 
context-rich than context-lean conditions.  	
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate Psychology (26 females) students from the University of 
Hertfordshire took part in the experiment in return for course credit with a mean age 
of 23.74 (SD = 5.82, age range: 18-37). The sample size was calculated following an a 
priori power analysis using G*Power. Assuming α =.05 and 1 – β =.80, the a priori 
power analysis indicated that a similar effect size to that found in Experiment 1 would 
be detected using a sample of 26 participants. 
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6.2.2 Design 
The experiment utilised a similarity judgment task presented in a 2x5 mixed 
design. All participants saw five types of pairings (within-subjects factor) drawn from 
the triads used in Experiment 2. The pairings therefore shared, either taxonomic 
membership (rifle + sword), action relations (rifle + water pistol), taxonomic 
membership and action relations (pencil + paintbrush), action relations but no 
perceptual properties (clarinet + balloon) or perceptual properties but no action 
relations (clarinet + wooden spoon). This led to the construction of sixty pairings that 
were presented between-subjects, either as images of the objects on a white 
background (context-lean condition) or as images of the objects being used in a 
functional context (context-rich condition). The images were the same as that used to 
construct the triads in the previous experiments. The dependent variable of interest 
was the rating of similarity for the paired items. 
 
6.2.3 Materials 
The pairs were constructed from the triads used in Experiment 2. A test 
booklet was constructed in which each page showed a target picture at the top, and, 
beneath, the two choice options from the triads (see Appendix AG and AH). Each 
choice option was presented with a scale from 1-7. For example, rifle was seen at the 
top of the page and beneath was sword with a 1-7 scale, and water pistol lied beneath 
that again with its own 1-7 scale. With the scale the instructions were written in the 
form of “on a scale of 1-7, how similar is rifle to sword”. The test booklet consisted of 
60 object-pairs across 30 pages. Based on the design of the SCO, DCO and PCO 
triads there were 20 pairs sharing a taxonomic membership (SCO and DCO), 10 
sharing an action relation (DCO), 10 sharing an action relation and taxonomic 
membership (SCO), 10 sharing perceptual properties but no action relation (PCO) and 
10 sharing an action relation but no perceptual properties (PCO). There were more 
taxonomic membership pairs since both the SCO and the DCO triads contained a 
target and a match based on taxonomic membership only, such as rifle/sword and 
pencil/elastic band. Two sets of the test booklet were created; in one booklet, 
participants saw the items as pictures solely on a white background (context-lean 
condition). The remaining participants saw the items as being used by an agent in a 
functional based scenario (context-rich condition). The booklets were 
		 195	
counterbalanced for the order of the triads (SCO, DCO and PCO) and the presentation 
of the choice items presented in reverse order to half of the participants.  
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were instructed that they would see a booklet consisting of 60 
pairings for which they had to indicate on a scale of 1-7 (where 7 would indicate high 
similarity and 1 high dissimilarity) how similar they were. Participants were told to 
work through at their own pace and the experiment lasted for approximately 10-15 
minutes. At the end of the experiment the participants were thanked for their 
participation and debriefed.  
 
6.3 Results 
The mean similarity ratings are reported in Table 6.1. The data from two 
participants was removed from analysis due to printing errors in the booklets. The 
highest ratings were given to the pairs sharing both an action and taxonomic similarity 
in both the context-lean (M = 4.45, SD = .58) and the context-rich (M = 4.55, SD = 
1.02) conditions. Ratings were lowest in the context-lean condition when the pairs 
shared perceptual but no action (P-NA) similarity (M = 1.91, SD = .68), but lowest in 
the context-rich condition when the pairs shared an action but no perceptual (A-NP) 
similarity (M = 2.08, SD = .50).  
A 2x5 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the mean similarity ratings using the 
item pairs as a within-subjects factor and context as a between-subjects factor50. The 
analysis revealed a non-significant main effect of context as participants tended to 
give the same similarity ratings whether the items were shown in context-lean or 
context-rich condition, F < 1. The main effect of pairing type was significant using 
the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment51, F (2.87, 103.4) = 102.93, p < .001, η2 = .74. 
Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni adjustment revealed that the taxonomic + 
action pairs had the highest mean and were significantly higher than all other pair 
types (for all comparisons p < .001). No difference was found between the action 
pairs and the taxonomic pairs (p = .81). However both the A-NP and the P-NA pairs 																																																								
50 For the purpose of this analysis the means for the taxonomic pairs from the SCO and DCO triads 
were combined for an overall ‘taxonomic only’ similarity pair and therefore the data arose from twice 
as many items (20) than the other pairs (10). 51	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was found to be significant; χ² (9) = 28.66, p = .001, and therefore the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .72.	
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were found to be significantly lower than all other pairs (p < .001) but no difference 
was found between them (p = 1.00). The paring type factor had a large influence 
accounting for three quarters of the explained variance in the data. The interaction 
effect between condition and pairing type was found to be significant using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment, F (2.87, 103.4) = 6.77, p < .001, η2 = .16. Post hoc 
tests using the Bonferroni adjustment showed that similarity ratings were significantly 
higher for the A-NP pairs compared to the P-NA pairs in the context-rich condition (p 
= .02) while the reverse was found in the context-lean condition with higher similarity 
ratings for the P-NA pairs than A-NP (p = .006). No effect was found for the 
taxonomic, action or the taxonomic + action pairs.  
 
Table 6.1.  
Mean Similarity Ratings (Standard Deviations) From 1 (Lowest) To 7 (Highest) On 
The Matched Pairings. 
Condition N Mean similarity ratings (SD) 
 Taxonomic 
+ action 
Taxonomic Action Action – no 
perceptual 
(A-NP) 
Perceptual 
– no action 
(P-NA) 
Context-
lean 
19 4.46 (1.02) 3.39 (.99) 3.54 (.80) 2.08 (.68) 2.53 (1.05) 
Context-
rich 
19 4.55 (.58) 3.35 (.84) 3.81 (.97) 2.77 (.77) 1.91 (.50) 
 
The purpose of the second analysis was to look at the competition effect of the 
action related pairs in the SCO and DCO triads against the taxonomic only pairs. 
When engaging in the triad task participants are effectively comparing the two choice 
objects to see which is the ‘better’ match. Participants in the similarity task might be 
engaging in a similar process given that both choice items were presented on the same 
page to simulate the process of the triad task. This was tested by separating the means 
for the taxonomic only pairs for each the SCO and the DCO triads and analysing these 
separately (the PCO triads were not included in this analysis). A 4x2 mixed ANOVA 
was conducted on the mean similarity ratings for the SCO and DCO triads using 
similarity pairs as a within-subjects factor and context as a between-subjects factor. 
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The main effect of pairs was significant using the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment52, F 
(1.62, 58.24) = 35.36, p < .001, η2 = .50 (see Figure 6.2). Post hoc analysis showed 
that the taxonomic + action pairs were significantly higher than all other pairs (for all 
comparisons, p < .001). In particular, there was a significant difference found between 
the taxonomic only pairs on the SCO and DCO triads with those on the SCO triads 
significantly higher (p < .001). The taxonomic only pairs on the DCO triads were also 
significantly lower than the action only pairs (p = .04). No difference was found 
between the action only pairs and the taxonomic only (SCO) pairs (p = 1.). This 
shows overall that for the DCO pairs, the action only pairs were rated as more similar 
to the target than the taxonomic only. The analysis further showed that there was no 
significant main effect of context, F < 1, nor a significant interaction effect between 
context and similarity pairs, F < 1. 
 
																																																								52	Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was found to be significant; χ² (5) = 46.66, p < .001, and therefore the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used; ε = .54.	
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Figure 6.2. Mean similarity ratings on the SCO and DCO pairs across contexts. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
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6.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 9 suggest that the more sources of similarity that 
items have in common, the greater their rated similarity. Similarity ratings were 
highest when the items shared an action with taxonomic information (and presumably 
perceptual information), than when taxonomic or action similarities were present 
independently. This is in line with previous work suggesting that similarity judgments 
involve a comparison of the stimuli and judged more similar when they have more 
commonalities between them53 (Tversky, 1977; Wisniewski & Bassok, 199954). The 
overall means from the initial analysis showed that there was no difference between 
the pairs that were matched on taxonomic information only and action only. The data 
in the second analysis from the competition effects on the pairs developed from the 
SCO triads shows that the taxonomic + action pairs were rated significantly more 
similar than the taxonomic pairs. Therefore, action has again been shown to have an 
additive effect in increasing similarity between items that share both an action and a 
taxonomic relation.  
The ratings from the DCO triads show that the action only items were rated as 
more similar to the target than the taxonomic only items. This would support the 
conclusion that action is more likely to be used in judging similarity than taxonomic 
information. However, this claim is not supported given the results of the pairs 
developed from the PCO triads. The similarity scores on the action-no perceptual (A-
NP) pairs was overall very low showing that action plays very little role on its own 
when judging similarity. If it was the case that participants were rating the action pairs 
based on action, then in the A-NP pairs developed from the PCO triads they should 
give higher similarity ratings than were seen in the data. In addition, given that the 
overall means on the action only items were fairly low (M = 3.68, out of 7), this might 
indicate that action on its own does not form a strong assessment of similarity.  
However, it is also clear that perceptual properties are not the driving factor 
here in making similarity judgments as the ratings on the perceptual-no action (P-NA) 
pairs was also very low. Such scores should be high if similarity judgments were 
primarily a perceptual process. It is most likely the case that judging similarity 																																																								
53 These commonalities may not all be of the same type, e.g. shared perceptual properties or shared 
themes or, as it seems to be the case here, shared actions.  
54 However, while Tversky (1977) and Wisniewki and Bassok (1999) found that items are rated more 
similar when they have more respects in common, it should be noted that action, as defined in this 
thesis, was not manipulated in these tasks nor considered to be a relevant source of similarity.  
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depends on the weighting of multiple commonalities used and perhaps a difficulty 
within research, is to assess which features have the strongest influence. It is clear that 
not all sources of commonality between objects would be ‘weighed’ the same. Those 
sources of commonality between objects that present as being more salient given the 
context and goal of the situation would be weighted as more important. Hence, such 
sources with stronger weightings are more likely to influence similarity judgements. 
In the current task, taxonomic information was weighted quite strongly as a source of 
commonality and was influential in the task. Those items sharing both a taxonomic 
and an action received the highest similarity rating because the shared action was also 
weighed in the context of the task. The shared action was identified as a source of 
commonality and this produces the additive effect seen on the SCO triads. The A-NP 
pairs share only action which, on its own, does not produce a strong weighting and 
hence similarity judgements were low.  
Within the current research, it is difficult to establish whether the high ratings 
on the action pairs (e.g. rifle and water pistol) were due to the shared action or 
perceptual characteristics. The most plausible explanations are that (i) the objects 
were weighed as being similar based on both action and perceptual characteristics, or 
that (ii) the objects were aligned on a third dimension outside of those proposed. Both 
explanations are plausible, however the former explanation is most likely true because 
participants were assessing the objects based on both action and perceptual 
characteristics. If participants were rating them solely on perceptual characteristics 
then the means would be similar to those of the perceptual-no action (P-NA) pairs. 
Equally, if participants were rating them based only on action then the ratings would 
be similar to the A-NP pairs. Neither case is true, and the ratings for the action only 
pairs were significantly higher than the PCO pairs.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the ideal method in which to test the 
action/perception distinction would be to have pairs that shared a taxonomic and 
perceptual relation but no action, and pairs sharing a taxonomic and an action relation 
but no perceptual properties. While the former is possible the latter is not, especially 
not with artefacts. This is because items in the world are designed to work within the 
ergonomics of the human body and therefore items operated in the same manner will 
invariably share perceptual properties. However, what is evident here is that judging 
similarity is not based on unitary properties but the combination of several similarity 
sources together including the shared actions between the objects. The pairs rated the 
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highest were those that had the highest level of combination between similarity 
sources, and those that were the lowest had only a single shared source amongst them. 
Taxonomic information seems to be more salient given that the pairs sharing only a 
taxonomic relation were rated more similar compared to those sharing only an action 
(A-NP) and only perceptual features (P-NA). However, in a similar manner found on 
the categorisation task, it does appear that action has a weaker influence as a source of 
similarity when on its own, but does have a strong additive effect.  
Analysis of the competition effects of the pairs formed from the SCO and 
DCO triads also showed that the taxonomic pairs from the DCO pairs were rated as 
less similar to each other compared to the SCO pairs. This is an interesting finding 
since theoretically speaking there should be no difference between these as they share 
the same relation. What is evident is that the inclusion of the opposing choice (the 
taxonomic + action pairs from the SCO triads, and the action pairs from the DCO 
triads) modulated their similarity response, hence creating a ‘framing’ effect. In the 
task, all three items from the triad were presented on a single page with the target at 
the top, and the two choice options beneath accompanied by the rating scale (see 
Appendix AG and AH). The similarity ratings were higher for the taxonomic pairs 
when the other choice on the page was a taxonomic + action pair. It might be the case 
that on such pages an overall taxonomic category becomes more salient for the 
participant given that all three items come from the same category and is weighted 
more as a strong source of similarity. Such presentation might automatically increase 
the viewed similarity between the items. Hence, participants find all the items more 
similar, and the taxonomic + action choice becomes even more so given that it shares 
additional sources with the target.  
However, on the DCO pairs the overall category is not as salient as it is in the 
SCO pairs, and the taxonomic only pair is judged as similar without category 
membership being such a salient factor as it is on the SCO pairs. Therefore, the 
taxonomic only pairs from the DCO triads were understandably rated as less similar 
than those from the SCO triads when presented in such a context. This supports the 
idea raised in Chapter 2 that the design manipulation of the triads modulates task 
response and that participants are using different processes for different triads. What 
the SCO triads encourages is a more ‘global’ strategy focusing on and using the 
shared category membership between all the items where as the DCO triads 
encourage more of an ‘individualised’ (local) strategy weighting the salient features 
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of each choice item against each other. This is in line with previous research 
suggesting that variations of material presentation modulates task response (Braisby, 
2004; Goldstone, et al., 1997; Medin et al., 1993). As such, this demonstrates how 
judgments of similarity are sensitive to all aspects of the ‘context’ of the design 
manipulation. While it is possible here that the saliency of the shared category 
membership is increased on the SCO pairs, it should also be noted that the overall 
similarity ratings were fairly low with the Tax+Act pairs receiving the highest mean 
(M = 4.61, out of a maximum of 7). The data further show that the shared category 
membership is based more on functional information than perceptual, given that the 
P-NA pairs received very low similarity ratings.  
It is possible that the similarity ratings on the A-NP and P-NA pairs were low 
because participants were assessing similarity on the PCO pairs based on ad hoc 
categories (Barsalou, 1983), but assessing similarity on the SCO and DCO pairs based 
on taxonomic categories. This might also explain why the similarity ratings for the 
PCO pairs were the lowest given that Barsalou (1982) found that members of 
common categories were rated as more similar to each other than members of ad hoc 
categories. Given that such categories of “things that you shake” are not very salient 
or concrete, this might explain why the similarity ratings between such pairs are low. 
This supports the notion that participants are using different strategies on each trial, 
and that there are variations both with and between categorisation and similarity. 
An unexpected finding here in the current experiment was the absence of a 
significant main effect of context. Across the pairs a main effect of context was not 
found suggesting that context, as defined by the parameters of the thesis, does not 
increase similarity ratings. This is surprising given the results reported in Experiments 
2 and 4 and given the notion that previous research suggests that similarity ratings are 
dynamic and influenced by context (Braisby, 2004; Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone et al., 
1997; Medin et al., 1993). As such it appears that context (as defined within this 
experimental work) is not salient enough to increase the overall similarity between the 
pairs and that showing the items in context activates no further information that was 
not already activated by the context-lean condition. As posited previously, one 
possibility here is that such differences have been found because of the way in which 
‘context’ has been operationalised. For the purpose of the presented experimental 
work, context is operationalised in terms of images showing scenes of the objects 
being used by an agent. In contrast, Braisby (2004) altered context in terms of giving 
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participants a different ‘perspective’ from which to think about their choice. Barsalou 
(1982) showed that providing a contextual category heading decreased differences in 
similarity ratings between common and ad hoc categories. Alternatively, Goldstone et 
al. (1997) altered context in terms of how a range of stimuli (faces in Experiment 2A 
and 2B) shared a varying number of features with a target. It could be that the 
‘context’ of the design manipulation does influence similarity judgments, but 
manipulating the visual context (context-lean vs context-rich) does not. However, it is 
also possible that the context does increase the saliency of the shared actions between 
the items but that this is not used in the context of already present taxonomic and 
perceptual information.  
However, despite the fact that the main effect of context was non-significant, 
what is interesting is that the interaction between context and pair type was found to 
be significant. Dissociations were found between the A-NP and P-NA pairs when 
presented in context. In the context-lean condition the similarity ratings were 
significantly higher for the P-NA pairs while the A-NP pairs were rated as 
significantly more similar in the context-rich condition. The data from the similarity 
ratings here is consistent with, and does track, the data from Experiment 4 where 
participants performed the triad task with the “most similar” instructions. In 
Experiment 4 participants were more likely to select the perceptual choice (e.g. vase) 
on the PCO triads in the context-lean condition, indicating that they found it more 
similar than the action choice. In the context-rich condition, participants were more 
likely to select the action choice (e.g. maracas). This pattern is reflected in the 
similarity ratings where the perceptual choice was more similar in the context-lean 
condition, and the action choice was more similar in the context-rich condition. This 
would therefore suggest that context increased the saliency of the shared actions 
between the objects on the PCO triads. If this were the case, then this would result in 
a context-based increase, as found in the data, but does not explain why the perceptual 
related pairs (cocktail shaker and vase) decreased in similarity. However, the latter 
can be explained by the use of perceptual information in making such judgments in 
the absence of taxonomic information. In the context-lean condition the objects are 
very clear in the sense that they are presented on a white background and as such any 
visual similarities are very clear. However, in the context-rich condition the same 
cannot be said due to the agent in the image. It is possible that the agent holding the 
items are partially obscuring elements of the objects, which impacts on the shared 
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perceptual qualities between them. As the participants cannot see all aspects of the 
objects then this decreases the shared perceptual characteristics of the objects and as 
such decreases overall similarity with the target object. It seems that shared action is 
more likely to influence similarity between these items when presented in context, 
given the differences found in context on the A-NP pairs. However, the similarity 
ratings for such items were still very low and close to floor effects. Therefore, 
similarity judgments are more likely to rely on shared taxonomic properties. The 
findings from this task, compared to the triad task, fall in line with Iachini et al., 
(along with the data from Experiments 2 and 4) that action is more likely to influence 
categorisation than rated similarity judgements of the same items.  
Overall, the results from the current experiment show how similarity 
judgements are influenced by action knowledge, having an additive effect when 
presented alongside taxonomic information. However, action does not appear to be as 
influential when it is the only shared relation between items. Pairs developed from the 
PCO triads showed that while action may serve on its own as some source of 
similarity, it is not very influential and such ratings are low and close to floor effects. 
This shows that potential sources of similarity are differentially weighted in the 
similarity judgment and that some sources are more influential than others. In 
addition, against strong predictions that it would, context seemed to have little 
influence on judging similarity of the items. However, it does appear that on such 
judgements of similarity what is most influential is not the between context 
manipulation (comparing visually rich compared to lean stimuli) but the design 
manipulation of the stimuli used from each triad type and how the pairs are visually 
presented against each other.
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Chapter 7 
The Influence of Action Knowledge 
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The aim of the thesis was to assess (some of) the circumstances under which 
action is used in complex categories on an action-irrelevant task. The research has 
demonstrated that action is most likely to be used for categorisation when (i) it is 
presented in conjunction with taxonomic information as in SCO triads, (ii) it is 
presented with a context, and (iii) when participants are first asked to physically 
interact with the objects. In addition, action has been shown to be influential in 
judging similarity as it has been in categorisation. Across both tasks, action has shown 
to have a strong additive effect when combined with taxonomic information, but a 
weaker influence when presented on its own.  
Chapter 7 discusses the experimental results in light of Simulation Theory 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008) and how different sources of commonality are 
‘weighed’ in conceptual tasks. The effect of context is discussed in terms of how the 
images ‘narrow’ the possible range of simulations that could be generated, which 
raises the saliency of the shared actions between the objects. In addition, the ‘time’ 
elapsed during the simulation is discussed as a potential factor for increasing 
likelihood of using action as a salient source for categorisation.  
Also addressed, is the importance of different actions. The triad task was 
originally designed with the assumption that different actions are ‘equal’ in their 
contribution to concept knowledge. The suggestion made here is that this is not the 
case, and that different actions will vary in their relative importance based on various 
factors including time, goals, physical effort and familiarity. Proposals for 
methodological improvements are presented along with suggestions for future 
research. 
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7. Challenging Traditional Categorisation 
  
Chapter 7 discusses the experimental research presented within this thesis in 
light of Simulation Theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008). The work discussed here 
has been broken down into the following sections: 
(i). Research Findings 
(ii). The Additive Effect of Action 
(iii). Action in Context 
(iv). Physical Object Interaction  
(v). Judging Actions as Similar 
(vi). Are All Actions Equal? 
(vii). Task Specificity 
(viii). 7.4 Critiquing Simulation Theory 
(ix). Potential Methodological Improvements 
(x). Empirical Contributions 
(xi). Future Work 
(xii). Conclusions 
 
7.1 Research Findings 
It seems uncontroversial to claim that the brain organises experience in 
memory in such a way that it can be informative in supporting our ability to 
successfully negotiate our environment. In the case of experiences of objects, the 
organisation seems to take the form of categories that allow us to quickly identify 
aspects of the environment and make predictions about them. In the categorisation of 
objects, an important line of research has been the investigation of which ‘features’ of 
objects form the basis of a category. Traditional theories suggested that shared 
functional, perceptual and biological features play a strong role in explaining many 
categories (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Mervis, Grey, Johnson & 
Boyes-Braem, 1976; Rosch, et al., 1976). For example, the category of ‘weapons’ 
develops around the functional property of being able (and having been designed) to 
inflict damage/injury. However, this is not to say that the categories comprise an “all 
or nothing” approach whereby the objects are either in or out of the category, 
possessing such a property or not, but rather they are probabilistic in nature (Medin & 
Smith, 1984; Smith & Medin, 1981). A challenge to this single notion of category 
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coherence has arisen in the past 20 years following the evidence that thematic 
relations between items, that share few (if any) perceptual, functional or biological 
features, can influence category decisions by adults since participants have been 
shown to also group objects together by shared situational co-occurrence55 (Kalénine 
et al., 2009; Lin & Murphy, 2001; Murphy, 2001; Simmons & Estes, 2009). 
Following the experimental work conducted through Chapters 2 to 6, the conclusion 
to be presented here is that, in addition to taxonomic and thematic relations, there is 
sufficient evidence to believe that an account of the role of action in categorisation is 
merited.	
The aim of this programme of research was to use an action-irrelevant 
categorisation task to investigate the conditions under which action may influence 
categorisation performance (using a triad task). Additionally, the thesis investigated 
how action influences similarity judgements given the close relationship that exists 
between categorisation and similarity (Brooks, 1978; Goldstone, 1994; Hampton, 
1995; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). While previous research has shown the influence of 
action on category decisions (Borghi et al., 2012; Kalénine et al., 2014), such research 
has done so using very broad classifications of objects such as ‘natural’ and ‘man 
made’ What the experimental work presented here has shown, is that action can 
influence decisions on more complex categories. The research has shown three main 
circumstances under which knowledge of action becomes influential in the triad task 
designed for the purpose of this research. In particular, the research has demonstrated 
that action is most likely to be used for categorisation when (i) it is presented in 
conjunction with taxonomic information as in the SCO triads, (ii) it is presented with 
a context, and (iii) when participants are first asked to physically interact with the 
objects.  
 
7.1.1 The Additive Effect of Action 
A consistent finding across the experiments using the triad task was that 
participants were significantly more likely to select the action choice on the Same 
Category Object (SCO) triads in comparison to the Different Category Object (DCO) 																																																								
55 The term feature/property is typically used to denote physical aspects of objects. For example, metal 
and flat head are both features of hammers. It could be argued that, theoretically, thematic relations 
such as kept in a toolbox is not a feature of hammers. However, as research has shown that participants 
who engage in property generation tasks do generate thematic properties (Wu & Barsalou, 2009) they 
are, for the purpose of the thesis, considered as a feature.  
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triads56. Therefore, knowledge of a shared action needed to use the objects seemed to 
enhance the attractiveness of the same category member as a suitable choice in this 
task. The objects already had a taxonomic relation and having an additional action 
relation made them a “better” match in the task. In comparison, when a shared action 
was directly pitted against a taxonomic relation in the DCO triads, participants were 
less inclined to make action-based categories. At face value, this would suggest that 
action is not as influential in this task as taxonomic relations. However, it should be 
noted that this effect was not consistent and for some triads the shared action alone 
was sufficient for participants to select it in the triad task (see Chapters 2 and 5). 
Therefore, action primarily gives rise to an additive effect in the triad task since it was 
more likely to be used in the SCO triads alongside taxonomic information. This is 
reminiscent of previous research from Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) who showed 
that thematic information had an additive effect in enhancing similarity, and to 
Tsagkaridis et al. (2014) who showed that action had an additive effect in thematic 
relations (see Chapter 1 for an explanation of how such research differs from the 
present experimental work). However, it should be noted that the use of the PCO 
triads in this work showed that under certain conditions action can act as the basis of 
category membership on its own. For example, on the clarinet triad participants 
showed a strong tendency to select the action related item (balloon) over the 
perceptual competitor (wooden spoon), which should, according to a traditional 
stance, be the preferred choice given the strong perceptual commonality in both 
objects. The fact that participants were more likely to choose balloon shows that 
under certain circumstances, action is sufficient to act as a basis for categorisation.  
In the case of SCO triads, the possibility exists that participants were playing a 
‘numbers’ game, and that selection of the action item occurred because it shared two 
sources of commonality (action and taxonomic characteristics) rather than the 
taxonomic choice sharing only a single source. This is believed not to be the case and 
there are multiple reasons to argue for such. First, if this were the case then 
participants should be more likely to select the action choice on the DCO triads where 
the action choice in many cases also shared (arguably) perceptual characteristics with 
the target. For example, rifle and water pistol share an action, but also perceptual 
																																																								
56 The only exception to this was in Experiment 6 reported in Chapter 4 where no difference was found 
between the SCO and DCO triads and a potential explanation for this is discussed there. 
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characteristics. However, participant performance on the rifle triad, for example, 
showed that participants were most likely to select the taxonomic choice (sword), 
which would not be predicted in a ‘numbers’ game. Second, if this were the case then 
participants would consistently be more likely to select the action choice on the SCO 
triads. This was not the case, and there were wide variations in selection of the action 
choice across the triads; participants did not always select the action choice, which 
would be predicted in a ‘numbers’ game. Third, participant performance on the 
Perceptual Object Category (PCO) triads showed that participants were more likely to 
select the action choice over the perceptual choice, particularly when shown in the 
context-rich condition. In these triads, the choice items only shared action or 
perception with the target and thus performance could not be explained by selecting 
the choice with most sources of commonality. That said, on the PCO triads 
participants did show a tendency to select the action choice.  
The results of the protocol analysis in Experiment 8 support the notion of 
action having an additive effect. Categorisation is both ‘rich’ and ‘fluid’ and 
participants can use a variety of strategies in order to group objects together. While it 
was a concern that participants were categorising the objects based on alternative 
reasons, the protocol analysis does show support that participants were consciously 
drawing upon action knowledge. For some of the triads, participants selected the 
action choice but did not report action as being the reason for doing so. However, for 
the majority of the triads, participants selected the action choice and reported the 
action as being a reason for doing so. In many cases, participants would report 
multiple reasons for doing so, which were broken down into part protocols. The 
action reason in many cases supported their choice. For example, participants selected 
banana with orange because “both are fruit and both have to be peeled”. Despite the 
arguments against using protocol analysis (see Chapter 5 for details), there are good 
reasons to be confident that participants were drawing upon action knowledge to 
categorise the objects together.   
Across the experiments, age and gender were tested to see if they had any 
confounding influence on the selection of the action choice. The results showed that 
age had no effect and that selection of the action choice was consistent irrespective of 
the participant’s age. For the most part, gender appeared to have little to no effect. 
Only in a few instances across the experiments did gender have any influence on the 
scores. In these studies, it did appear that males were more likely to select the action 
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choice than females. However, the results were highly inconsistent and not replicated 
across the experimental work. Therefore, it is possible that any increase in the action 
scores was not due to the gender of the participants, but additional factors outside of 
those measured here such as physical familiarity (Yee et al., 2013). While the gender 
results are inconsistent, this does highlight an interesting avenue of research.  
 
7.1.2 Action in Context 
The experimental work in Chapters 2, 4, and 5 consistently showed that 
participants were more likely to select the action choice when presented in a 
functional context. It seems that the shared actions between the objects were made 
more salient when shown in context. The theory of concept simulation (Barsalou, 
1999, 2003, 2008; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) has been drawn upon to explain this effect.  
According to Barsalou (2003) objects are not simulated “context-free”, but are 
always situated within a relevant scenario. Under this view, when participants see the 
objects in the context-lean condition, they can instantiate a wide variety of possible 
situations. Consider the orange and banana example. In the context-lean condition, 
no specific scenario is suggested and therefore participants could instantiate a wide 
variety of situations such as buying them, walking around a shopping market, eating 
them, putting the into a blender or even peeling them. As such, the simulations can be 
generated from a wide range of potential scenarios.  
In contrast, the context-rich condition presents the participant with a specific 
scenario that should directly influence how participants simulate the objects. The 
simulations are ‘guided’ by the context and should mirror57 that seen in the context 
images, which in turn should highlight the associated actions by showing them in use 
by an agent. Therefore, under such contextualised conditions, the simulations are 
more restricted and hence the action choice becomes more salient in the task58. 																																																								
57 It is noted that the simulations would not be exactly the same as that indicated by the context, and 
should be based within the participants’ own experience. While it is not exactly the same, the 
simulations should ‘mirror’ to an extent that they are very close in nature to that suggested by the 
images used.  
58 In presenting this work at the 2016 Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, a 
suggestion was made that any context used would increase the action choices and not necessarily need 
to show the functional actions. Given the wide variety of possible situations in which objects occur it is 
believed that this is not the case. Objects shown in different contexts would make certain features more 
salient than others and hence might not focus on the shared actions. Such information would then not 
be as influential in the triad task used here. This is in line with previous research showing how certain 
object features become more salient under different contextualised conditions (Barsalou, 1982; Borghi 
et al., 2012).  
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However, what was not strictly controlled here was the exact nature of the context 
that participants saw in the triads. The images themselves varied and while they all 
showed the objects being used, some showed the agent in full using them while others 
only showed the agents’ hands on the objects. Chapter 5 showed that differences in 
triad performance directly arose from the images used, and intimated that showing the 
agent in full led to a higher proportion of action choices on the triads. This will be 
discussed later in this chapter as future work needs to examine the effect of the 
context in which the objects are seen (either as just hands on the objects or as a full 
agent using the object for its function) more systematically in order to identify what it 
is about the provision of ‘context’ that seems to raise the salience of the actions.  
An initial analysis of the results of Experiment 2 led to the inference that 
participants were particularly focusing not on the objects, but on the hands of the 
agent interacting with the objects. This was investigated in Experiment 5 using eye 
tracking, to investigate what aspects of the objects participants were looking at. The 
results showed that participants spent very little time looking at the individual hands 
interacting with the objects, but rather looked at the image as a whole. This would 
also support the notion of concepts being contextualised, in that participants were 
more likely to select the action item when viewed as a whole image. This might arise 
because the whole scene is included within the situation, not just the hands and the 
object. What this suggests is that viewing the scene as a whole and absorbing the 
additional information provided by the image, would be more likely to ‘narrow’ the 
simulation to guide a specific scenario. However, it should not be forgotten that a 
certain number of action choices were made in the absence of context.  
 
7.1.3 Physical Object Interaction 
Chapter 4 (Experiment 6) showed an interesting finding whereby participants 
were more likely to select the action choice after they had first used the objects for 
their functional purpose. This was compared against participants categorising the 
objects, or moving them around for a general purpose not related to their function. 
The explanation proposed in Chapter 4 is that the functional actions created a 
‘recency’ effect on the contribution of action to their simulations. Simulation theory 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) suggests that how recently we 
have interacted with objects directly influences the simulation created when thinking 
about them. As such, the functional action of the objects was simulated and therefore 
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participants were more likely to select it in the triad task. However, as can be inferred 
from Experiment 6, it is important that actions performed by the participants should 
be directly related to the function of the object in order to increase likelihood of the 
action choice being selected. As discussed in Chapter 4, the possibility also stands 
that interacting with the objects results in long-term functional activations (Binkofski 
& Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). The long-
term activation of the ventro-dorsal stream remains active during the triad task, which 
acts in a facilitatory effect when participants simulate the objects in the triads. The 
same effect does not happen when participants perform structural actions because 
activation of the dorso-dorsal stream rapidly degrades (see Chapter 4 for further 
details).  
 
7.1.4 Judging Actions as Similar 
In addition to using the triad task, the thesis also investigated how action 
knowledge is used in making similarity judgements. As outlined in Chapter 6, many 
traditional models of categorisation place a strong emphasis on similarity as a key 
component of categorisation (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Rosch & Mervis; 1975; Rosch 
et al., 1976). Given that categorisation and similarity are often seen as related 
processes, with the former depending upon the latter, it is reasonable to hypothesise 
that factors affecting categorisation might also affect similarity. However, Iachini et 
al. (2008) showed that action information (how to grip the object) influences 
categorisation but not similarity judgements. In contrast, the research reported in this 
thesis demonstrated that action can exert an influence on similarity judgements.  
Chapter 6 reported that the additive effect found on the triad task, was also 
found in similarity judgements. On the pairs developed from the SCO triads, those 
matched on both action and a taxonomic relation were rated as more similar than 
those matched only on taxonomic information, mirroring the predominant choice 
made on the triad task. The object most likely to be selected in the triad task was also 
the object rated as most similar. However, while higher similarity ratings on the SCO 
pairs reflected this additive effect, in the absence of any other relations, shared action 
was not a strong influence on similarity judgements. On the pairs developed from the 
PCO triads where they shared only an action, the similarity ratings were low and close 
to floor effects. This might seem to be inconsistent with the results from the 
instruction task. For example, on the PCO triads used in Experiment 4 participants 
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were more likely to select the perceptual choice as being most similar. While this 
might suggest that the perceptual choice was most preferred, it is based on an 
experiment where participants were forced to make one choice over the other (see 
Section 7.3). In Experiment 9 where participants gave ratings of similarity, neither 
choice was rated as highly similar and ratings were, overall, exceptionally low. This 
would suggest that there is more to rating similarity than focusing on action or 
perceptual characteristics. Therefore, while action had an additive effect in judging 
similarity, taxonomic information was the main source for assessing similarity.  
The process used to assess similarity could explain why action has an additive 
effect (SCO triads). In judging similarity, participants will ‘weigh’ the sources of 
commonality and base their assessment on those elements more salient. On the SCO 
triads, the objects already have a strong weighting given that the objects all share a 
taxonomic relation. Action is entered as another ‘source’ of similarity that is weighted 
into the judgement. The additive effect occurs because the shared actions are 
weighted alongside the taxonomic information and the action item becomes more 
‘similar’ to the target than the taxonomic only choice.  
There are numerous factors that will affect the importance of those sources of 
commonality that are drawn upon in assessing similarity, including context and 
recency. If it is the case that action information is weighed into the similarity 
judgement, then the type of goal the items (potentially) share should reflect the 
similarity ratings. For example, items from the SCO that share an action also come 
from the same category. As such, the functional goal of the objects is likely to highly 
related. For example, a pencil and a paintbrush could be used in creating art, and are 
therefore related to each other. This would lead to a high similarity rating. In contrast, 
the action related pairs from the PCO triads will share the same action, but are not 
related to a specific goal. While the items could potentially form an ad hoc category, 
the actions are less likely to be related to each other because such categories are not 
well defined. This would lead to low similarity ratings, as seen in the PCO triads.  
What is not clear is why the action related items in the DCO pairs were higher 
than the action related pairs in the PCO pairs. Theoretically speaking, the ratings on 
both pair types should be close because they share the same rule (sharing only an 
action relation to the target). However, the higher similarity rating on the DCO pairs 
could be the result of two factors. First, the PCO items were designed so that the 
objects shared no perceptual characteristics, only a shared action. The perceptual 
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characteristics of the DCO items was not systematically manipulated and therefore, 
the DCO pairs could be more similar because they are inflated by shared perceptual 
characteristics. Second, the presence of the competitor could have inflated similarity 
ratings. For example, the target/taxonomic item pairs in the DCO condition were rated 
as more similar than the PCO target/perceptual item pairs. This could have potentially 
inflated the score on the action item by acting as a “positive context”, and led to 
participants giving it a higher similarity rating. It is believed that the former is a more 
likely explanation for the pattern seen in the data, but this could not be tested without 
developing new triads where the strength of the competitor is manipulated.  
Also of interest was variation in performance within the triad types. This could 
be the result of the type of action performed in each pair, and of certain actions being 
more salient than others (see Section 7.2). Watson and Buxbaum (2014) have argued 
that the semantic similarity of tools is determined by the amount of ‘featural overlap’. 
In their research, participants rated tools based on how they are used. Specifically, 
participants rated (i) the amount of arm used, (ii) the distance the arm travels, (iii) the 
amount of forced used, (iv) the surface area of the hand, and (v) the peripersonal 
direction of whether the objects are used towards or away from the body. Following 
Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and multidimensional scaling, 
Watson and Buxbaum showed that actions are judged as being similar based on the 
magnitude of the arm movement and the configuration of the hand. This offers a clear 
explanation for the differences found in the triad task between the objects, and 
between the different types of action. Objects that share the same functional actions 
would share high similarities on arm movement magnitude (AMM) and hand 
configuration (HC). However, there will be natural differences between objects that 
require different actions. Watson and Buxbaum did show that objects cluster together 
based on AMM and HC. Objects share actions based on how they cluster together 
within the “action space” of AMM and HC. Therefore, those that lie on the extremes 
of such dimensions might be rated as more salient, because they are most unique 
compared to how other objects cluster. Given that differences occur within the same 
action space, this can provide a clear explanation for why different actions within 
each triad type were rated as more/less similar than others.  
Overall, the experimental work has shown that action has an additive effect in 
judgements of categorisation and similarity. However, differences arise between such 
when action is recruited on its own in both tasks. Action has been shown to, when 
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presented in context, act on its own in making category judgements but seems to be a 
weaker source of similarity assessments. Therefore, the research has added to our 
understanding of the potential sources of information may enter into considerations of 
category membership and similarity. 
 
7.2 Are All Actions Equal? 
While traditional models of categorisation suggest that concepts are abstracted 
from context, the theoretical and experimental evidence outlined in Chapter 1 has 
shed light on how conceptual knowledge is contextualised. Simulation theory 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) posits that concepts are 
simulated within a specific context by partially re-instantiating the neurons that were 
active at the initial encounter. As outlined above, the results here are explained in 
terms of simulation theory. Presenting the objects in context is believed to have 
guided the participants’ simulations such that the shared action was made more 
salient. Such an explanation should predict that participants would always select the 
action choice, and that the effect of context should be consistent across all the triads. 
However, this was not the case. The reasons as to why participants vary in terms of 
selecting the action choice or not has been explored above. The simulations created 
are guided by the context, previous experience and individual differences, all of 
which play a role in the simulations. It is a decision made which could be based on 
various aspects of the simulation. Therefore, it is possible that participants simulate 
the actions but may still weigh other factors as more influential in categorising the 
objects.  
Two relevant questions to address here are (i) why the effect of context is not 
consistent across all of the triads, and (ii) why some triads are “better” than others in 
terms of high selection of the action choice59. What has not been discussed 
previously, and could explain both of the above questions, is the ‘temporal nature’ of 
the simulation and what is included. Research would suggest that participants are 
quick to simulate (Barsalou et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2008) but 
does not suggest how long the simulation might last for, nor the internal content of the 
simulation and how much ‘time’ in the event is covered. For example, in simulating 
																																																								
59 It should be noted that these two questions are interconnected. For many examples of the triads, the 
effect of context was more consistent when they were “better” examples.  
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the water pistol participants might simulate only grasping and squeezing the trigger, 
or the full sequence from filling it up with water to pulling the trigger and the 
consequences of such an action. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this has not 
been discussed and it is assumed that the simulations contain the actions, but has not 
specified how much more additional information is also simulated. Furthermore, 
some actions take longer to perform than others. For example, the action of typing on 
a computer or playing a piano60 arguably takes a lot longer in both real time and 
(presumably) ‘simulation time’, than turning a key or pushing a plug into a socket. If 
this is reflected in how participants simulate the objects, then the simulations should 
vary in ‘temporal length’ according to how long it takes to perform them.  
What is argued here, is that both factors influence the simulations and hence 
how action may exert its influence in the triad task. It is suggested that participants 
not only simply simulate the initial interaction with the objects (as originally 
anticipated when designing the triads) but also simulate the ongoing sequence of 
events. Therefore, participants may not only simulate the specific agent/object 
interaction but also the goal that leads the action to be initiated. The variation of the 
influence of action between the triads may be linked to the length of the action 
sequence, and the time the action itself takes to perform, with the prediction that the 
longer this mental simulation takes the more likely it is that the shared actions become 
a salient feature used in the triad task. As the simulation-time duration increases, 
participants might be more likely to select the action choice in the triads. Though it 
should be noted that there is no suggestion that participants simulate in real time, 
particularly given how simulations are rapidly instantiated (Barsalou et al., 2008; 
Simmons et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2008). 
The explanation above might be difficult to test experimentally, especially in 
the context of the triad task. Since simulation-time duration could not physically be 
measured externally, only an estimate could be requested from the participant, which 
in itself would not be an accurate measure. As suggested above, simulations are quick 
to instantiate (Barsalou et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2008), which 
is also reflected by fast reaction times on the triad task. Within the time it would take 
for participants to potentially describe their simulations (assuming that participants 																																																								
60 Depressing a single key would be a very quick action for both typing and playing a piano. It is 
assumed that when people simulate both actions they do not simulate depressing a single key (as this is 
less reflective of real life), but simulate a longer action of ‘typing’ and ‘playing’.  
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could do this with some level of accuracy), they may have already chosen their 
preferred object in the task. In addition, the act of describing the simulation might 
cause participants to change their mind. Participants might decide that the alternative 
is a better match for some reason, or even select the same object but using a different 
strategy to do so compared with their initial decision. Designing a new set of triads in 
which the ‘action length’ is systematically manipulated would theoretically help to 
address this issue. For example, designing new triads (both DCO and SCO) where the 
actions are longer for one set than the other. However, such a triad set would be 
difficult to design given the complications in perceptual, action and taxonomic 
relations already outlined in previous chapters (see Chapter 2 for further details).  
It is suggested above that the longer the simulation, the more likely it is that 
action is chosen in the triad task. However, it is possible that with potentially long 
simulations the action choice is actually made less salient. Consider the following 
example. First, a participant simulates peeling a banana (taking a few seconds to do) 
and eating it. Since the simulation only contains two elements, peeling and eating, the 
shared action becomes a salient aspect of the simulation (comprising of approximately 
50%61). Second, a participant simulates making a smoothie by peeling a banana, 
adding it to a blender, adding other fruit, and pushing the on button. In this example, 
the peeling action would be less salient in favour of the overall goal of the situation. 
Therefore, in the orange/banana/strawberry triad participants might be tempted to 
group those objects together which they prefer to make a smoothie. This might 
suggest that action has an ‘optimum saliency level’ where it might be under or 
overwhelmed by other elements in the simulation. However, this could be said of any 
potential categorical source where features of objects are made more salient given the 
context in which they are presented. Furthermore, a potentially long simulation might 
have multiple actions within it. For example, bananas and oranges require both 
peeling and eating. Therefore, while the initial action might present as more salient at 
the beginning of the simulation, this may be overridden by any subsequent actions 
that become more salient. The reverse is also possible, that when two objects require 
different actions then this may distinguish one object from the other that may be 
chosen given how distinct it is.  
																																																								
61 This is calculated based on the number of potential elements within the scenario. It is not suggested 
here that participants would spend the same amount of time peeling the banana as they would eating it.  
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The research outlined to this point, and the explanations for the triad choices, 
has made a critical assumption that should be addressed here. It has been assumed that 
all potential actions have the same level of importance in how conceptual knowledge 
is structured. For example, the ‘trigger’ action of the rifle is assumed to be just as 
important as the ‘shaking’ action of the cocktail shaker and the ‘inserting’ action of 
the plug. If this were the case, then the action effects should be consistent across all of 
the triads and that objects are either grouped by action or not. While this might be the 
case, the suggestion made here is that this is not so. This is based on several findings 
from both the present and the previous research. First, previous research has shown 
that there are differences in the planning and execution of different types of actions. 
Bub and Masson (and colleagues) have shown that functional actions are quicker to 
instantiate and take longer to dissipate compared to volumetric actions (Bub & 
Masson, 2006, 2010, 2012; Bub et al., 2008; Masson et al., 2008). Their argument, 
along with the arguments of others (Barsalou et al., 2005; Barton & Komatsu, 1989; 
Chaigneau & Barsalou, 2008; Chaigneau et al., 2004; Chaigneau et al., 2009; Keil, 
1989), is that functional actions are more important in conceptual knowledge. This is 
certainly plausible given the notion that artefacts are designed, and conceptually 
stored, based on their function and not based on abstract and ‘potential’ volumetric 
actions. It is not plausible that the human conceptual system stores a long list of 
possible volumetric actions, but that such actions are guided by the fluid nature of 
current goals and situational information. Therefore, certain types of actions are more 
important than others. Second, certain real world categories put more emphasis on 
certain features than others. For example, fruits and vegetables are strongly based on 
biological features where tools are strongly based on functional and thematic features. 
Other features, besides action, vary in strength based on both the category and the 
context. It would be illogical to assume that the saliency of other properties varies 
across categories and context, but action does not62.  
While this variability has been attributed to numerous factors such as the 
context, how the triads were manipulated and the “strength” of the competitor, it is 
possible that this was because certain actions are simply more salient than others. In 
certain triad examples, selection of the action choice was not only high, but also 
consistent across the various experiments conducted in this thesis. In particular, as 																																																								
62 Chapters 2 and 5 have shown that the influence of action does vary across categories and context.  
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outlined in Chapter 5, the orange and the clarinet triads were most likely to encourage 
selection of the action choice. This could be linked to (i) the length of the simulation 
as outlined above, (ii) the strength/importance of the end goal, (iii) the amount of 
physical effort required to perform the action, or (iv) the familiarity the action. In 
particular, the frequency of the action could be most influential in leading to selection 
of the action choice. In a similar manner to how distinctive stimuli leads to better 
recall (McDaniel & Einstein, 1986), distinctive actions might stand out within a given 
scenario and hence be more salient in the simulation. Indeed, other triads that 
arguably require large amounts of energy to perform the associated actions showed 
high levels of action choices (e.g. axe, baseball bat, cocktail shaker). Therefore, 
based on the above points, it is believed that not all actions are ‘equal’ in how they 
contribute to conceptual representations. It was initially assumed that the effects seen 
within the triad sets would be homogenous, but clearly this is not the case and directly 
reflects the difficulty in developing a homogenous set of items in all the respects 
outlined above.  
 
7.3 Task Specificity  
Previous research has shown that shared actions can be influential in grouping 
objects together in an action-irrelevant task in which knowledge of shared actions is 
not necessary for task performance. Research has also shown that such action effects 
extend to other tasks such as free sorting tasks (Iachini et al., 2008), stimulus-
response compatibility tasks (Bub & Masson, 2006, 2010, 2012; Bub et al., 2008; 
Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2000, 2004) and object classification tasks (Borghi et al., 2012; 
Campanella & Shallice, 2012).  
It has been suggested above, that the triad experiments reported in this thesis 
have not been as successful in demonstrating action effects on task performance as it 
has in previous research (Borghi et al., 2012; Bub & Masson, 2010, 2012; Iachini et 
al., 2008; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004). For example, Iachini et al. found that 
participants consistently sorted objects together based on the grip/handle feature. In 
addition, Tucker and Ellis (1998, 2001) found that participants were influenced by the 
micro-affordances offered by the primed image. While the triad task has been 
successful in showing some of the circumstances under which action is used in 
categorisation, the effects have not always been consistent and there are clear 
individual differences in using such a task. The question that therefore must be 
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addressed, is why action may be more influential in some tasks than others? A strict 
view of categorisation might suggest that if certain features are salient enough, then 
they should influence category decisions no matter the method used. For example, 
research has shown that functional information is important in categorisation and this 
has been demonstrated using a variety of tasks (Barsalou et al., 2005; Barton & 
Komatsu, 1989; Chaigneau & Barsalou, 2008; Chaigneau et al., 2004; Chaigneau et 
al., 2009; Keil, 1989, Rips, 1989). However, the context in which features are 
presented determines their saliency for use in task performance. Under certain 
conditions, different features are more salient than others. Therefore, a strict category 
view cannot be adopted here.  
It is clear that while action may be influential in some tasks, it may not be as 
influential in others. The research outlined in Chapter 1 has outlined convincing 
results that action knowledge is automatically instantiated upon viewing objects 
(Borghi, 2004; Chao & Martin, 2000; Hauk et al., 2001; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; 
Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2006). However, just because the information is instantiated, 
this does not necessarily mean that it will always be ‘used’ in task performance. It 
might be the case that participants are instantiating (and simulating) action 
information, but that it does not inevitably influence task performance even if 
instantiated for task performance. This is similar to the findings of Lin and Murphy 
(2001) where participants may recognise thematic relations but still prefer to choose a 
taxonomically related item. Particularly in the case of the triad task, other factors 
might be more salient or preferred when participants make their decisions. This is 
supported in Chapter 5 where participants reported using a wide variety of reasons to 
justify their performance.  
The experimental work presented here has shown that action knowledge can 
influence decisions on more complex categories. However, performance was not 
consistent across participants nor across the triad types. Participants did not always 
select the action choice across all the triads, and participants selected the action 
choice more so in some triads than others. Previous research has tended to show very 
strong action based effects, where clear influences can be seen. Given that the current 
research has shown the influence of action to be task specific, it could be argued that 
the triad task used here has not demonstrated strong action-based effects in 
comparison to the previous research. It is possible that performance differs on the 
triad task in comparison to other tasks, because the triads require a different process 
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compared to other tasks. In particular, it is suggested here that performance on the 
triad task reflects a two-step process and requires more conscious ‘effort’ than other 
tasks. Consider the following example. Participants, tasked with property verification, 
see the word (or a picture of) calculator. According to Barsalou and colleagues 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2003 2008; Santos et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Wu & 
Barsalou, 2009), the LASS system becomes active and participants begin to simulate 
the calculator. In doing so, conceptual information is accessed. The simulation itself is 
represented by a visual image that can be ‘inspected’ by participants to verify the 
property. Therefore, participants if given the property buttons can readily accept the 
property based on the visual representation created. Or the reverse, where given the 
property wheels participants can readily reject this because it is not present in the 
visual representation. Performance is therefore a ‘yes or no’ response based on 
whether or not they can see it and does not require any additional processes. This is 
not a difficult strategy and participants can answer fairly easily, though performance 
is not always perfect.  
The triad task used here is different because while participants are simulating 
the object they cannot answer based solely on the representation created. The task 
does not require that participants make a yes or no response, but make a comparison 
between the three object simulations and select the one they feel “goes best” with the 
target. Participants are not only simulating the objects, but also performing a 
categorisation task in which a decision is made as to which is a “better” category 
match. The simulation generated then directly influences the categorisation/decision 
making process and this requires more cognitive effort than simply verifying the 
property of the object. Performance on the triad tasks used in this programme of 
research potentially demands use of a “dual-process” strategy in comparison to other, 
simpler conceptual tasks used in the reported literature. This dual-process occurs in 
two stages; first, participants simulate the objects and second, participants make a 
categorical decision based upon the simulations.  
Property generation tasks might lie somewhere between triad and verification 
tasks. When generating properties participants have been shown to strongly rely on 
the visual imagery of the simulation (Santos et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Wu & 
Barsalou, 2009). This can be completed fairly easily by simply stating what they 
“see” on their mental representation. However, participants can report properties not 
directly derived from the simulation, which is why the task may be seen as being 
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more difficult than property verification. In order to be successful on this task, 
participants are required to simulate a variety of situations to generate multiple 
properties which would require more cognitive effort compared to property 
verification. Properties could be generated from reporting what participants ‘see’ 
within the simulations, but do not make a categorical decision.  
The results of Experiment 7 showed that performing a manual concurrent 
action while engaging in the triad task had no effect on task performance. All the 
objects in the triads were (mostly) selected as being objects that require hand actions 
to operate. Simulation theory suggests that the neurons active at the initial encounter 
with objects are (partially) re-instantiated when simulating the objects at a later date. 
Based on this, it was predicted that performing concurrent actions would ‘block63’ the 
simulation process and hence favour selection of the non-action choice in the triad 
task. The results did not show any difference between participants who performed 
concurrent actions, and those that did not. The dual-process theory outlined above 
could explain why no interference effect was found. If the triad task does reflect a 
dual-process, then performing concurrent actions should only interfere with the 
simulation phase, but not the decision phase. Given that participants are required to 
make a decision, which extends the amount of time in which the simulation system is 
in effect, any interference from the concurrent actions could diminish as participants 
progress through the task. While the concurrent actions may have initially interfered 
with the simulation process, this effect diminished with the simulation at “full 
strength” and had no impact on the choices made in the task. Therefore, it is 
suggested here that the triad task represents a dual-process task making the task 
different to other single-process strategies such as verification and generation tasks. 
 
7.4 Critiquing Simulation Theory 
The results have been interpreted based on Simulation theory because as 
argued in Chapter 1, it can at the very least, offer a more parsimonious explanation of 
how concepts include action information. This is in comparison to traditional 
(amodal) views which would suggest that action information is stored as ‘features’ of 
the objects. Chapter 1 has described how amodal views cannot offer an elegant 
explanation of action based on the varying definitions of action, the numerous 																																																								
63 Or potentially inflate; see Chapter 4 for more details.  
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possible types of actions that can be performed, and the notion of what is meant by 
‘intrinsic features’. It is, therefore, difficult for amodal views to capture an economic 
explanation of how action is incorporated into concept knowledge. In contrast, 
Simulation Theory can offer a stronger explanation of concept representation not by 
representing action as ‘features’, but by simulation and reactivation of the motor 
cortex. Therefore, Simulation theory can, it has been proposed, offer both an account 
of the data presented in this thesis, and a more elegant account of how concepts 
represent action knowledge.  
While Simulation theory can offer a strong explanation of the data collected 
within this thesis, this is not to say that the explanation is flawless. Arguments against 
simulation theory relate to how it could be considered too situated. The theory 
suggests that when thinking about a concept, it is simulated within a situation based 
on personal factors relating to a persons’ experience. However, participants can 
extract information from concepts that initially requires accessing a simulation, but 
over time would consist of common and lexically frequent features. For example, cats 
and dogs are highly associated and often coincide without participants having to 
simulate cats and dogs together. Performance based on lexically frequent features are 
quickly generated and represent ‘quick thinking’ responses. This therefore shows that 
concepts can be accessed without accessing a simulation. Evidence from Santos et al. 
(2011) supports this with their findings that participants generate lexical properties 
before taxonomic or situational. Therefore, a strength of amodal theories is that they 
can explain how participants abstract information from concepts, thus lexical 
properties can be generated without simulating. However, while it is possible that 
some aspects of concepts can be accessed without simulating, it is doubtful that this 
includes action knowledge because (i) action cannot be comfortably considered a 
feature and (ii) its intrinsic association with the goals of the situation.  
Evidence from patients with neurological disorders has also served as a further 
source of challenge to simulation theory. One example is apraxia in which patients 
have difficulties in using objects and making relevant gestures based on function.  
Embodied views of concepts suggest that thinking about a concept reactivates the 
motor cortex and that the two systems are highly intertwined. This therefore makes 
the prediction that damage to one system should impact on the other. In other words, 
if concepts are embodied then not being able to use an object should correlate with not 
being able to recognise them. However, this has not always been shown to be the case 
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(Garcea, Dombovy & Mahon, 2013; Garcea & Mahon, 2012; Machery, 2016; Negri 
et al., 2007). Negri et al. has demonstrated double dissociations between using and 
recognising objects/actions. In their experiment, apraxic patients showed patterns of 
not being able to use the objects, yet still able to name them with high levels of 
accuracy. This does present a problem for embodied views since they would not 
predict this pattern to occur. Machery (2016) has built upon this to suggest the 
‘Offloading Hypothesis’. In his view, concepts are primarily amodal, but the 
conceptual system can “offload the solution of tasks onto the perceptual and motor 
systems” (Machery, 2016, pg.1094). Hence, the perceptual and motor systems work 
as ‘slave systems’ to an amodal representation of concepts. Given that not all tasks 
can be solved by perceptual or motor simulation, the amodal system itself can be used 
for task completion. 
Barsalou (2016a) has counter-argued, and offered further criticism to both the 
offloading hypothesis, and the amodal approach. He has argued that the amodal 
approach is often see as being the default explanation of concepts, that when data 
arises that cannot be accounted for by the embodied approach, then concepts must be 
amodal. However, this view is taken despite the fact that there is no empirical 
evidence for symbols. Their adoption by other researchers simply reflects that such 
theories have been around the longest and that it is not necessary to prove that amodal 
representations exist, but to cite evidence disproving the embodied view. Barsalou 
further argues that descriptions of amodal theories are often vague and ill-defined. It 
is therefore difficult to use amodal theories as a basis for concept representation, 
when it cannot be agreed on what exactly they represent. The reason why concepts 
may still exist in lesioned patients, may be because of conjunctive brain areas that can 
account for conceptual processing, but this does not necessarily mean that concepts 
are amodal. Performance on tasks that do not appear to utilise perceptual and motor 
processes, occur because the conceptual system is specialised in abstracting 
information (not representing them as amodal symbols).  
The value of adopting a theoretical stance of simulation regarding concepts 
will continue to be debated and tested. For the reasons given here it is felt that, 
overall, it accommodates evidence regarding the role of action more effectively than 
treating it as a new ‘addition’ to an amodal feature-list and so has been adopted as the 
main explanatory theory for the purpose of this thesis.  
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7.5 Potential Methodological Improvements 
The research conducted in the thesis has used the forced-choice triad task as 
the primary research method. The triad task was selected as it could be easily 
manipulated to allow competition between choices matched with the target on specific 
criteria. Unlike other categorisation methods (e.g. card sorting tasks) the triad task 
allows for only two stimuli to enter into how the decision is made. Therefore, if 
manipulated correctly, inferences can be made based on the choices made. For 
example, if choice option A has feature X and choice option B has feature Y, then the 
choices made can be attributed to the feature that only one possesses. Furthermore, 
the triad task has been successfully used to show how participants categorise using 
taxonomic and thematic information (Lin & Murphy, 2001). Based on such reasoning, 
the triad was selected as an appropriate method with which to test how action could 
be used in categorisation. However, while the triad task has been successful in this 
respect, it is not without its drawbacks.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, one issue relates to confounding influences in 
matching features between the objects. Objects that share actions will invariable share 
perceptual properties. For example, water pistols and rifles share a certain amount of 
perceptual characteristics that could have been the basis of participant’s choices. The 
only way in which this could be further explored would be to design new triads and 
pull apart such confounding features. However, as intimated in Chapter 2, designing 
such triads could be near impossible. To pull these apart, new triads would need to be 
designed with the following remit based on sharing taxonomic, perceptual and action 
features: 
• Choice A: Shares a taxonomic relation with the target, but no action 
and no perceptual characteristics (+T -A -P). 
• Choice B: Shares a taxonomic and an action relation with the target, 
but no perceptual characteristics (+T +A -P).  
• Choice C: Shares taxonomic and perceptual characteristics with the 
target, but no action (+T -A +P).  
• Choice D: Shares taxonomic, action and perceptual characteristics with 
the target (+T +A +P).  
If participants are selecting the action choice because of the shared actions then 
selection of choices B and D should not differ. However, based on the close relation 
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that exists between perception and action, it is not possible to design such triads using 
everyday objects. The ergonomics of the human body are always a primary concern 
when designing objects. If it is not easy for a person to use an object then it is difficult 
for it to fulfil its function. For example, a torch that was too big to hold would not be 
used. In such an example, the size of the torch is key in its design because it must fit 
within the hand and should also be lightweight enough to hold. Based on such, objects 
that are designed with a specific operating mechanism (e.g. pulling a trigger) will 
invariably share perceptual characteristics to confirm with ergonomic functionality. 
Furthermore, objects can (to an extent) share perceptual characteristics without 
sharing an action. For example, a pencil and a straw look similar but are not operated 
in the same manner. As such, objects from different categories can be combined in 
such a manner. This is complicated however, when taxonomic information is 
combined. Stationery objects such as pencils, pens and paintbrushes all share 
perceptual information, the direct result of the objects being designed around the same 
operating mechanism. Therefore, using the triad stimuli developed here, it is virtually 
impossible to systematically disentangle the influence of action and perception in 
categorisation when the objects are also linked by taxonomic information. 
A further point of issue with the research might arise from the design format 
of the triads, given that the choice is dichotomous. The triad task is designed so that 
the participants select only a single item to “go with” the target. While this leads the 
participant to make a category based on these two items alone, it perhaps does not 
accurately reflect the richness of how numerous objects are categorised into the same 
group. For example, the concept of fruit contains numerous members, many of which 
share specific features with each other. Therefore, tasks that include many items (such 
as sorting tasks) might be more suitable in demonstrating how action (or other 
features) is used in categorising a richer set of stimuli64. A question that therefore 
arises is whether or not action only becomes a salient feature in the context of such 
‘two-item’ pairings or would be used in free sorting tasks. Iachini et al. (2008) used a 
free sorting task and showed that action is influential in categorisation. However, this 
																																																								
64 Pilot work for the PhD program was conducted as part of the author’s MSc thesis using a free sorting 
task. The task used objects (both novel and everyday) that could be sorted based on shared actions or 
taxonomic relations. Part of the justification for not using the free sorting tasks here was that 
participants only sorted the objects using action when given several trials to sort the objects and 
instructed to use a different method each time. Action was not the primary categorisation strategy used.   
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has not been investigated using objects designed in the format used in the present 
triad task.  
The dichotomous choice and the fact that the triad task is forced choice might 
bias the participant to make a category decision where they might not naturally do so. 
This might particularly be a problem on the PCO triads. For example, the results of 
Experiment 2 showed that participants were more likely to group clarinet with 
balloon over wooden spoon. It might be possible that participants viewed neither 
object as being a good object to pair with the target, particularly given that there are 
few real world scenarios that would involve such items together. Given that the task 
demands that participants must make a response, participants select the “best” 
alternative. Despite selecting such, it may still not be a good match. In this case 
participants select the balloon not because they feel it matches the target object well, 
but simply that it is a better choice than wooden spoon. Under such forced conditions, 
participants’ action scores might be inflated and, again, not reflect a natural 
categorisation strategy. Evidence for this could be seen in the similarity scores on the 
PCO objects. In Experiment 4, the action choice was selected in the context-rich 
condition on 63% of trials when using the “most similar”. This would indicate that the 
action choice was the better choice under such conditions. However, in Experiment 9 
using the similarity ratings the action choice was given a very low rating (2.77 out of 
a maximum of 7) which would therefore suggest that participants do not see such 
objects as being similar to each other. This demonstrates the point made above that 
while participants selected it in the triad task, such selection was simply the result of a 
“weaker” competitor and participants’ did not view the items as being very 
similar/going together in a category. The way in which the task could be manipulated 
to get around this issue would be to introduce a ‘no choice’ option. Under such 
conditions, it could be made clear to the participants that if they feel that no option 
goes well with the target then they are free to not select any option. It should be noted 
that this is not standard practice with the use of the triad task, and to date no known 
research has introduced this option into the format of the triad task.   
A further potential criticism of the triad task used here relates to the design 
format and presentation of the triads. First, the manipulation of context was not 
consistent across all of the triads. Different images use different scenarios (this cannot 
be avoided unless the objects used all come from the same functional context) and 
different elements in the pictures. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, some of the 
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pictures show only a hand on the objects while others include more of the agent. This 
arose because (i) it was important to ensure that the images used reflected a natural 
context and (ii) because variations in the size of the objects would lead to perceptual 
inaccuracies. For example, rifles are large objects and to show a full agent using the 
rifle would mean that the rifle itself would dominate a large portion of the image 
used. In contrast, a USB pen is very small and therefore to manipulate the image to 
include a full agent would lead to a small object within the whole image. It was felt 
that this might increase the saliency of other features of the scenario rather than the 
action element but the decision led to other different inconsistencies. In Chapter 5, it 
was suggested that the variations in the presence of a hand or full agent led to 
variations in the use of action in categorisation. As it stands however, this is based on 
speculation since the triads were not manipulated based on such a feature. Therefore, 
a possible avenue for future research would be to test this hypothesis and manipulate 
the context based on such considerations. For example, the type of context (functional 
or not) in which the objects are presented could be manipulated. The objects could be 
presented within a context that shows the objects being handled, but not used for their 
functional purpose. Such a context would offer more information than the context-
lean condition, and may show how functional and volumetric (structural) actions are 
differentially influential in making categorical decisions.  
The potential issues outlined above raises an important, and valid, question on 
whether it would, for future research, be “better” to use a different task. The most 
widely used tasks in measuring conceptual knowledge include property verification, 
property generation/feature listing, sorting tasks and triad tasks. For example, rather 
than using the triad task the experimental work could have employed a sorting task or 
property verification task. The aim of the thesis was to investigate how action was 
used making categorical decisions, particularly when compared against taxonomic 
information. Property verification and property generation tasks assess conceptual 
representations by focusing on the features used to organise objects together. Such 
tasks are more likely to use familiar than novel objects. Having no prior experience 
with the objects, participants would be more likely to rely on perceptual 
characteristics rather than accessing conceptual knowledge. Previous research has 
already shown that action information is produced during such tasks and under 
different contexts in which the items are imagined (Borghi, 2004; McRae, Cree, 
Seidenberg & McNorgan, 2005; Riordan & Jones, 2011; Vinson & Vigliocco, 2008). 
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However, the aims of the thesis was to establish whether or not participants use action 
in a categorisation task, and whether this is used over taxonomic information. While 
property verification/generation tasks measure conceptual representations, they do not 
reflect an ‘online’ categorisation process. Therefore, using such tasks would not have 
been appropriate for the aims of the thesis. Free sorting and triad tasks reflect a more 
direct measure of categorisation, as they require participants to categorise familiar and 
novel objects for on-going task performance. Iachini et al. (2008) showed that action 
is an influential property when sorting objects together. They manipulated objects 
based on sharing perceptual or action-based properties, namely the grip, size and 
shape of the objects. However, the objects were not manipulated based on sharing 
taxonomic information, but came from the same category (Experiment 1 consisted of 
using cups). Previous pilot work conducted outside of the thesis (see Footnote No.58) 
showed that when participants could sort objects based on either shared actions or 
shared taxonomic relations, they were more likely to use the latter. In order for the 
sorting task to successfully show that action is used to categorise objects together, the 
shared actions must be recognised across various objects (across different taxonomic 
categories). If it is the case that action information is not made salient enough under 
such conditions, then participants are not likely to use action to group the objects 
together. Rather, shared taxonomic categories and functional information, which is 
already salient in categorisation tasks, is likely to be exerted to categorise the objects. 
The triad task was used because it required participants to recognise the shared 
actions between only two objects. If participants cannot recognise and categorise the 
shared actions between two objects, then they would be unlikely to do so using 
multiple objects. Therefore, the triad task was selected in order that action and 
taxonomic information could be directly pitted against each other.  
 
7.6 Empirical Contributions 
As research into categorisation has advanced, the understanding of how 
objects are mentally grouped together has progressed. For example, categorisation has 
progressed from the ‘Roschian’ notion of categories stored amodally as 
decontextualised feature lists (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 
1976; Rosch et al., 1976), to the notion of categories being grounded across the modal 
systems in which they were first encountered (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; Yeh & 
Barsalou, 2006). However, it should be noted that the amodal/grounded debate still 
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exists with particular emphasis on patients with apraxia as evidence for an amodal 
representation (Barsalou, 2016a; Machery, 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Yee & 
Thompson-Schill, 2016). Behavioural and neuropsychological evidence has further 
shown how semantic knowledge is distributed across neural topography (see Chapter 
1). The development of such modal views of categorisation has encouraged 
researchers to move away from the more traditional view. In generating properties, 
amodal views suggest that participants would access these abstract feature lists and 
simply report those features available. The features most commonly reported are often 
related to the typicality of the objects (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976), and 
both lexical and statistical co-occurrence across difference category instances (Taylor, 
Devereux, Acres, Randall & Tyler, 2012).  
Simulation theory would suggest that participants report the features available 
from directly simulating the referent object in context. The LASS theory suggests that 
participants make use of both a simulation and a lexical strategy in task performance. 
Additional research has also supported prototype theory suggesting that new 
examples are judged as being members of the category based on similarity to an 
overall prototype (Hampton, 1995). Therefore, the view taken here is not that 
grounded views should replace amodal views. Rather, the conceptual system can 
make use of both strategies in line with the Offloading Hypothesis (Machery, 2016). 
Both the grounded and amodal view of categorisation both share the idea, that 
various sources of information can be drawn upon for categorisation. What differs 
between the views is the strategy in how such information is accessed. Typically, 
amodal views refer to ‘features’ of objects used to categorise them including 
biological, functional and perceptual properties. The term ‘features’ is usually used to 
refer to physical elements of objects. The suggestion is not being made here that 
action is one of such ‘features’ used in categorisation. Irrespective of whether action 
could be considered a ‘feature’, it does provide an additional source of information by 
which objects can be categorised. The research conducted here as part of the thesis 
has shown that action is another source of information used in making complex 
categorisations in an action-irrelevant task. While simulation theory has dominated 
the interpretation of the data throughout the thesis, there is no argument for the 
redundancy of amodal representations. The research here adds to the literature in 
identifying action as a categorical source that can be used in such tasks. However, as 
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demonstrated using the triad task, the use of action as a ‘feature’ for categorisation is 
context (and task) dependent.  
Barsalou (1982) demonstrated that conceptual knowledge contains both 
context-dependent and independent properties. For example, the notion that skunks 
smell is a context-independent as such knowledge can be quickly accessed in contexts 
where the ‘smell’ property is irrelevant to the situation. In contrast, the notion that a 
basketball can float is context-dependent as such knowledge is only accessed in 
contexts where a basketball is seen to float. However, the development of situated 
simulation theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008) might suggest that context-
independent properties do not exist. Simulation theory suggests that in thinking about 
objects, the conceptual system automatically instantiates a context. No object 
properties will be instantiated in the absence of a context. Those properties which are 
more common are those that are occur in multiple contexts. Therefore, those 
properties which are “context-dependent”, simply occur in fewer contexts. This does 
imply that action information should be a common property of objects given that the 
objects are used in the same manner, irrespective of the context. This is in line with 
the previous research (Borghi, 2004; Borghi et al., 2012; Iachini et al., 2009; Kalénine 
et al., 2009), along with that reported here, of the importance of action information in 
categorisation.  
 
7.7 Future Work 
The experimental research within this thesis has reported (some of) the 
circumstances under which action is an influential source in making complex 
categorical decisions. Throughout the reported chapters, suggestions have been made 
as how the triad task developed here can be adapted. In addition to this, the research 
has led to various avenues that should be the focus of future research within this field.  
One factor that has been identified as increasing the saliency of action being 
used to categorise objects together is context. Chapter 5 alluded to the fact that action 
is more likely to be used in categorisation when the context shows a full agent using 
the objects. However, as outlined above the context was not systematically 
manipulated within this thesis. What the area should focus on is a more systematic 
identification of how context can increase the saliency of action. In addition, the goal 
of the task should also be identified as to how this can be used to predict maximum 
influence of action knowledge, with particular emphasis on reflecting real life goals. 
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The research outlined above has shown that, under certain conditions, participants are 
likely to categorise rifle with water pistol. A sensible question is the extent to which 
this would reflect a real life category. It is difficult to imagine a real life scenario in 
which participants would need to categorise these objects together. Participants in the 
triad task carry no specific goal outside of the goal of completing the experiment. A 
suggestion that has been made above is that the goal of the task would influence how 
different sources of commonality would be weighted in the decision. For example, a 
fork would be useful with the goal of eating food, but not with the goal of hammering 
in a nail. Therefore, in the same way that the function of an object is determined by 
the goal, so is the saliency of the action. However, for many objects the method used 
to operate the objects is the same across context and goals. Since the goals of the 
situation can vary greatly, research should seek to identify the type of goal related to 
the objects that can ‘maximise’ the saliency of the actions.  
 An additional avenue for future work is to assess the factors behind why some 
actions might be more ‘important’ than others. In section 7.2 it was suggested that not 
all actions are equal, and that shaking a cocktail shaker might be more salient than 
inserting a plug. Several factors have been suggested as to why this might be the case 
including time, task goals, physical effort and familiarity. The latter would be the 
most difficult to assess. The others can be measured accurately, however familiarity 
with using an object would be difficult given the participants understanding of what 
might entail being ‘familiar’ with an object. Yee et al. (2013) asked participants to 
rate on a scale of one to ten how familiar they were with using objects. However, for 
many objects a person might not be physically familiar with using it, but familiar in 
the sense that if they came across one, they might know how to use it. For example, 
film and television influence could mean that a person is aware of the basic ‘trigger’ 
action of a rifle and how to use one, without having direct physical experience of 
doing so. In addition, if it is the case that actions are more salient following a longer 
time duration and greater physical effort, then perhaps a person might be just as 
familiar with mowing the garden once a fortnight compared to plugging an object into 
a socket everyday. The suggestion that not all actions are equal has a direct influence 
on how objects are conceptually represented as well as predicting performance under 
task conditions.  
 The empirical findings within this thesis have been discussed within the 
framework of simulation theory. The results are arguably consistent with the theory 
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and research should focus on establishing such. Suggestions have been made based on 
the process that participants use while engaged within the triad task. Specifically, the 
notion of time has been suggested as to why certain actions are more salient in such 
tasks as well as the notion of a ‘dual-process’ strategy. Future empirical work perhaps 
using neuroimaging techniques could be used to support the role of simulations when 
engaged in the triad task.  
 
7.8 Conclusions 
The present research has sought to investigate the circumstances under which 
action is used to categorise objects together in an action-irrelevant task. The main 
findings are that action is used when it is combined with taxonomic information, and 
shown within a functional context. The research has added to the literature by 
identifying additional sources, and the circumstances surrounding such, that influence 
decisions on complex categories. Knowledge of action plays an important role in 
cognition across a variety of methodologies including the triad task. Knowing what 
the function of a lamp and what one looks like is important for object identification, 
but without knowledge of how to interact with one it becomes difficult (and near 
impossible) to navigate the environment. Therefore, it is important for the conceptual 
system to include such functional, perceptual, thematic and action based information. 
The research presented here has supported this in showing that action is an additional 
source with which to categorise objects. Navigating the environment cannot take 
place by assessing affordances alone. To do so successfully, it is not enough to know 
what an object looks like and does, but also to know how to use and manipulate 
objects. Concepts support the agent in acting in the environment and in line with the 
view of Franks and Braisby (1997), develop in the service of guiding actions. 	
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Information	Sheet		I	am	a	PhD	student	from	the	University	of	Hertfordshire	undertaking	a	study	into	semantic	knowledge.			If	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	asked	to	complete	a	short	questionnaire,	which	should	take	no	longer	than	10	minutes.			As	a	participant	you	will	be	asked	not	to	discuss	the	study	with	others	until	the	study	is	completed	in	May	2011.		You	will	have	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	now	and	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
Please	note	that	any	information	you	may	supply	today	will	only	be	used	
for	the	purposes	outlined	here.	You	may	withdraw	your	assistance	from	
this	study	at	any	time.		You	may	use	the	contact	email	address	below,	should	any	queries	or	concerns	arise	in	the	future.		Thank	you	for	your	participation.		Name	of	researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk		Ethics	protocol	number:	PSY/04/11/NS	
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CONSENT	FORM				I																																																																																																																														(please	type	name)	give	my	full	consent	to	take	part	in	the	following	research	investigation	with	the	full	understanding	that	I	may	withdraw	at	any	time	without	giving	any	reason.		If	I	withdraw	from	the	study,	the	data	that	I	have	submitted	will	also	be	withdrawn	at	my	request.	I	have	received	an	information	sheet	explaining	what	the	experiment	entails	and	what	will	be	expected	from	me.		I	understand	that	the	information	that	I	will	submit	will	be	confidential	and	completely	anonymous	and	used	only	for	this	study.	I	have	read	and	understand	the	above	information.		I	agree/do	not	agree	to	participate	in	the	study.		Signed:		Date:	
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Action Questionnaire 
 
You are about to see a list of 30 triads. Please circle which two of the three objects 
share the same action, i.e. how we use them. If you feel that all three items share the 
same action then please circle all three.  
 
 
1. orange    apple    onion 
 
 
2.  fax machine   telephone   photocopier 
 
 
3.  screwdriver   key    hammer 
 
 
4.  drink bottle   mug    jam jar  
 
 
5.  pencil    paintbrush   pen 
 
 
6.  boat    airplane   car 
 
 
7.  rifle    sword    water pistol 
 
 
8. glass    jug    cup 
 
 
9. computer   piano    printer 
 
 
10. trumpet   violin    clarinet 
Appendix A: Pilot questionnaire on shared actions (including information sheet, consent form and 
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11. spatula    saucepan   grater 
 
 
12. calculator   mobile phone   set square 
 
 
13. teapot    coffee cup   milk jug 
 
 
14. book    iPod     wallet 
 
 
15. paperclip   clothes peg   ruler 
 
 
16. dice    playing card   bowling ball 
 
 
17. spade    trowel    shears 
 
 
18. pin    plug    screw 
 
 
19. cake    ice cream   pizza 
 
 
20. ketchup   mayonnaise    shower gel 
 
 
21. lawnmower   pram    shovel 
 
 
22. deodorant   hair gel   insect repellent 
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23. scissors   stapler    selotape 
 
 
24.  drum    triangle   trombone 
 
 
25. fork    spoon    skewer 
 
 
26. shoelace   sock    tie 
 
 
27. dvd player   cd player   television 
 
 
28. knife     ladle    saw 
 
 
29. bed    sofa    wardrobe 
 
 
30. leaflet    newspaper   poster 
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DEBRIEFING		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	see	how	you	grouped	the	items	together	for	use	in	a	later	experiment.				If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk
Appendix B: Pilot questionnaire on category membership (only page 1 included because the 
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Category Questionnaire 
 
You are about to see a list of 30 triads. Please circle which two of the three objects go 
together in the same category. If you feel that all three items belong in the same 
category then please circle all three 
 
 
1. orange    apple    onion 
 
 
2.  fax machine   telephone   photocopier 
 
 
3.  screwdriver   key    hammer 
 
 
4.  drink bottle   mug    jam jar  
 
 
5.  pencil    paintbrush   pen 
 
 
6.  boat    airplane   car 
 
 
7.  rifle    sword    water pistol 
 
 
8. glass    jug    cup 
 
 
9. computer   piano    printer 
 
 
10. trumpet   violin    clarinet
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INFORMATION	SHEET 	I	am	a	PhD	student	from	the	University	of	Hertfordshire	undertaking	a	study	into	semantic	knowledge.	Semantic	knowledge	is	one	form	of	long	term	memory	which	stores	information	regarding	the	world	around	us	and	objects	which	exist	in	that	world.			If	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	asked	to	complete	a	triad	choice	task.	The	whole	task	should	take	no	longer	than	15	minutes.			As	a	participant	you	will	be	asked	not	to	discuss	the	study	with	others	until	the	study	is	completed	in	March	2012.		You	will	have	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	now	and	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
Please	note	that	any	information	you	may	supply	today	will	only	be	used	
for	the	purposes	outlined	here.	You	may	withdraw	your	assistance	from	
this	study	at	any	time.		You	may	use	the	contact	email	address	below,	should	any	queries	or	concerns	arise	in	the	future.		Thank	you	for	your	participation.		Name	of	researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk		Ethics	protocol	number:	PSY/04/11/NS		
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CONSENT	FORM 			I																																																																																																																														(please	type	name)	give	my	full	consent	to	take	part	in	the	following	research	investigation	with	the	full	understanding	that	I	may	withdraw	at	any	time	without	giving	any	reason.		If	I	withdraw	from	the	study,	the	data	that	I	have	submitted	will	also	be	withdrawn	at	my	request.	I	have	received	an	information	sheet	explaining	what	the	experiment	entails	and	what	will	be	expected	from	me.		I	understand	that	the	information	that	I	will	submit	will	be	confidential	and	completely	anonymous	and	used	only	for	this	study.	I	have	read	and	understand	the	above	information.		I	agree/do	not	agree	to	participate	in	the	study.		Signed:		Date:	
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DEBRIEFING		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	investigate	whether	our	semantic	memory	contains	information	related	to	actions	associated	with	everyday	objects.	It	further	aimed	to	see	whether	people	would	select	an	item	that	shared	the	same	action	over	its	categorical	function.			Once	again	thank	you	for	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk	
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List of Triads Used (Experiment 1) 
Table F1 
List of the SCO Triads Used in Experiment 1.  
Target Taxonomic choice Taxonomic + action 
choice 
Bed Wardrobe Sofa 
Cake Ice cream Pizza 
DVD player Television CD player 
Glass Jug Cup 
Leaflet Poster Newspaper 
Pencil Elastic band Paintbrush 
Pin Screw Plug 
Spade Shears Trowel 
Spatula Grater Saucepan 
 
Table F2 
List of the DCO Triads Used in Experiment 1.  
Target Taxonomic choice Action choice Book	 Ipod	 Wallet	Calculator	 Set	square	 Mobile	phone	Computer	 Printer	 Piano	Deodorant	 Hair	gel	 Insect	repellent	Dice	 Playing	cards	 Bowling	ball	Drink	bottle	 Mug	 Jam	jar	Fax	machine	 Telephone	 Photocopier	Ketchup	 Mayonnaise	 Shower	gel	Knife	 Ladle	 Saw	Orange	 Apple	 Orange	Paperclip	 Ruler	 Clothes	peg	Rifle	 Sword	 Water	pistol	Screwdriver	 Hammer	 Key						
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Table F3 
List of the Foils Used in Experiment 1.  Target	 Choice	Option	1	 Choice	Option	2	Ant	 Spider	 Centipede	Anteater	 Armadillo	 Raccoon	Camel	 Sloth	 Kangaroo	Cow	 Duck	 Pig	Crab	 Lobster	 Seahorse	Daffodil	 Rose	 Tulip	Dog	 Rabbit	 Cat	Donkey	 Horse	 Deer	Elephant	 Giraffe	 Lion	Fox	 Hedgehog	 Badger	Frog	 Crocodile	 Next	Goat	 Sheep	 Pony	Gorilla	 Hippo	 Chimpanzee	Iguana	 Alligator	 Llama	Monkey	 Bear	 Snake	Moth	 Wasp	 Butterfly	Mouse	 Hamster	 Rat	Oak	tree	 Willow	tree	 Maple	tree	Owl	 Hawk	 Hummingbird	Ox	 Gecko	 Panda	Parrot	 Koala	 Macaw	Robin	 Eagle	 Bat	Seagull	 Kestrel	 Heron	Seal	 Polar	bear	 Walrus	Snail	 Worm	 Scorpion	Tiger	 Rhino	 Panther	Tortoise	 Lizard	 Aadvark	Trout	 Cod	 Salmon	Turkey	 Chicken	 Goose	Whale	 Shark	 Dolphin	
Appendix G: Triads used in Experiment 1 (context-lean and the context-rich conditions).     
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Figure G3. Format of the bed triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 1).  	
	
Figure G4. Format of the bed triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 1). 
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Figure G5. Format of the boat triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 	
	
Figure G6. Format of the boat triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G7. Format of the book triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G8. Format of the book triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G9. Format of the cake triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 	
	
Figure G10. Format of the cake triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G11. Format of the calculator triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment1). 
 
	
Figure G12. Format of the calculator triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G13. Format of the computer triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G14. Format of the computer triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G15. Format of the deodorant triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G16. Format of the deodorant triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G17. Format of the dice triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G18. Format of the dice triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G19. Format of the drink bottle triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure G20. Format of the drink bottle triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G21. Format of the drum triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G22. Format of the drum triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G23. Format of the dvd player triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G24. Format of the dvd player triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G25. Format of the fax machine triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G26. Format of the fax machine triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G27. Format of the fork triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G28. Format of the fork triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G29. Format of the glass triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G30. Format of the glass triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G31. Format of the ketchup triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G32. Format of the ketchup triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G33. Format of the knife triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 	
	
Figure G34. Format of the knife triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G35. Format of the lawnmower triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G36. Format of the lawnmower triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G37. Format of the leaflet triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G38. Format of the leaflet triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
Appendix G: Triads used in Experiment 1 (context-lean and the context-rich conditions).     
	 278	
	
Figure G39. Format of the orange triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G40. Format of the orange triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G41. Format of the paperclip triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G42. Format of the paperclip triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
Appendix G: Triads used in Experiment 1 (context-lean and the context-rich conditions).     
	 280	
	
Figure G43. Format of the pencil triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G44. Format of the pencil triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G45. Format of the pin triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G46. Format of the pin triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G47. Format of the rifle triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G48. Format of the rifle triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G49. Format of the scissors triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G50. Format of the scissors triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G51. Format of the screwdriver triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G52. Format of the screwdriver triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G53. Format of the shoelace triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G54. Format of the shoelace triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
Appendix G: Triads used in Experiment 1 (context-lean and the context-rich conditions).     
	 286	
	
Figure G55. Format of the spade triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiment 
1). 
	
Figure G56. Format of the spade triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G57. Format of the spatula triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G58. Format of the spatula triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure G59. Format of the teapot triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G60. Format of the teapot triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure G61. Format of the trumpet triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiment 1). 
	
Figure G62. Format of the trumpet triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiment 1). 
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Figure H1. Format of the ant triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H2. Format of the anteater triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H3. Format of the camel triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H4. Format of the cow triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H5. Format of the crab triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H6. Format of the daffodil triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H7. Format of the dog triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H8. Format of the donkey triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H9. Format of the elephant triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H10. Format of the fox triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H11. Format of the frog triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H12. Format of the goat triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H13. Format of the gorilla triad (Experiment 1) 	
	
Figure H14. Format of the iguana triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H15. Format of the monkey triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H16. Format of the moth triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H17. Format of the mouse triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H18. Format of the oak tree triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H19. Format of the owl triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H20. Format of the ox triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H21. Format of the parrot triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H22. Format of the robin triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H23. Format of the seagull triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H24. Format of the seal triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H25. Format of the snail triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H26. Format of the tiger triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H27. Format of the tortoise triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H28. Format of the trout triad (Experiment 1). 
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Figure H29. Format of the turkey triad (Experiment 1). 	
	
Figure H30. Format of the whale triad (Experiment 1). 
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Information	Sheet		I	am	a	PhD	student	from	the	University	of	Hertfordshire	undertaking	a	study	into	semantic	knowledge.			If	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	asked	to	complete	a	short	questionnaire	which	should	take	no	longer	than	10	minutes.			As	a	participant	you	will	be	asked	not	to	discuss	the	study	with	others	until	the	study	is	completed	in	February	2012.		You	will	have	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	now	and	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
Please	note	that	any	information	you	may	supply	today	will	only	be	used	
for	the	purposes	outlined	here.	You	may	withdraw	your	assistance	from	
this	study	at	any	time.		You	may	use	the	contact	email	address	below,	should	any	queries	or	concerns	arise	in	the	future.		Thank	you	for	your	participation.		Name	of	researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk		Ethics	protocol	number:	PSY/04/11/NS	
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Consent	Form			I		_______________________________________________________________	(please	type	name)	give	my	full	consent	to	take	part	in	the	following	research	investigation	with	the	full	understanding	that	I	may	withdraw	at	any	time	without	giving	any	reason.		If	I	withdraw	from	the	study,	the	data	that	I	have	submitted	will	also	be	withdrawn	at	my	request.	I	have	received	an	information	sheet	explaining	what	the	experiment	entails	and	what	will	be	expected	from	me.		I	understand	that	the	information	that	I	will	submit	will	be	confidential	and	completely	anonymous	and	used	only	for	this	study.	I	have	read	and	understand	the	above	information.		I	agree/do	not	agree	to	participate	in	the	study.		Signed:		Date:																						
Appendix I: Pilot questionnaire on shared actions (including information sheet, consent form and debrief 
sheet).      
	 307	
Action Questionnaire 
 
On the next page you are about to see a list of 15 triads. Please circle which two of the 
three objects share the same action I terms of how we operate them. If you feel that all 
three items share the same action then please circle all three. Look at the example 
below; 
 
 computer   printer   piano 
           
 
If you think that computer and printer share the operated in the same way then circle 
them two. If you feel that computer and piano are operated in the same way circle 
those two. Circle all three if you feel they are all operated in the same way.   
 
If you feel that none of them share an action then do not circle any.  
 
Turn the page to start when you are ready.  
 
Thank you.  
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1. axe    cane    tennis racket 
                             
 
 
 
2. wrapping paper  mace    baseball bat 
                   
 
 
 
3. speakers   hairspray   wine bottle 
       
 
 
4. usb pen   chewing gum   phone charger 
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5. joystick   suitcase   handbrake 
                       
 
6. balloon   clarinet   wooden spoon 
              
 
7. nut     money    car key 
                         
 
 
8. storage box   shoe    present 
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9. telephone   thermos   plant pot 
     
 
10. gun   hairdryer   cleaning spray 
               
 
11. rake   staple remover   hairclip 
        
 
12. hairwax   peppermill   spraypaint 
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13. facewipes   jewellery box   sandwich packet 
       
 
 
14. cheese grater  cookie jar   handbag 
     
 
 
15. maracas   cocktail shaker  vase.    
           
 
 
Appendix I: Pilot questionnaire on shared actions (including information sheet, consent form and debrief 
sheet).      
	 312	
Debriefing		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	see	how	you	grouped	the	items	together	for	use	in	a	later	experiment.				If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk			
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Visual Questionnaire 
 
On the next page you are about to see a list of 15 triads. Please circle which two of the 
three objects share visual properties, i.e. they look similar to each other. If you feel that 
all three items look similar to each other then please circle all three. Look at the 
example below; 
 
 computer   printer   piano 
           
 
If you think that computer and printer look similar then circle them two. If you feel that 
computer and piano look similar circle those two. Circle all three if you feel they are 
all look the same.   
 
If you feel that none of them share visual properties then do not circle any.  
 
Turn the page to start when you are ready.  
 
Thank you.  
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INFORMATION	SHEET		I	am	a	PhD	student	from	the	University	of	Hertfordshire	undertaking	a	study	into	semantic	knowledge.	Semantic	knowledge	is	one	form	of	long	term	memory	which	stores	information	regarding	the	world	around	us	and	objects	which	exist	in	that	world.			If	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	asked	to	complete	a	triad	choice	task.	The	whole	task	should	take	no	longer	than	15	minutes.			As	a	participant	you	will	be	asked	not	to	discuss	the	study	with	others	until	the	study	is	completed	in	March	2012.		You	will	have	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	now	and	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
Please	note	that	any	information	you	may	supply	today	will	only	be	used	for	
the	purposes	outlined	here.	You	may	withdraw	your	assistance	from	this	
study	at	any	time.		You	may	use	the	contact	email	address	below,	should	any	queries	or	concerns	arise	in	the	future.		Thank	you	for	your	participation.		Name	of	researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk		Ethics	protocol	number:	PSY/04/11/NS		
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DEBRIEFING		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	investigate	whether	our	semantic	memory	contains	information	related	to	actions	associated	with	everyday	objects.	It	further	aimed	to	see	whether	people	would	select	an	item	that	shared	the	same	action	over	its	categorical	function.			Once	again	thank	you	for	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk	
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List of Triads Used (Experiments 2-8) 
Table M1 
List of the Same Category Object (SCO) Triads used in Experiments 2-8. 
Target Item Choice Items 
Taxonomic Choice Taxonomic and Action 
Choice Pencil	 Elastic	band	 Paintbrush	Glass	 Jug		 Cup		Spatula	 Grater		 Saucepan		Pin	 Screw		 Plug		Orange		 Banana	 Strawberry	DVD	player	 Television		 CD	player	Bed	 Wardrobe	 Sofa	Leaflet	 Poster	 Newspaper		Spade	 Shears		 Trowel		
Ketchup Vinegar Salt 
 
 
Table M2 
List of the Different Category Object (DCO) Triads used in Experiments 2-8. 
Target Item Choice Items 
Taxonomic Choice Action Choice Fax	machine	 Telephone		 Photocopier		Screwdriver	 Hammer		 Key		Drink	bottle	 Mug		 Jam	jar	Rifle	 Sword		 Water	pistol	Computer	 Printer		 Piano		Calculator	 Set	square		 Mobile	phone	Book	 Ipod		 Wallet		Paperclip	 Ruler		 Clothes	peg	Deodorant	 Hair	gel		 Insect	repellent	Knife		 Ladle		 Saw		
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Table M3 
List of the Perceptual Category Object (PCO) Triads used in Experiment 2-8. 
Target Item Choice Items 
Perceptual Choice Action Choice 
Axe  Cane Tennis racket 
Baseball bat Wrapping paper Mace  
USB pen Chewing gum Phone charger 
Clarinet Wooden spoon Balloon  
Nut  Money  Car key 
Present  Storage box Shoe  
Cocktail shaker Vase  Maracas  
Gun  Hairdryer  Cleaning spray 
Peppermill  Spray paint  Hairwax  
Handbag  Cheese grater  Cookie jar 
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Figure N1. Format of the pencil triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
	
Figure N2. Format of the pencil triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
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Figure N3. Format of the glass triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
	
Figure N4. Format of the glass triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
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Figure N5. Format of the spatula triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
	
Figure N6. Format of the spatula triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
Appendix N: SCO triads used in Experiments 2-8.             
	 321	
	
	
Figure N7. Format of the pin triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
	
Figure N8. Format of the pin triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
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Figure N9. Format of the dvd player triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8).  
	
Figure N10. Format of the dvd payer triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure N11. Format of the bed triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
	
Figure N12. Format of the bed triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
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Figure N13. Format of the leaflet triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
	
Figure N14. Format of the leaflet triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
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Figure 15. Format of the spade triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
	
Figure N16. Format of the spade triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
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Figure N17. Format of the orange triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure N18. Format of the orange triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure N19. Format of the ketchup triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure N20. Format of the ketchup triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure O1. Format of the screwdriver triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure O2. Format of the screwdriver triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure O3. Format of the drink bottle triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure O4. Format of the drink bottle triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure O5. Format of the rifle triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
	
Figure O6. Format of the rifle triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
Appendix O: DCO triads used in Experiments 2-8.             
	 331	
	
	
Figure O7. Format of the computer triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure O8. Format of the computer triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure O9. Format of the calculator triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure O10. Format of the calculator triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure O11. Format of the book triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
	
Figure O12. Format of the book triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
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Figure O13. Format of the paperclip triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure O14. Format of the paperclip triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure O15. Format of the deodorant triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure O16. Format of the deodorant triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure O17. Format of the knife triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
	
Figure O18. Format of the knife triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
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Figure O19. Format of the fax machine triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure 020. Format of the fax machine triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure P1. Format of the axe triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
	
Figure P2. Format of the axe triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
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Figure P3. Format of the baseball bat triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure P4. Format of the baseball bat triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure P5. Format of the USB pen triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure P6. Format of the USB pen triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure P7. Format of the clarinet triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
	
Figure P8. Format of the clarinet triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 
2-8). 
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Figure P9. Format of the nut triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
	
Figure P10. Format of the nut triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
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Figure P11. Format of the present triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure P12. Format of the present triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure P13. Format of the cocktail shaker triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure P14. Format of the cocktail shaker triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure P15. Format of the gun triad used in the context-lean condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
	
Figure P16. Format of the gun triad used in the context-rich condition (Experiments 2-
8). 
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Figure P17. Format of the peppermill triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
	
Figure P18. Format of the peppermill triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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Figure P19. Format of the handbag triad used in the context-lean condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 	
	
Figure P20. Format of the handbag triad used in the context-rich condition 
(Experiments 2-8). 
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FORM EC6: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
Title of Research 
 
Using	an	Online	Questionnaire	to	Measure	Object	Typicality	Ratings		
 
Introduction 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide whether to 
do so, it is important that you understand the research that is being done and what 
your involvement will include.  Please take the time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Do not hesitate to ask us anything that 
is not clear or for any further information you would like to help you make your 
decision.  Please do take your time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
 
Previous research has shown that participants when asked to match objects together 
do so by making use of the taxonomic category that they come from. In addition to 
this, additional features such as action (Shipp, Vallée-Tourangeau & Anthony, in 
press) and thematic relations (Wisniewski & Bassok, 1997) when combined with 
taxonomic information make such items a better match. While Shipp et al. showed 
that items are a better match when they share both taxonomic information and a 
shared action relation, the possibility still remains that items were picked simply 
because they were better category members. For example participants might pick 
drums over cello as going better with trumpet simply because drums are more typical 
members of the category instruments. The aim of the current experiment is to collect 
ratings of typicality using a 10-point scale.   
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is completely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this study.  If you 
do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to 
sign a consent form.  Agreeing to join the study does not mean that you have to 
complete it.  You are free to withdraw at any stage without giving a reason.  A decision 
to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part at all, will not affect any 
treatment/care that you may receive (should this be relevant). 
 
How long will my part in the study take? 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be involved in it for 15 – 25 minutes.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
The first thing to happen is that you will be asked to sign the consent form if you agree 
to take part in this study. After this you will be presented with object names and asked 
to rate (on a scale of 1-10) how typical they are of the category they are drawn from. 
For example if you feel that carrot is very typical of the category VEGETABLE then 
you might give it a score of 10. If you feel that carrot is not at all typical then you might 
give it a score of 1.     
 
What are the possible disadvantages, risks or side effects of taking part? 
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There are no disadvantages or side effects of taking part.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
The gratitude of the researcher for assisting in the collection of data.  
 
 
How will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Upon signing the consent form you will be asked to generate an anonymity number 
which all of your data will be kept under. No data will be stored under your own name 
and you will not be identifiable from your results.   
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results will be included within the PhD thesis of the principle investigator.  
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
 
This research has been reviewed by Dr Sue Anthony 
 
Who can I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you would like further information or would like to discuss any details personally, 
please get in touch with me, in writing, by phone or by email: n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk 
  
Although we hope it is not the case, if you have any complaints or concerns 
about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the 
course of this study, please write to the University Secretary and Registrar. 
 
 
Thank you very much for reading this information and giving consideration to 
taking part in this study. 
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FORM EC3 
CONSENT FORM FOR STUDIES INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 
The material contained in this form may be adapted for use in an alternative consent form, 
provided the principles of what is contained in the form are retained 
 
  
I, the undersigned [please give your name here, in BLOCK CAPITALS] 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
of  [please give contact details here, sufficient to enable the investigator to get in touch with you, such as 
a postal  or email address] 
 
…..…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… .. 
hereby freely agree to take part in the study entitled Using an Online Questionnaire to Measure Object 
Typicality Ratings  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….  
 
 
1  I confirm that I have been given a Participant Information Sheet (a copy of which is attached to this 
form) giving particulars of the study, including its aim(s), methods and design, the names and contact 
details of key people and, as appropriate, the risks and potential benefits, and any plans for follow-up 
studies that might involve further approaches to participants.   I have been given  details of my 
involvement in the study.  I have been told that in the event of any significant change to the aim(s) or 
design of the study I will be informed, and asked to renew my consent to participate in it.  
 
2  I have been assured that I may withdraw from the study at any time without disadvantage or having to 
give a reason. 
 
3  I have been given information about the risks of my suffering harm or adverse effects.   I have been 
told about the aftercare and support that will be offered to me in the event of this happening, and  I have 
been assured that all such aftercare or support  would be provided at no cost to myself.  
 
4  I have been told how information relating to me (data obtained in the course of  the study, and data 
provided by me about myself) will be handled: how it will be kept secure, who will have access to it, and 
how it will or may be used.   
 
5  I have been told what will be done if the study reveals that I have a medical condition which may have 
existed prior to the study, which I may or may not have been aware of, and which could affect the present 
or future health of myself or others. If this happens, I will be told about the condition in an appropriate 
manner and advised on follow-up action I should take.   Information about the condition will be passed to 
my GP, and I may no longer be allowed to take part in the study. 
    
6  I have been told that I may at some time in the future be contacted again in connection with this or 
another study. 
 
 
  
Signature of 
participant……………………………………………………………………………………Date…………………
………. 
 
 
 
Signature of (principal) investigator: ………………………………………….   Date:………………… 
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Debrief 
 Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	collect	ratings	of	how	typical	objects	are	of	their	category.	Research	does	show	that	objects	do	vary	in	how	typical	they	are	(Rosch,	1975;	Rosch	&	Mervis,	1976).	For	example,	an	orange	is	more	typical	of	the	category	fruit	than	a	tomato.	The	aim	of	this	experiment	was	to	collect	ratings	of	typicality	for	use	in	future	experiments.					If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk		
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FORM EC6: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Title of Research 
 
Measuring the effects of instructional bias in tasks of categorical and similarity 
judgements. 
 
Introduction 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to do so, it is important that you understand the research that is being 
done and what your involvement will include. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Do not 
hesitate to ask us anything that is not clear or for any further information you 
would like to help you make your decision. Please do take your time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
 
The aim of this study is measure the underlying assumptions of a well used 
cognitive task in the field of semantic memory. In this study you will see a 
Forced-Choice Triad task. In this task you will see a target image followed by 
two choice pictures and asked to match up the choice pictures with the target 
picture at the top.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is completely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this study. If 
you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
be asked to sign a consent form. Agreeing to join the study does not mean that 
you have to complete it. You are free to withdraw at any stage without giving a 
reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part at all, 
will not affect any treatment/care that you may receive (should this be 
relevant). 
 
How long will my part in the study take? 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be involved in it for 
approximately 10-15 minutes.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
You will be shown a series of ‘triads’ consisting of a target image with two 
choice options. You will simply be asked to match one of the two choice 
options with the target image at the top as indicated by a left (a)/right (l) key 
press.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages, risks or side effects of taking part? 
 
There are no associated risks or side effects from taking part.  
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
You will gain experience in participating in research and see a variety of the 
equipment and study procedures that the department can offer.  
 
How will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
You will be known to the experimenter only by an anonymity code and after 
completion of the project all confidential material will be destroyed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
They will be used for the purposes of completing my PhD thesis.   
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
 
This research has been reviewed by Dr Sue Anthony and by the local ethics 
comitee.  
 
Who can I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you would like further information or would like to discuss any details 
personally, please get in touch with me by email: n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk 
 
Although we hope it is not the case, if you have any complaints or 
concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or 
treated during the course of this study, please write to the University 
Secretary and Registrar. 
 
 
Thank you very much for reading this information and giving 
consideration to taking part in this study. 
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DEBRIEFING		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	investigate	the	underlying	assumptions	of	a	well-used	cognitive	task	known	as	the	Triad	task.	It	is	assumed	that	the	triad	task	is	measures	categorical	decisions	however	the	possibility	exists	that	participants	simply	pick	the	item	that	is	most	similar	to	the	target,	rather	than	the	one	that	reflects	a	categorical	choice.	This	is	because	research	has	shown	that	categorisation	and	similarity	are	closely	linked	and	are	often	interdependent	of	each	other	(Goldstone,	1994;	Rips,	1989;	Sloman	&	Rips,	1998).	In	addition	research	has	shown	that	even	the	nature	of	the	instructions	in	such	a	task	can	alter	how	participants	perform	(Lin	&	Murphy,	2001).	Therefore	in	the	current	experiment	we	are	comparing	the	effects	of	the	instructions	to	either	select	the	choice	item	that	“goes	best”,	“goes	best	to	form	a	category”	or	“is	most	similar	to	the	target”	to	measure	the	effects	this	has	on	performance.	If	participants	are	engaging	in	categorising	the	objects	(as	is	assumed)	then	there	should	be	no	difference	between	selecting	the	item	that	goes	best	or	goes	best	to	form	a	category.	In	contrast	if	participants	are	selecting	items	based	on	overall	similarity	then	there	should	be	no	difference	between	selecting	the	item	that	goes	best	or	is	most	similar	to	the	target.				Once	again	thank	you	for	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk		
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FORM EC6: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Title of Research 
 
Motor Routines in Everyday Object Categorising.	
 
Introduction 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to do so, it is important that you understand the research that is being 
done and what your involvement will include. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Do not 
hesitate to ask us anything that is not clear or for any further information you 
would like to help you make your decision. Please do take your time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
 
The aim of this study is to look at what parts of a picture people look at when 
making categorical choices. In this study you will see a Forced-Choice Triad 
task. In this task you will see a target image followed by two choice pictures 
and asked to choose which of the bottom two pictures goes with the target 
image at the top. While doing this you will be asked to wear and fitted with eye 
tracking equipment so that it can be measured where on the images you spend 
most time looking.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is completely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this study. If 
you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
be asked to sign a consent form. Agreeing to join the study does not mean that 
you have to complete it. You are free to withdraw at any stage without giving a 
reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part at all, 
will not affect any treatment/care that you may receive (should this be 
relevant). 
 
How long will my part in the study take? 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be involved in it for 
approximately 30 minutes.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
The first thing to happen is that you will be fitted with the mobile eye-tracking 
equipment to record where you are looking.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages, risks or side effects of taking part? 
 
There are no associated risks or side effects from taking part.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
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You will gain experience in participating in research and see a variety of the 
equipment and study procedures that the department can offer.  
 
How will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
You will be known to the experimenter only by an anonymity code and after 
completion of the project all confidential material will be destroyed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
They will be used for the purposes of completing my PhD thesis.   
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
 
This research has been reviewed by Dr Sue Anthony.  
 
Who can I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you would like further information or would like to discuss any details 
personally, please get in touch with me by email: n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk 
 
Although we hope it is not the case, if you have any complaints or 
concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or 
treated during the course of this study, please write to the University 
Secretary and Registrar. 
 
 
Thank you very much for reading this information and giving 
consideration to taking part in this study. 
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DEBRIEFING		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	investigate	under	what	condition	participants	would	group	objects	together	based	on	a	shared	action	interface	rather	than	based	on	standard	semantic	knowledge	such	as	how	an	object	looks	or	its	general	function.	In	particular	we	wanted	to	look	at	whether	people	look	at	not	just	an	object	but	how	we	interact	with	the	objects,	i.e.	also	looking	at	the	hands	and	the	body	position.	This	is	why	you	were	fitted	with	eye-tracking	equipment		Once	again	thank	you	for	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk
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Information	Sheet		I	am	a	PhD	student	from	the	University	of	Hertfordshire	undertaking	a	study	into	semantic	knowledge.			If	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	asked	to	complete	a	series	of	tasks	involving	everyday	objects	followed	by	completing	a	forced-choice	task.	The	whole	task	should	take	no	longer	than	45	minutes.			As	a	participant	you	will	be	asked	not	to	discuss	the	study	with	others	until	the	study	is	completed	in	May	2012.		You	will	have	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	now	and	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
Please	note	that	any	information	you	may	supply	today	will	only	be	used	for	
the	purposes	outlined	here.	You	may	withdraw	your	assistance	from	this	
study	at	any	time.		You	may	use	the	contact	email	address	below,	should	any	queries	or	concerns	arise	in	the	future.		Thank	you	for	your	participation.		Name	of	researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk	
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Debriefing	Sheet		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	investigate	whether	prior	actions	related	to	direct	object	use	influences	how	we	perform	in	tasks	based	on	categorisation	of	those	objects.	Research	shows	that	our	knowledge	of	objects	is	weighted	in	favour	of	how	we	use	them.			Once	again	thank	you	for	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk
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The ‘Checklist’ Task 
 
q Open	the	drink	bottle	and	pour	some	into	the	plastic	cup	
q Open	the	hair	wax	
q Open	the	cookie	jar	and	take	out	the	contents	
q Open	the	chewing	gum	and	please	pass	me	a	piece	
q Take	a	pencil	and	sign	your	name	on	a	piece	of	paper	
q Tie	the	shoelace	on	the	shoe	
q Open	the	book	on	any	page	and	read	the	top	line	
q Use	the	hammer	to	bang	the	nail	in	on	the	wooden	plank	
q Plug	the	phone	charger	into	the	wall	
q Connect	the	ipod	to	the	phone	charger	
q Unlock	the	ipod	and	click	on	shuffle,	tell	me	what	the	first	song	is	that	comes	on	
q Unlock	the	ipod	and	click	on	shuffle,	tell	me	the	first	song	that	comes	on	
q Unravel	the	poster	and	tell	me	what	it	is	of	
q Use	the	ruler	to	draw	a	20cm	line	on	a	piece	of	paper	
q Open	the	handbag	and	take	out	the	contents	
q This	is	Timmy	the	bear,	he	is	afraid	of	insects	so	can	you	please	spray	him	with	the	insect	repellent	
q Demonstrate	how	you	would	use	the	cocktail	shaker	
q Place	four	pins	into	the	notice	board	
q Open	the	leaflet	that	is	on	the	table	and	tell	me	what	it	is	of	
q Open	the	food	box	and	tell	me	what	is	inside	
q Peel	the	banana	and	the	orange	
q Peel	the	grapes	off	the	storks	
q Play	the	maracas	
Appendix Z: The ‘checklist’ task used in the action priming condition of Experiment 6.              
	 361	
q Open	the	wallet	and	tell	me	whose	driving	license	is	inside	
q Open	the	jam	jar	
q Take	the	key	and	go	out	and	lock	the	door,	then	unlock	it	and	come	back	inside	
q Insert	the	USB	into	the	laptop	
q On	the	calculator,	work	out	617	*	14	
q Read	out	one	of	the	headlines	on	the	newspaper	
q Light	the	candle	
q Open	the	storage	box	and	take	out	the	contents	
q Place	the	flower	into	the	vase	
q Use	the	paint	to	draw	any	line	on	the	paper	you	wish	
q Use	the	paperclip	to	clip	some	paper	together	
q Now	clip	the	clothes	peg	onto	it	
q Use	the	set	square	to	draw	a	10cm	line	extending	from	the	previous	line	you	drew	
q There	is	a	screw	in	the	plank	of	wood,	use	the	screwdriver	to	screw	it	in	a	little	further	
q Grind	some	pepper	into	the	bin	
q Here	is	a	mobile	phone,	dial	the	following	number	01707	285051	
q Pretend	to	pour	water	from	the	cup	into	the	glass	
q Now	pretend	to	take	a	sip	from	each	of	the	glass,	the	cup	and	the	mug	
q Open	the	present	
q Timmy	the	bear	is	now	worried	that	he	does	not	smell	nice,	please	spray	some	deodorant	on	him	
q Use	the	elastic	band	to	band	the	pencils	together	
q Grate	some	carrot	into	the	bowl	
q Please	put	some	moisturiser	into	my	hand	
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FORM EC6: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Title of Research 
 
Manual Interference in Situated Simulation.  
 
Introduction 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to do so, it is important that you understand the research that is being 
done and what your involvement will include. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Do not 
hesitate to ask us anything that is not clear or for any further information you 
would like to help you make your decision. Please do take your time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
 
The aim of this study is measure the underlying assumptions of a well used 
cognitive task in the field of semantic memory. In this study you will see a 
Forced-Choice Triad task. In this task you will see a target image followed by 
two choice pictures and asked to match up the choice pictures with the target 
picture at the top. While engaging in this task you may be asked to perform a 
manual task at the same time.   
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is completely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this study. If 
you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
be asked to sign a consent form. Agreeing to join the study does not mean that 
you have to complete it. You are free to withdraw at any stage without giving a 
reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part at all, 
will not affect any treatment/care that you may receive (should this be 
relevant). 
 
How long will my part in the study take? 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be involved in it for 
approximately 10-15 minutes.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
You will be shown a series of ‘triads’ consisting of a target image with two 
choice options. You will simply be asked to match one of the two choice 
options with the target image at the top as indicated by giving a verbal 
response of which object you feel goes best with the target. While doing this 
you may be asked to perform a manual task with your hands at the same time.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages, risks or side effects of taking part? 
 
There are no associated risks or side effects from taking part.  
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
You will gain experience in participating in research and see a variety of the 
equipment and study procedures that the department can offer.  
 
How will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
You will be known to the experimenter only by an anonymity code and after 
completion of the project all confidential material will be destroyed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
They will be used for the purposes of completing my PhD thesis.   
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
 
This research has been reviewed by Dr Sue Anthony and by the local ethics 
comitee.  
 
Who can I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you would like further information or would like to discuss any details 
personally, please get in touch with me by email: n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk 
 
Although we hope it is not the case, if you have any complaints or 
concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or 
treated during the course of this study, please write to the University 
Secretary and Registrar. 
 
 
Thank you very much for reading this information and giving 
consideration to taking part in this study. 
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DEBRIEFING		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	investigate	the	theory	behind	what	happens	when	participants	engage	in	a	triad	task.	It	is	believed	that	when	we	think	about	objects	we	mentally	simulate	them	within	a	given	situation	(Barsalou,	1999,	2003,	2008).	This	simulation	draws	heavily	on	the	motor	cortex	and	causes	a	partial	reactivation	of	the	neurons	that	were	active	at	the	time	of	encountering	the	object.	We	believe	that	when	participants	engage	in	this	task	they	simulate	the	objects,	and	then	select	the	item	that	is	most	relevant	to	the	target	in	terms	of	the	physical	action	of	using	the	object.	Here	we	aimed	to	demonstrate	that	participants	are	in	fact	simulating	the	objects,	by	disrupting	the	simulation	with	a	manual	task.	Should	this	result	in	lower	action	scores	then	this	would	provide	support	of	disrupting	the	simulation.			Once	again	thank	you	for	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk
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PSY1	Protocol	Lab		Response	sheet		Gender………………..		Age……………………		Group………………….			Triad	1:	Target				Orange					 	 Choice……………………….			Reason	for	making	this	choice…	what	sort	of	things	were	you	considering?			…………………………………………………………………………………………		………………………………………………………………………………………….		…………………………………………………………………………………………		………………………………………………………………………………………….		…………………………………………………………………………………………		Triad	2:	Target			Pencil	 	 Choice……………………….			Reason	for	making	this	choice…	what	sort	of	things	were	you	considering?			…………………………………………………………………………………………		………………………………………………………………………………………….		…………………………………………………………………………………………		………………………………………………………………………………………….		…………………………………………………………………………………………						
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Protocol Analysis 
 
Appendix AD shows the individual protocol scores and detailed analysis for 
each triad. The data reported below shows the results looking at the most commonly 
used reasons given in the protocols for when they picked the action or competitor item 
in the triads and across both conditions (lean vs rich). However, the tables below do 
not include the data from the “other” type of feature. Such reasons were removed from 
the overall data because they were not consistent and often reflected idiosyncratic 
choices from the individual participants. As such they are not reported in the tables 
below.  	
Table AD1 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Screwdriver Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (33.33%) 
Action (33.33%) 
Perceptual (16.67%) Mediating link 
(8.33%) 
Personal (8.33%) 
Taxonomic Functional (34.88%) Thematic (27.91%) 
Category (27.91%) 
Perceptual (3.49%) 
Rich Action Action (47.62%) Functional (9.52%) 
Perceptual (9.52%) 
Mediating link 
(4.76%) 
Same material 
(4.76%) 
Motion (4.76%) 
Autobiographical 
(4.76%) 
Taxonomic Functional (33.33%) 
Thematic (33.33%) 
Category (24.36%) Perceptual (1.28%) 
Mediating link 
(1.28%) 
Personal (1.28%) 
Autobiographical 
(1.28%) 
 
The data from Table AD1 above shows that participants were more likely to 
give shared actions as a reason when they selected the action item (key) with 
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screwdriver. This occurred in both the context-lean and context-rich condition. In 
addition when they selected the action item they were also highly likely to report 
functional reasons such as “they both open things: and mediating links such as “they 
both go into holes”. However participants did report perceptual reasons for selecting 
the action item. This provides evidence for the notion put forward in Chapter 2 that 
participants focus on the perceptual characteristics evident between the target and 
action item as a result of design ergonomics.  When selecting the taxonomic item 
(hammer) participants mostly relied on function (“both used in building and DIY”), 
thematic (“both found in a tool box”) and category (“both are DIY tools”) across both 
conditions in basing their choice. Other reasons were used such as perceptual and 
autobiographical but these were generally very few in number and accounted for less 
than 5% of their reasons.  
 
Table AD2 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Drink Bottle Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (21.43%) Functional (14.29%) 
Perceptual (14.29%) 
Personal (14.29%) 
Mediating link 
(14.29%) 
- 
Taxonomic Functional (82.54%) Action (4.76%) 
Thematic (4.76%) 
Personal (4.76%) 
- 
Rich Action Action (53.13%) Functional (12.50%) Perceptual (6.25%) 
Personal (6.25%) 
Taxonomic Functional (81.48%) Thematic (5.56%) Action (3.70%) 
 
Table AD2 shows the percentage of reasons given in the drink bottle triad. It 
shows that in both the context-lean and context-rich condition participants were most 
likely to report shared actions for selecting the action choice (jam), particularly so in 
the context-rich condition. Participants also reported functional and perceptual reasons 
for selecting the action choice such as “they are both containers” and “they look more 
similar because they don’t have a handle”. When selecting the taxonomic choice (mug) 
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participants were most likely to report functional reasons such as “they are used to 
drink from” but also reported thematic and action based reasons such as “you keep 
them in the kitchen” and “you raise them to your mouth to drink”. This shows that 
there may be some confounding aspects of the choice items in that they both share 
certain actions with the target. However it should be noted that in both conditions 
action protocols for the taxonomic item was less than 5% of the protocols.  
 
Table AD3 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Rifle Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (32.14%) Perceptual (21.43%) Functional (17.86%) 
Taxonomic Functional (31.08%) Thematic (28.38%) 
Category (28.38%) 
Perceptual (8.11%) 
Rich Action Functional (26.83%) Perceptual (24.39%) Action (19.51%) 
Taxonomic Functional (31.67%) Category (30.00%) Thematic (28.33%) 
 
Table AD3 shows the percentage of reasons given in the rifle triad. It shows 
that when participants selected the action choice (water pistol) they did so because of 
the shared action and reported so in the protocols. Action reasons were most reported 
in the context-lean condition (32%). However while action was reported in the context-
rich condition (19.51%) participants mostly reported functional and perceptual reasons 
for selecting water pistol. While the two objects do not share a function between them 
(one is a toy and one is a weapon) participants would often give them an ad hoc/goal 
related function in that they are “used to shoot people”. This supports the notion put 
forward from Experiment 4 in that participants use overall goals in grouping objects 
together in an “ad hoc” manner. The results further show that when selecting the 
taxonomic choice (sword) they did so commenting on function (“they are used to 
hurt/kill people”), thematic (“they are used on a battlefield”) and category reasons 
(“they are both weapons”).  
 
Appendix AD: Results of the individual protocol analysis of each triad.   
	 369	
Table AD4 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Book Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (50.00%) Perceptual (14.71%) 
Mediating link 
(14.71%) 
Functional (11.76%) 
Taxonomic Functional (33.33%) Personal (14.81%) Mediating link 
(12.96) 
Rich Action Action (37.04%) Mediating link 
(22.22%) 
Personal (14.81%) 
Taxonomic Functional (62.00%) Thematic (12.00%) Category (6.00%) 
One can be the other 
(6.00%) 
 
Table AD4 shows the percentage of reasons given in the book triad. It shows 
that when participants selected the action choice (wallet) they did so because of the 
shared actions between them in both the context-lean (50.00%) and the context-rich 
condition (33.33%). They also reported perceptual and mediating links between them 
such as “they look similar to each other” and “they both contain paper”. When 
participants selected the taxonomic choice (iPod) they did so mainly because of 
functional reasons such as “they keep you entertained”. Participants also reported 
personal reasons along with thematic reasons (“you take them on holiday with you”) 
and also commenting that “you can read books on an ipod” suggesting that one can be 
the other.   
 
Table AD5 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Fax Machine Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Mediating link 
(41.82%) 
Functional (23.64%) Thematic (14.55%) 
Taxonomic Functional (55.56%) Perceptual (19.44%) Mediating link 
(8.33%) 
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Rich Action Functional (28.79%) 
Mediating link 
(28.79%) 
Perceptual (13.64%) Thematic (9.09%) 
Taxonomic Functional (52.38%) Mediating link 
(19.05%) 
One can be the other 
(7.14%) 
 
Table AD5 shows the percentage of reasons given in the fax machine triad. 
Despite the choice results showing that participants were more likely to select the 
action choice (photocopier) they did not do so because of shared actions between them. 
Action reasons accounted for only 1.28% of the protocols in the context-lean condition 
and were not reported by any participants in the context-rich condition. Participants 
were more likely to report functional, mediating links and thematic reasons such as 
“you can use them to copy documents”, “they both use paper” and “they are found in 
an office”. When participants selected the taxonomic choice (telephone) they did so 
because of functional reasons (“you use them to communicate with people”) and 
mediating links (“they both have a phone and buttons”).    
 
Table AD6 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Computer Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (20.00%) Functional (13.33%) 
Personal (13.33%) 
Mediating link 
(13.33%) 
Thematic (6.67%) 
Motion (6.67%) 
Autobiographical 
(6.67%) 
Taxonomic Mediating link 
(64.94%) 
Category (20.78%) Functional (9.09%) 
Rich Action Action (69.23%) Functional (7.69%) 
Perceptual (7.69%) 
Thematic (7.69%) 
- 
Taxonomic Mediating link 
(51.72%) 
Thematic (20.69%) Category (17.24%) 
 
Table AD6 shows the percentage of reasons given in the computer triad. 
Participants were most likely to select the taxonomic choice (printer), however when 
participants selected the action item (piano) they gave action reasons in their protocols.  
Participants also gave functional (“they play music”), mediating links (“they both have 
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keys”) and thematic reasons (“you find them both in a school”). When participants 
selected the taxonomic choice they do so because of mediating links (“you need paper 
to print on them”), category (“both electrical equipment”) and thematic reasons (“you 
find them in an office”).  
 
Table AD7 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Calculator Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Perceptual (33.33%) One can be the other 
(24.44%) 
Mediating link 
(13.33%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (76.47%) Functional (13.73%) Perceptual (1.96%) 
Category (1.96%) 
Personal (1.96%) 
Autobiographical 
(1.96%) 
Rich Action One can be the other 
(47.22%) 
Action (13.89%) Category (11.11%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (53.85%) Mediating link 
(23.08%) 
Same material 
(15.38%) 
 
Table AD7 shows the percentage of reasons given in the calculator triad. The 
results show that when participants selected the action choice (mobile phone) they only 
reported the shared actions between them in the context-rich condition. The shared 
actions in the context-lean condition comprised of only 6.67% of protocols and were 
more likely to base their choices in perceptual reasons such as “they look similar and 
have a similar shape”. In the context-rich condition participants reported that “mobile 
phones have a calculator on them” and therefore claimed that one can be the other. The 
strongest reason for basing selection of the taxonomic choice (set square) were 
thematic with participants reporting that “they are both used in maths classes”.   
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Table AD8 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Paperclip Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (84.91%) Perceptual (9.43%) Thematic (3.77%) 
Taxonomic Category (42.86%) Thematic (31.43%) Mediating link 
(5.71%) 
Autobiographical 
(5.71%) 
Rich Action Functional (80.65%) Action (9.68%) Perceptual (6.45%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (60.00%) Category (30.00%) Functional (10.00%) 
 
Table AD8 shows the percentage of reasons given in the paperclip triad. When 
participants selected the action choice (clothes peg) they did so mainly because of 
functional reasons commenting that they “hold things together”. Participants also 
reported perceptual reasons stating that they “look similar”. Overall action accounted 
for very few of the protocols with no one reporting such in the context-lean condition 
and accounting for only 9.68% of protocols in the context-rich condition. When 
participants selected the taxonomic choice (ruler) they main reported thematic and 
category reasons stating that they are “both used in mathematics/maths classes” and are 
“both stationary”.  
 
Table AD9 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Deodorant Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Category (29.27%) Functional (21.95%) Perceptual (17.07%) 
Taxonomic Functional (38.18%) Thematic (27.27%) Category (16.36%) 
Rich Action Functional (29.63%) Action (22.22%) Perceptual (18.52%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (31.25%) Category (18.75%) Functional (6.25%) 
Perceptual (6.25%) 
 
Table AD9 shows the percentage of reasons given in the deodorant triad. When 
participants selected the action choice (insect repellent) they reported action responses 
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more in the action-rich context (22.22%) than in the context-lean (12.20%). In the 
context-lean condition participants were more likely to report functional and perceptual 
reasons such as “both keep something away” and “both look similar”. In addition 
participants would use category reasons in the context-lean condition such as “both are 
sprays”. When participants selected the taxonomic choice (hair gel) they mostly 
reported functional (“both make you attractive”), thematic (“you find them in the 
bathroom) and category reasons (”they’re grooming products).  
 
Table AD10 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Knife Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (50.00%) Perceptual (41.67%) Thematic (2.78%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (45.24%) Category (23.81%) Functional (19.05%) 
Rich Action Functional (59.46%) Perceptual (24.32%) Action (10.81%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (77.78%) Category (22.22%) - 
 
Table AD10 shows the percentage of reasons given in the knife triad. When 
participants selected the action choice (saw) very few participants reported the shared 
actions between them as a reason for doing so. In the context-rich condition action 
protocols only accounted for 10.81% of responses, and only 1.39% in the context-lean 
condition. Participants were most likely to report functional and perceptual reasons 
such as “they are both used to cut things” and “they both look sharp”. When 
participants selected the taxonomic choice (ladle) they reported thematic (“you find 
them in a kitchen”) and category reasons (“both are kitchen utensils”).   
 
Table AD11 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Pencil Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Perceptual (34.85%) Functional (28.03%) Action (14.39%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (25.00%) Functional (12.50%) 
Action  (12.50%) 
- 
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Category (12.50%) 
Personal (12.50%) 
Rich Action Functional (46.30%) Thematic (14.81%) Action (13.89%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (25.00%) Category (12.50%) 
Personal (12.50%) 
Autobiographical 
(12.50%) 
- 
 
Table AD11 shows the percentage of reasons given in the pencil triad. While 
action reasons were used in selecting the action choice (paintbrush) in both conditions 
it was not the primary reason for select. Participants favoured functional (“you can 
draw with both”), perceptual (“they look similar”) and thematic reasons (“they are used 
in art”). When participants selected the taxonomic choice (elastic band) they mainly 
reported thematic reasons such as “you find them in an office” or “can be found in a 
stationary cupboard”. Participants who selected the taxonomic item also reported 
functional reasons (“elastic bands hold pencils together”), category (“both are 
stationary”), and action reasons (“you tie the elastic bands around pencils”).  
 
Table AD12 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Glass Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (65.71%) Action (8.57%) 
Perceptual (8.57%) 
Thematic (5.71%) 
Same material 
(5.71%) 
Personal (5.71%) 
Taxonomic Functional (33.33%) Perceptual (30.30%) 
Same material 
(30.30%) 
Action (1.52%) 
Thematic (1.52%) 
Personal (1.52% 
Motion (1.52%) 
Rich Action Functional (63.46%) Action (9.62%) Perceptual (5.77%) 
Thematic (5.77%) 
Taxonomic Same material 
(33.96%) 
Functional (24.53%) Perceptual (15.09%) 
 
Table AD12 shows the percentage of reasons given in the glass triad. 
Participants who selected the action choice (cup) did report action reasons for doing so, 
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but were more likely to use function to group them together (“you can drink out of 
both of them”). When participants selected the taxonomic choice (jug) participants 
reported functional (“you pour the jug into the glass”), same material (“made of 
glass”), and perceptual reasons (“they’re see through”).  
 
Table AD13 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Spatula Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Thematic (38.89%) Functional (29.63) Perceptual (9.26%) 
Taxonomic Category (37.14%) Functional (20.00%) 
Thematic (20.00%) 
Perceptual (14.29%) 
Rich Action Thematic (41.51%) Functional (37.74%) Personal (3.77%) 
Taxonomic Category (36.71%) Thematic (17.02%) Functional (10.64%) 
 
Table AD13 shows the percentage of reasons given in the spatula triad. When 
participants selected the action item (saucepan) they did not because of the shared 
actions between the objects. Participants in the context-rich condition did not report 
any action based protocols, and those in the context-lean condition only accounted for 
1.85% of protocols. Rather when the action choice was selected it was mainly done 
because of thematic (“you find them in the kitchen”) and functional reasons (“you cook 
with them”). When participants selected the taxonomic item (can opener) they reported 
category (“both are kitchen utensils”), functional (“you cook with them”) and thematic 
reasons (“you find them in the kitchen”).  
 
Table AD14 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Pin Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (25.00%) Same material 
(16.67%) 
Mediating link 
(8.33%) 
Motion (8.33%) 
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Word feature 
(8.33%) 
Autobiographical 
(8.33%) 
Taxonomic Functional (45.26%) Perceptual (40.00%) Same material 
(5.36%) 
Rich Action Action (35.71%) Same material 
(14.29%) 
Word feature 
(14.29%) 
Perceptual (7.14%) 
One can be the other 
(7.14%) 
Autobiographical 
(7.14%) 
Taxonomic Functional (41.51%) Perceptual (33.02%) Action (11.32%) 
 
Table AD14 shows the percentage of reasons given in the pin triad. When 
participants selected the action choice (plug) they mostly reported action protocols. 
Participants also reported that the object were made of the same materials along with 
word-based features (“both begin with the letter p”). When participants selected the 
taxonomic choice (screw) they mostly reported functional (“they hold things together”) 
and perceptual (“they are small”). However some participants in the context-rich 
condition did report action as a method for selecting the taxonomic item. However the 
protocols referred to how to pick up the objects rather than use them with comments 
such as (“you pick them up in your fingers”).  
 
Table AD15 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Ketchup Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Perceptual (24.36%) Same material 
(21.79%) 
Functional (16.67%) 
Taxonomic Personal (33.33%) Functional (23.81%) Thematic (19.05%) 
Rich Action Perceptual (35.38%) Functional (18.46%) Category (12.31%) 
Taxonomic Personal (47.62%) Functional (11.90%) 
Thematic (11.90%) 
Mediating link 
(4.76%) 
Category (4.76%) 
 
Table AD15 shows the percentage of reasons given in the ketchup triad. The 
results show that when participants selected the action choice (vinegar) they did not do 
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so because of the shared actions between them. Action protocols accounted for only 
2.56% of protocols in the context-lean condition and 3.08% in the context-rich. When 
they did select the action choice mainly because of perceptual (“the bottles look the 
same”), functional (“they make food taste better”), thematic (“they’re both in the 
kitchen”) and because they are made of the same material (“they are both made of 
vinegar”). When participants selected the taxonomic choice (salt) they mainly did so 
because of personal reasons such as “I prefer salt with ketchup on my chips” or “I 
don’t like vinegar”. They also reported functional (“they make food taste better”), 
thematic (“you find them in the kitchen”), category reasons (“they’re both 
condiments”) and because of mediating links (“you put them on chips”).  
 
Table AD16 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Orange Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (21.15%) Personal (19.23%) Category (15.38%) 
Biological (15.38%) 
Taxonomic Perceptual (71.05%) Biological (13.16%) 
Personal (13.16%) 
Category (2.63%) 
Rich Action Action (58.33%) Perceptual (8.33%) 
Thematic  (8.33%) 
Biological  (8.33%) 
Personal  (8.33%) 
Category (5.56%) 
Taxonomic Perceptual (28.57%) 
Biological (28.57%) 
Category (21.43%) Personal (14.29%) 
 
Table AD16 shows the percentage of reasons given in the orange triad. When 
participants selected the action choice (banana) they did so primarily because of the 
shared actions between them, particularly so in the context rich condition where action 
accounted for more than half (58.33%) of the protocols. In addition when selecting the 
action choice participants also reported personal (“I prefer bananas/I don’t like 
strawberries”), category (“both are fruit”), thematic (“you keep them in a fruit bowl”) 
and biological reasons (“they both grow on trees”). When participants selected the 
taxonomic choice (strawberry) they mainly reported perceptual reasons such as “they 
are both small and round”. In addition participants reported biological (“both have 
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seeds”), personal (“I prefer strawberries to bananas”) and category reasons (“both are 
fruit”). In this triad participants rarely reported category reasons on their own, but often 
used this in conjunction with other reasons. Particularly because as all three items in 
the triad are fruit such reasoning cannot be used on its own to distinguish between the 
selected choice and its counterpart.  
 
Table AD17 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the DVD Player Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (38.46%) Mediating link 
(30.77%) 
Action (12.82%) 
Taxonomic Mediating link 
(75.51%) 
Perceptual (6.12%) 
Personal (6.12%) 
Functional (4.08%) 
Rich Action Mediating link 
(62.16%) 
Functional (16.22%) Perceptual (13.51%) 
Taxonomic Mediating link 
(42.86%) 
Thematic (28.57%) Personal (14.29%) 
Autobiographical 
(14.29%) 
 
Table AD17 shows the percentage of reasons given in the DVD player triad. 
The results show that action reasons were not common when participants selected the 
action choice (CD player). Participants favoured functional and mediating links 
between the objects such as “they play disks” and “you need disks to work them”. 
While action was reported in the context-lean condition (12.82%) this dropped in the 
context-rich condition (2.70%) suggesting that the context does not increase saliency 
towards the shared actions. When participants selected the taxonomic choice 
(television) they mainly reported mediating links such as “you use the tv and the dvd 
player to watch films”. Participants also reported functional (“you use them to watch 
things”) and thematic reasons (“they’re in the living room”).   
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Table AD18 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Bed Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (62.82%) Perceptual (25.64%) Personal (3.85%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (77.27%) Category (9.09%) 
Personal (9.09%) 
Functional (4.55%) 
Rich Action Functional (33.33%) Action (20.51%) 
Thematic (20.51%) 
Category (7.69%) 
Taxonomic Thematic (80.00%) - - 
 
Table AD18 shows the percentage of reasons given in the bed triad. The results 
show that participants reported action based reasons for selecting the action choice 
(sofa) in the context-rich condition, but not in the context-lean condition (0%). In the 
context-lean condition they selected sofa mainly because of functional reasons such as 
“they provide somewhere to sit and relax” along with perceptual (“the sofa and the bed 
look comfy”) and personal reasons (“I like to have naps on the sofa”). When 
participants selected the taxonomic choice (wardrobe) they did so because of shared 
thematic reasons. Participants said that “you find them in the bedroom” and such 
comments dominated more than three quarters of their protocols in both the context-
lean and context-rich condition.  
  
Table AD19 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Leaflet Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (55.56%) Perceptual (16.67%) One can be the other 
(11.11%) 
Taxonomic Functional (56.90%) Perceptual (27.59%) Personal (5.17%) 
Rich Action Action (53.85%) Functional (30.77%) Perceptual (7.69%) 
Same material 
(7.69%) 
Taxonomic Functional (59.26%) Perceptual (25.93%) Autobiographical 
(11.11%) 
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Table AD19 shows the percentage of reasons given in the leaflet triad. The 
table shows that when participants selected the action choice (newspaper) they mainly 
reported action as the reason for doing so in the context-rich condition, but not in the 
context-lean where action only accounted for 5.56% of the protocols. In the context-
lean condition functional reasons accounted for the most protocols given with 
comments such as “they both convey important information” but also reported 
perceptual reasons (“the newspaper looks like a big leaflet/the leaflet looks like a small 
newspaper”) and stated that one can be the other (“a leaflet can show the news”). 
When participants selected the taxonomic choice (poster) they primarily did so because 
of shared functional information such as “both show important information” but also 
commented on shared perceptual features between them (“posters and leaflets are both 
very colourful”).   
 
Table AD20 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Taxonomic Choices in the Spade Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (54.84%) Perceptual (19.35%) Autobiographical 
(12.50%) 
Taxonomic Functional (25.00%) 
Category (25.00%) 
Perceptual (12.50%) 
Thematic (12.50%) 
Autobiographical 
(12.50%) 
- 
Rich Action Functional (53.85%) Perceptual (32.69%) One can be the other 
(5.77%) 
Taxonomic - - - 
Note. There were no reasons provided for shears in the context-rich condition because no participant selected this in 
the triads.   
 
Table AD20 shows the percentage of reasons given in the spade triad. Analysis 
of the protocols showed that when participants selected the action choice (trowel) in 
the triads they did not do so because of the shared actions. Action protocols accounted 
for only 3.23% in the context-lean and 1.92% in the context-rich conditions. Rather 
when they did select it they did so because of shared functions (“you can dig with them 
both”), perceptual (“a trowel is a mini spade”) and autobiographical reasons (“I 
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remember helping out my dad win the garden when I was younger”). In the present 
experiment no participant selected the taxonomic choice (shears) in the context-rich 
condition and as such no protocol data exists for this choice. However when they did 
select it in the context-lean they commented on the shared functions (“you use them to 
dig and make the garden look nice”), perceptual (“they look sharp/they look shiny”), 
thematic (“you find them in the garden shed”) and autobiographical.  
 
Table AD21 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Clarinet Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (48.84%) Perceptual (11.63%) Thematic (9.30%) 
Mediating link 
(9.30%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (72.34%) Same material 
(12.77%) 
Functional (2.13%) 
Action (2.13%) 
Thematic (2.13%) 
Category (2.13%) 
Autobiographical 
(2.13%) 
Rich Action Action (88.57%) Mediating link 
(5.71%) 
Perceptual (2.86%) 
Thematic (2.86%) 
Perceptual Personal (66.67%) Autobiographical 
(33.33%) 
- 
 
Table AD21 shows the percentage of reasons given in the clarinet triad. The 
results show that when participants selected the action choice (balloon) they reported 
action as being the primary reason for doing so in both the context-lean and rich 
conditions, with higher responses in the latter. Participants also reported perceptual 
reasons (“they both come to a point”), mediating links (“they both need air to work”) 
and thematic reasons (“you might find both at a party”). When participants selected the 
perceptual choice (wooden spoon) they mainly reported the shared perceptual features 
(“they are both long and thin”) in both contexts. Participants also reported 
autobiographical responses and reported that they were made of the same material.  
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Table AD22 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Cocktail Shaker Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (50.00%) Perceptual (22.97%) Thematic (16.22%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (50.00%) Functional (33.33%) Mediating link 
(5.56%) 
Personal (5.56%) 
Rich Action Action (85.71%) Perceptual (5.71%) 
Autobiographical 
(5.51%) 
- 
Perceptual Functional (60.00%) Perceptual (20.00%) 
Same material 
(20.00%) 
- 
 
Table AD22 shows the percentage of reasons given in the cocktail shaker triad. 
The table shows that when participants selected the action choice (maracas) they 
mainly reported action as being the reason for doing so in both contexts, with higher 
responses in the context-rich condition. Participants also reported perceptual reasons 
for selecting the action choice, but these were not related to the visual aspects of the 
objects but participants reported that “both objects are noisy” and “both make a loud 
noise”. When participants selected the perceptual choice (vase) in the context-lean 
condition they mainly reported perceptual reasons (“they both have the same shape”) 
followed by functional reasons (“they both contain things”). This pattern was reversed 
in the context-rich condition where functional reasons accounted for the majority of 
responses.   
  
Table AD23 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Gun Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action (48.78%) Perceptual (21.95%) Functional (9.76%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (71.70%) Action (15.09%) Functional (3.77%) 
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Rich Action Action (70.00%) Perceptual (10.00%) Autobiographical 
(6.67%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (78.57%) Action (7.14%) 
Thematic (7.14%) 
- 
 
Table AD23 shows the percentage of reasons given in the gun triad. The results 
hear appear confounded. When participants selected the action choice (cleaning spray) 
they mainly reported action as being the primary reason for doing so. However they 
also reported perceptual reasons in that some participants believed they looked similar 
because of the ‘trigger’ mechanism of operating both. In addition when participants 
selected the perceptual choice (hairdryer) they mainly reported perceptual reasons for 
doing so (“they both look similar”), but also reported action based on the general grip 
of the object such as “you have to hold them by the handle”. Therefore the gun triad is 
confounded in that participants reported both reasons for selecting both choices.  
 
Table AD24 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Peppermill Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Personal (40.00%) Action (30.00%) Functional (10.00%) 
Thematic (10.00%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (61.43%) Functional (12.86%) Mediating link 
(5.71%) 
Rich Action Action (84.62%) - - 
Perceptual Action (14.29%) Perceptual (9.52%) 
Functional (9.52%) 
Word feature 
(4.76%) 
 
Table AD24 shows the percentage of reasons given in the peppermill triad. The 
results show that when participants selected the action choice (hair wax) they did so 
because of the shared actions between them (“you have to hold the bottom and twist 
the top”) in both contexts, but primarily in the context-rich condition. In the condition-
lean condition participants were most likely to report personal reasons, often selecting 
the action choice simply because they preferred it (“I prefer hair wax”) or having never 
used the other (“I’ve never used spray-paint”). When participants selected the 
perceptual choice (spray-paint) they did so reporting different reasons in both contexts. 
In the context-lean condition they reported perceptual reasons (“they are both tall and 
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thin”) and functional reasons (“they release stuff”). In the context-rich condition 
participants mainly reported action based on the grip of the objects (“can be picked up 
in one hand”) along with perceptual and functional reasons.    
 
Table AD25 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Handbag Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (66.67%) Action (9.09%) 
Perceptual (9.09%) 
- 
Perceptual Perceptual (85.42%) Personal (4.17%) Functional (2.08%) 
Action (2.08%) 
Rich Action Functional (60.53%) Action (26.52%) Autobiographical 
(5.26%) 
Perceptual - - - 
Note. There were no reasons provided for grater in the context-rich condition because no participant selected this in 
the triads.   
 
Table AD25 shows the percentage of reasons given in the handbag triad. the 
table shows that when participants selected the action choice (cookie jar) they did not 
do so because of the shared actions. While participants did report actions they were 
much more likely to report functional reasons such as “they both contain things”. 
When participants selected the perceptual choice (grater) in the context-lean condition 
they mainly reported the shared perceptual reasons for doing so (“they look similar and 
both have a handle”).  
 
Table AD26 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Axe Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Action/Motion 
(48.48%) 
Functional (21.21%) Perceptual (9.09%) 
Personal (9.09%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (34.33%) Same material 
(28.36%) 
Functional (21.21%) 
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Rich Action Action/Motion 
(66.66%) 
Functional (16.67%) Perceptual (5.56%) 
Thematic (5.56%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (30.00%) Functional (20.00%) Category (15.00%) 
 
Table AD26 shows the percentage of reasons given in the axe triad. For the 
coding of the protocols, separate protocols were given based on the action of the object 
and the motion (e.g. often swinging objects). Within the axe triad these represent the 
same thing because it was designed with that in mind (that the object requires holding 
with two hands and swinging). Therefore for the current protocols here the action and 
motion protocols were combined to give an overall action/motion score. The results 
show that when participants selected the action choice (tennis racket) they mainly 
reported such action/motion reasons which accounted for the majority of their reasons 
in both contexts. Participants also reported functional reasons (“you use them to hit 
something”) and perceptual (“they make a loud noise when they hit their target”). 
When participants selected the perceptual choice (cane) they reported the shared 
perceptual characteristics for doing so claiming that the objects “look similar”. 
Participants also reported functional reasons (“you can hit something with it”), said 
that both were the same material and also stated that both were the same category, 
particularly that “both can be used as weapons”.   
 
Table AD27 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Baseball Bat Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Functional (34.62%) Action/Motion 
(20.52%) 
Perceptual (19.23%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (50.00%) Functional (13.33%) Thematic (6.67%) 
Mediating link 
(6.67%) 
Rich Action Action/Motion 
(38.15%) 
Perceptual (16.49%) Functional (13.40%) 
Perceptual Thematic (25.00%) 
Autobiographical 
(25.00%) 
Perceptual (12.50%) - 
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Table AD27 shows the percentage of reasons given in the baseball bat triad. As 
with the axe triad the action and motion scores were combined to provide an overall 
score. When participants selected the action choice (mace) in the context-lean 
condition some participants did report the shared actions as being the reason to do so, 
but the majority of participants selected the shared functions between the items as their 
primary reason (“you use them to hit something/both can be used as weapons”). The 
majority of participants in the context-rich condition selected the action choice because 
of the shared actions, but also stated perceptual (“both are long”) and because of 
functional reasons. When participants selected the perceptual choice (wrapping paper) 
in the context-lean condition they mainly did so because of the shared perceptual 
characteristics between them. However in the context-rich condition perceptual reasons 
did not account for the majority of responses, rather participants stated thematic (“you 
could wrap a baseball bat and give it as a Christmas present”) and autobiographical (“I 
remember a birthday party where my parents gave me a baseball bat”).   
 
Table AD28 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the USB Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Category (35.44%) Mediating link 
(29.11%) 
Functional (10.13%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (55.55%) Action (10.00%) 
Personal (10.00%) 
Functional (5.00%) 
Rich Action Action (37.72%) Category (26.52%) Functional (9.65%) 
Mediating link 
(9.65%) 
Perceptual - - - 
Note. There were no reasons provided for chewing gum in the context-rich condition because no participant selected 
this in the triads.   
 
Table AD28 shows the percentage of reasons given in the USB triad. When 
participants selected the action choice (phone charger) the shared actions only became 
a dominant reason to do so in the context-rich condition. Action did not account for a 
lot of protocols in the context-lean condition (8.86%). Rather participants selected the 
action choice mainly because of shared category information (“both are electronics”) 
and mediating links between them (“they can both connect to a computer”). This 
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means that this triad is problematic as they were designed with the intention of not 
sharing category information, and yet participants have assigned them a superordinate 
category membership. When participants selected the perceptual choice (chewing gum) 
in the context-lean condition they mainly reported the shared perceptual characteristics, 
but also reported action (“you can easily pick them up”), personal reasons (“I keep my 
USB and chewing gum in my bag”) and functional reasons (“chewing gum helps while 
I’m doing my coursework”).    
 
Table AD29 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Nut Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action Mediating link 
(29.41%) 
Action (23.53%) Perceptual (17.65%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (72.73%) Same material 
(21.21%) 
Functional (1.53%) 
Rich Action Mediating link 
(22.22%) 
Functional (18.52%) 
Action (18.52%) 
Thematic (11.11%) 
Same material 
(11.11%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (46.33%) Same material 
(36.00%) 
Thematic (2.67%) 
 
Table AD29 shows the percentage of reasons given in the nut triad. when 
participants selected the action choice (car key) they did report action as being a reason 
for doing so in both contexts, but were more likely to report mediating links between 
the items stating that “both are related to cars” or “you find them both in cars”. When 
participants selected the perceptual choice (money) the majority of their reasons was 
because of the shared perceptual characteristics (“both are small and round”) and the 
fact that they are made of the same material (“both are made of metal”). The majority 
of participants reported these in conjunction with one another and were highly likely to 
give both reasons within their protocols.  
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Table AD30 
The Top Features Used Accounting for the Highest Percentage of Protocols Given for 
the Action and Perceptual Choices in the Present Triad 
Context Choice Top Three Features Used 
1 2 3 
Lean Action One can be the other 
(54.55%) 
Perceptual (15.15%) Autobiographical 
(12.12%) 
Perceptual Perceptual (38.33%) Functional (26.67%) One can be the other 
(23.33%) 
Rich Action One can be the other 
(42.86%) 
Action (25.00%) Autobiographical 
(7.14%) 
Perceptual One can be the other 
(27.27%) 
Perceptual (24.24%) Functional (22.73%) 
 
Table AD30 shows the percentage of reasons given in the present triad. When 
participants selected the action choice (shoe) they only reported the shared action in the 
context-rich condition, but this was not the primary reason for doing so. Participants 
mostly reported that one can be the other, i.e. “you can give shoes as a present”. When 
participants selected the perceptual choice (storage box) they reported the shared 
perceptual features between them (“a present box looks like a storage box”), functional 
reasons (“you can keep things like presents in a storage box”) and also reported that 
one can be the other (“presents come in boxes”).  
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Information	Sheet		I	am	a	PhD	student	from	the	University	of	Hertfordshire	undertaking	a	study	into	semantic	knowledge.	Semantic	knowledge	is	one	form	of	long	term	memory	which	stores	information	regarding	the	world	around	us	and	objects	which	exist	in	that	world.			If	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	asked	to	complete	a	triad	choice	task.	The	whole	task	should	take	no	longer	than	15	minutes.			As	a	participant	you	will	be	asked	not	to	discuss	the	study	with	others	until	the	study	is	completed	in	March	2012.		You	will	have	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	now	and	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
Please	note	that	any	information	you	may	supply	today	will	only	be	used	for	
the	purposes	outlined	here.	You	may	withdraw	your	assistance	from	this	
study	at	any	time.		You	may	use	the	contact	email	address	below,	should	any	queries	or	concerns	arise	in	the	future.		Thank	you	for	your	participation.		Name	of	researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk		Ethics	protocol	number:	PSY/04/11/NS		
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Debriefing	Sheet		Thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	co-operation	in	taking	part	in	this	experiment.		The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	investigate	whether	knowledge	of	action	influence	how	we	select	objects	as	being	in	the	same	category.	Research	shows	that	our	knowledge	of	objects	is	weighted	in	favour	of	how	we	use	them.			Once	again	thank	you	for	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	further	questions	or	would	like	to	hear	of	the	outcome	of	this	study,	please	use	the	contact	details	below.		Name	of	Researcher:	Nicholas	Shipp		Contact	email	address:	n.j.shipp@herts.ac.uk	
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INSTRUCTIONS	
	The	task	here	is	a	similarity	judgement	task	whereby	you	have	to	indicate	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	how	similar	two	items	are.	Below	is	an	example	of	how	the	scale	will	be	set	out;		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		A	score	of	1	means	that	the	two	items	are	not	at	all	similar	to	each	other.	A	score	of	7	means	that	they	are	highly	similar	to	each	other.			Each	page	of	this	booklet	has	at	the	top	a	picture	of	an	object	(the	target	object).	Beneath	this	you	will	see	two	further	objects,	each	with	its	own	scale	of	1	to	7.	Your	task	is	to	compare	how	similar	each	of	these	objects	is	to	the	target	object.			Please	turn	the	page	to	begin	the	experiment.																										
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PENCIL		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	ELASTIC	BAND	to	PENCIL	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7									How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PAINTBRUSH	to	PENCIL		(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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SCREWDRIVER		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	HAMMER	to	SCREWDRIVER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	KEY	to	SCREWDRIVER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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AXE	
						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CANE	to	AXE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TENNIS	RACKET	to	AXE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				
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GLASS		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	JUG	to	GLASS	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CUP	to	GLASS	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
Appendix AG: Context-lean similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 396	
DRINK	BOTTLE		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MUG	to	DRINK	BOTTLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	JAM	to	DRINK	BOTTLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
Appendix AG: Context-lean similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 397	
BASEBALL	BAT		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WRAPPING	PAPER	to	BASEBALL	BAT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MACE	to	BASEBALL	BAT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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SPATULA	
						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CAN	OPENER	to	SPATULA	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SAUCEPAN	to	SPATULA	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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RIFLE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SWORD	to	RIFLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WATER	PISTOL	to	RIFLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				
	
Appendix AG: Context-lean similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 400	
USB	PEN		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CHEWING	GUM	to	USB	PEN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PHONE	CHARGER	to	USB	PEN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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PIN	
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SCREW	to	PIN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PLUG	to	PIN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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COMPUTER	
						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PRINTER	to	COMPUTER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PIANO	to	COMPUTER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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CLARINET	
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WOODEN	SPOON	to	CLARINET	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	BALLOON	to	CLARINET	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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DVD	PLAYER	
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CD	PLAYER	to	DVD	PLAYER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TELEVISION	to	DVD	PLAYER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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CALCULATOR	
						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SET	SQUARE	to	CALCULATOR	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MOBILE	PHONE	to	CALCULATOR	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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NUT		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MONEY	to	NUT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CAR	KEY	to	NUT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
Appendix AG: Context-lean similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 407	
	
BED		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SOFA	to	BED	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
	
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WARDROBE	to	BED	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
Appendix AG: Context-lean similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 408	
	
BOOK		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WALLET	to	BOOK	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	IPOD	to	BOOK	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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PRESENT		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SHOE	to	PRESENT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7								How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	STORAGE	BOX	to	PRESENT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
Appendix AG: Context-lean similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 410	
	
LEAFLET	
						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	NEWSPAPER	to	LEAFELT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	POSTER	to	LEAFLET	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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PAPERCLIP		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CLOTHES	PEG	to	PAPERCLIP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	RULER	to	PAPERCLIP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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COCKTAIL	SHAKER		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MARACAS	to	COCKTAIL	SHAKER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	VASE	to	COCKTAIL	SHAKER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
Appendix AG: Context-lean similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 413	
SPADE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TROWELL	to	SPADE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SHEARS	to	SPADE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				
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DEODORANT		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	INSECT	REPELLANT	to	DEODORANT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TENNIS	RACKET	to	AXE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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GUN		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CLEANING	SPRAY	to	GUN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	HAIRDRYER	to	GUN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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KETCHUP		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SALT	to	KETCHUP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
	
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	VINEGAR	to	KETCHUP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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KNIFE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SAW	to	KNIFE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	LADLE	to	KNIFE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				
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PEPPERMIL		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	HAIRWAX	to	PEPPERMIL	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SPRAYPAINT	to	PEPPERMIL	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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ORANGE	
						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	BANANA	to	ORANGE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7							How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	STRAWBERRY	to	ORANGE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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FAX	MACHINE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PHOTOCOPIER	to	FAX	MACHINE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TENNIS	RACKET	to	AXE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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HANDBAG		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	COOKIE	JAR	to	HANDBAG	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CHEESEGRATER	to	HANDBAG	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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INSTRUCTIONS	
	The	task	here	is	a	similarity	judgment	task	whereby	you	have	to	indicate	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7,	how	similar	the	two	items	are.	Below	is	an	example	of	how	the	scale	will	be	set	out;		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		A	score	of	1	means	that	the	two	items	are	not	at	all	similar	to	each	other.	A	score	of	7	means	that	they	are	highly	similar	to	each	other.			Each	page	of	this	booklet	has	at	the	top	a	picture	of	an	object	(the	target	object).	Beneath	this	you	will	see	two	further	objects,	each	with	its	own	scale	of	1	to	7.	Your	task	is	to	compare	how	similar	each	of	these	objects	is	to	the	target	object.			Please	turn	the	page	to	begin	the	experiment.																											
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PENCIL		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	ELASTIC	BAND	to	PENCIL	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PAINTBRUSH	to	PENCIL		(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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SCREWDRIVER		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	HAMMER	to	SCREWDRIVER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
	
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	KEY	to	SCREWDRIVER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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AXE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CANE	to	AXE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TENNIS	RACKET	to	AXE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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GLASS		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	JUG	to	GLASS	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CUP	to	GLASS	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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DRINK	BOTTLE		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MUG	to	DRINK	BOTTLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	JAM	to	DRINK	BOTTLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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BASEBALL	BAT		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WRAPPING	PAPER	to	BASEBALL	BAT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MACE	to	BASEBALL	BAT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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SPATULA		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CAN	OPENER	to	SPATULA	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SAUCEPAN	to	SPATULA	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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RIFLE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SWORD	to	RIFLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
	
			1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WATER	PISTOL	to	RIFLE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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USB	PEN		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CHEWING	GUM	to	USB	PEN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PHONE	CHARGER	to	USB	PEN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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PIN		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SCREW	to	PIN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PLUG	to	PIN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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COMPUTER	
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PRINTER	to	COMPUTER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7						How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PIANO	to	COMPUTER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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CLARINET	
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WOODEN	SPOON	to	CLARINET	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	BALLOON	to	CLARINET	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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DVD	PLAYER	
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CD	PLAYER	to	DVD	PLAYER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TELEVISION	to	DVD	PLAYER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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CALCULATOR		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SET	SQUARE	to	CALCULATOR	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MOBILE	PHONE	to	CALCULATOR	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
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NUT		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MONEY	to	NUT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7								How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CAR	KEY	to	NUT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7			
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BED		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SOFA	to	BED	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
	
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WARDROBE	to	BED	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
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BOOK		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	WALLET	to	BOOK	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	IPOD	to	BOOK	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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PRESENT		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SHOE	to	PRESENT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	STORAGE	BOX	to	PRESENT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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LEAFLET		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	NEWSPAPER	to	LEAFELT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	POSTER	to	LEAFLET	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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PAPERCLIP		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CLOTHES	PEG	to	PAPERCLIP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	RULER	to	PAPERCLIP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
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COCKTAIL	SHAKER		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	MARACAS	to	COCKTAIL	SHAKER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	VASE	to	COCKTAIL	SHAKER	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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SPADE		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TROWELL	to	SPADE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SHEARS	to	SPADE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7	
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DEODORANT	
	
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	INSECT	REPELLANT	to	DEODORANT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	HAIR	GEL	to	DEODORANT	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
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GUN		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CLEANING	SPRAY	to	GUN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	HAIRDRYER	to	GUN	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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ORANGE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	BANANA	to	ORANGE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	STRAWBERRY	to	ORANGE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
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KNIFE		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SAW	to	KNIFE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	LADLE	to	KNIFE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).		
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7		
Appendix AH: Context-rich similarity task used in Experiment 9.     
	 449	
	
PEPPERMIL		
			How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	HAIRWAX	to	PEPPERMIL	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SPRAYPAINT	to	PEPPERMIL	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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KETCHUP		
					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	SALT	to	KETCHUP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).			
	
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	VINEGAR	to	KETCHUP	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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FAX	MACHINE		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	PHOTOCOPIER	to	FAX	MACHINE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	TELEPHONE	to	FAX	MACHINE	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
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HANDBAG		
				How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	COOKIE	JAR	to	HANDBAG	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).				
		1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 	 7					How	similar	on	a	scale	of	1	to	7	is	CHEESEGRATER	to	HANDBAG	(1	=	not	at	all	similar,	7	=	highly	similar).	
	
	1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6	 														7		
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